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West Europe Report

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25 September 1985

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

PAPER SEES ' CATASTROPHIC' ELECTION OUTCOME FOR LIBERALS

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 5 Aug 85 p 10

[Editorial: "Conservatives or Liberals?"]

[Text] Fredriksborg County Newspaper is delighted that neither Anker Jorgensen, Poul Schluter nor Uffe Ellemann-Jensen alone will decide the outcome of the local elections in November.

The same cannot be said of the Hillerod paper. It is generally believed that Conservatives will win the mayoral races--at the expense of Liberals, but that nothing can be done about it.

Voters no longer know the local politicians and, hence, party perceptions become important. Consequently, top party figures will be playing a role. This will be catastrophic for the Liberal Party, not because Uffe Ellemann is not a good man, but because the Conservative Party has assumed the leading nonsocialist party role--and because the Liberal Party has so many mayors to lose!

The Liberal Party has mayors in many relatively small municipalities, where a modest voter turnout can be of great importance and tentatively cost a mandate. Furthermore, the Conservatives have "the prime minister effect," which also plays a role in local elections. Of course, the fact that the Liberal Party is less of a rural party than it once was--and has failed to compensate for it in the cities--also plays a role.

Yes, the top political figures could easily be important in local elections. They can hardly avoid being important, and voters will not avoid being made aware of their importance. Just wait till the election campaign gets under way. Top political figures will be traveling throughout the country to document the connection between state and local politics.

8952
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POLITICAL

DENMARK

ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN SEEN LEADING CONTENDER FOR LIBERALS' POST

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Aug 85 p 8

[Article by Carl Otto Brix]

[Text] Anders Fogh Rasmussen on his way to becoming deputy chairman of the national organization of the Liberal Party.

The young lions of the Liberal Party are roaring at the very center of power. The things that happened to people such as Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Bertel Haarder, and now a new generation of lions is coming forward. Anders Fogh Rasmussen is ready to take over the post of deputy chairman of the national organization of the Liberal Party after Hanne Severinsen, who will resign at the national congress in September after a deplorable tax case.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen is an ambitious person, and his career is according to the usual pattern. The son of a farmer in the county of Viborg, he received his degree in economics from the University of Århus. He held many posts locally and on the national level within the Liberal Party Youth Organization and then gradually entered the Folketing, elected in his home county, first as a deputy and then--in 1978-- as a regular member. There he sits firmly in his seat as successor to Gustav Holmberg, despite his young age. He is only 32 years old.

He thus embodies the combination of things which Liberals appreciate: Well rooted in the soil of his home county and with a good education, which means that he is able to participate in any discussion, which he does.

He has made himself well known in political circles as a gifted and eager participant in debates, especially on economic issues and issues concerning the housing situation. However, he certainly has not forgotten his liberal, ideological basis. He has written books on the subject. The very fact that he drew the attention to the ideology of the Liberal Party made him well known in wider circles.

The other government parties did not care for that, and the chairman of the Liberal Party had to call him to order. That, however, has not caused any barrier between them, and it is rumored that after that incident Anders Fogh Rasmussen received more invitations to speak than ever before.

He does not conceal the fact that he has big goals. The post of deputy chairman of the national organization of the Liberal Party could probably be well combined with a ministerial office.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen has got both the ambition, the ability and the looks for it.

7262

CSO: 3613/183

POLITICAL

FINLAND

CONSERVATIVES FORMING TOUGHER OPPOSITION ROLE FOR NEXT ELECTION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 Aug 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Ilkka Suominen Getting Tougher"]

[Text] The most interesting outcome of the summer convention of the Conservative Party's parliamentary group was the tough attitude of Chairman Ilkka Suominen while defining the opposition policy of his party. After a long period of unassertiveness, Suominen seems to have found a style which promises that the speeches about the party's opposition policy becoming more assertive and the quality of its content improving may be fulfilled.

Giving up all hope of being included in the cabinet before the parliamentary election of 1987 has made the position of the party better defined. On the other hand, it has been understood that concentration on carefree criticism of the cabinet and fruitless jabbering is not enough.

Suominen observed, quite correctly, that in order to obtain the desired success in the next election, the Conservative Party must be able to present more precise arguments in support of its criticism than before, as well as firm justifications for its own demands. Opposition policy must be challenging but, at the same time, offer concrete alternatives.

However, the basic problem of forming concrete alternatives became obvious when the parliamentary group was defining its budget demands. The demands of the Conservative Party do not have much significance now that the cabinet parties, wiser after last year's difficulties, have decided not to rely on opposition when drafting the budget. Therefore, the parliamentary group did not waste too much time on them.

In any case, the conservatives want the cabinet to initiate and incorporate the tax reforms concerning company taxation and marginal taxes in next year's budget and declare them to be the key concern of the party. In practice, the party's threats of resorting to its parliamentary strength are hardly enough for anything else than a vote of confidence, which has become all too routine. In spite of the tough tone, even the conservatives know that it is hardly possible to implement the tax reforms without further research. Also Pentti Somerto, the general manager of STK [Finnish Employers Association] has acknowledged its necessity.

Chairman Suominen seems to have taken the criticism of the parties' low ideological profile seriously. He was drawing the line between his party and social democracy with more strict and idealistic tones than has been heard for a long time.

According to Suominen, "Nordic social democracy has started to approach an ideological condition in which all property in society actually belongs to society...the conservatives, on the other hand, want a society of individuals." Suominen thought that it is about time to show the voters the true colors of the social democrats. However, the election is not until two years from now.

12956

CSO: 3617/158

POLITICAL

FINLAND

PAPER VIEWS CONSERVATIVES' MORE VIGOROUS OPPOSITION IMAGE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 17 Aug 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Suominen's Shotgun"]

[Text] A pump has also been found for Conservative Party Chairman Ilkka Suominen's double barreled shotgun on the eve of duck hunting season. Shots were fired at large as well as some small targets at the summer meeting of the party's parliamentary group in Kuopio.

Perhaps, one should ask whether Suominen attempted to take aim at too many targets. It is, however, good that a political leader presents his overall view on important questions in the early part of autumn and is not satisfied with hunting down publicity and gaining loose points by some conveniently ostensible initiative.

The primary target of the speech was, however, clear. The prime minister is the managing director of the government; he is responsible for the fact that energy solutions are delayed, that there is a threat of falling behind in the development of high technology, and that mistakes are being made in tax policy -- not to mention the fact that the labor minister is allowed to do anything he wants.

Kalevi Sorsa cannot shirk his responsibility even though the prime minister's formal position is not as powerful in Finland as it is in England and West Germany, for example.

The chairman of the largest opposition party must present a challenge to the prime minister, in particular. Indeed, Suominen should be continuously astonished at how the president and the prime minister are both from the Social Democratic Party in Finland even though the parliament is more bourgeois than it has ever been since World War II.

Labor Minister Urpo Leppanen's problems were not the main subject of Suominen's speech, but as a matter of timely urgency this question will, of course, become highly visible. The demand for Leppanen's resignation is not new, but is becoming ever more justified from day to day and from one billion-markka proposal to another.

Leppanen's accumulated efforts to eliminate unemployment in 6 months can already fill a large loose-leaf binder. The well-known excess of appropriations is not, on the other hand, disturbing as far as the amount is concerned, but -- as Suominen stated -- alarming as an administrative precedent.

The key ruling parties admit the Leppanen problem, but they do not dare to confront it out of a fear that they will make a martyr of the minister. The opposition must then preserve the government's internal discipline and outward prestige.

What is decisive is whether Suominen has sufficient vigor to push through his rather ambitious program. It means placing the government under the "watchful eye of all the rank and file" or the presentation of tough criticism and alternatives in all timely questions.

An opposition leader should concentrate on a few main themes close to the majority of the people and keep them visible for a sufficient amount of time. Suominen has had some interesting openings, but their continued development has been frequently cut short. An extreme example of this style is Finland's most imaginative but also most unsuccessful party chairman, Jaakko Itala.

Nevertheless, the establishment of points of emphasis cannot mean that the government's activities should be approved as such by other segments or that we should be satisfied with detailed criticism in the tranquility of parliamentary committees. However, important operations in the Conservative Party have been too much in the hands of the chairman. The members of its parliamentary group have been rather passive and even less has been heard from the groups of experts associated with the party office.

The injection of an interpellation means the immediate introduction of a debate on important economic policy questions and not sometime in the final phase of a budget debate or in next spring's income negotiations. The opposition should not grant the government a closed season on hunting in the early fall. The adjustment of marginal taxation as well as the reform of the business tax are questions of first priority which have been allowed to go too long without being tackled.

10576

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

SKDL'S NEW CHAIRMAN ESKO HELLE PROFILED

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 9 Aug 85 p 22-26

[Article by Tuomo Lappalainen: "SKDL's New Softie"]

[Text] To describe Esko Helle, the new chairman of SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League], exactly the same adjectives can be used as for Kalevi Kivisto, who moved to a governor's position: quiet, well-educated, greenish, softie...

Thus, the specialized dentist of Turenki is born to lead the party which, for a long time, has not considered even people with a master's degree for its leadership position.

Last autumn, when the president appointed Kalevi Kivisto governor of the province of Keski-Suomi [Central Finland], an open leadership crisis broke out in SKDL. The charismatic chairman, respected across the party lines, was leaving an opening for which there was nobody even in sight.

Finally, Esko Helle, 47, of Turenki, a first-term member of Parliament and a member of SKDL's National Council, was discovered for the position. It is typical of the present period of infocracy that the UUSI SUOMI, which at least in the people's democrats' own camp is recognized mainly as a mouthpiece for industry and business, was the first to introduce him as a potential candidate for the chairmanship.

The fact that it settled on Helle proves that SKDL still misses a conciliatory paternal figure like Kivisto. Both could be best defined as well-educated softies. Helle has a licentiate's degree in dentistry while Kivisto has the same degree in political science.

"On the background, there is a distinct ideological basis. Practical working style, however, is not pushy; therefore, being called a softie comes from the fact that we try and maybe know how to listen to other people as well. Which, however, does not mean that we could be lead into just any direction," asserts the new chairman.

His own ideological choice goes back to his childhood home. The father, an electrician, was an active local politician, part of whose trusted positions

have been passed on to his son. His wife Paula is presently the second vice chairman of the Town Council of Janakkala. The older daughter, a third generation people's democrat, has been elected into SKDL's District Commission.

Against this family background, it is quite easy to understand that it is useless to go and complain about young people's political passiveness to Esko Helle. No matter, that the People's Democrats' own organizational machinery is rapidly becoming senile and the party no longer has one single member of Parliament under 30 years of age.

"I guess most people understand that certain kinds of teams are needed to address common issues. I believe that the claims about politics not being interesting are quite superficial. For example, the low voter turnouts in local elections do not necessarily mean that people would not accept the parties as such. They just have not found a channel in them through which they could make their own wishes known."

In the same pile of rubbish Helle also puts doubts about the decay of parties' internal democracy. He believes that the members' possibilities to influence things have hardly diminished, at least not for the past couple of decades.

"However, the enhanced significance of the radio, press and television has lead to a situation in which issues are reflected through well-known names. Thus people may get the idea that these people address every issue and agree on everything."

"Even three years ago, it was useless to hope for publicity, no matter how sensible the speech was and even if summaries had been sent out. There was no other status than the chairmanship of SKDL. As a member of Parliament it has been easier to receive press coverage for even somewhat more stupid ideas. Now it will be exciting to see how well one can be heard in this position."

Welcome, Greens!

Recently, one of the things diminishing SKDL's support has been the rapid rise of the Green Movement into a considerable factor both in the national and local politics.

Ville Komsa and companies are luring voters with almost the same things which for years have been well-known from the People's Democrats' slogans: equality, environmental protection, solidarity, peace...

The same slogans which make the Greens and SKDL adversaries also create a basis for future cooperation:

"I would not at all consider it impossible that the Greens could operate within SKDL even as an organization. For them it is just a question of principle; they wish to stick to being independent," complains Esko Helle.

Another potential cooperative partner is SMP [Finnish Rural Party] which, at least in speeches, promotes the cause of society's disadvantaged groups.

"I must say, however, that I would classify the Greens and the Rural Party in quite different categories since the viewpoints that they represent are completely opposite. The Greens are looking more into the future, while SMP is living in the past. And SKDL, for its part, represents all kinds of viewpoints--as is appropriate in a party for maintaining vitality."

The new chairman himself is probably closer to the people thinking like the Greens?

"Well, yes, this is quite obvious if that is how you wish to say it. In the 70's, I was even involved in establishing a society called Janakkalan luonto ja ymparisto [Janakkala's Nature and Environment] and I guess I am still a member of the board. My participation has only tended to decrease."

Image Revision Ahead for Democrats

However, a key question, e.g. on SKDL's road to the cabinet, is cooperation with the other labor party, Social Democrats. Esko Helle believes that there is increased desire for cooperation on both sides.

"At least on our side we are quite ready for it. Of course, there are always those who want to set the mark so high, the conditions so tough, that they are difficult to achieve. But the majority disagrees."

"As far as I know, in SDP [Finnish Social Democratic Party] there is also considerable pressure toward revising the image of the head of the state, even in the parliamentary group, although it has not been very visible in the past few years. And in order to be able to do so, an inevitable prerequisite is a search for a certain common platform with us."

As areas suitable for practical cooperation, Helle mentions social and health issues, which have "considerable impact on social atmosphere." After a start has been made, also program cooperation can be discussed. However, it is not yet of current interest.

Recently Kalevi Kivisto made a peace offer to the Social Democrats by proposing that the incumbent president were nominated as a joint candidate for the left-wing parties in the 1988 election. At least as of now, his successor is not ready for the idea.

"The idea seems somehow distant, which was also proven by the fact that Kivisto's initiative did not lead into any significant discussion. Obviously the presidential election issue is in the thoughts, but it is difficult to grasp. Personally, I would not say anything at this stage, I cannot take a definite stand when I don't even have one. Let us return to the issue next spring."

"Of course, a search for a joint candidate is always possible. It is what the People's Democrats have repeatedly proposed for the past decades. But the Social Democrats have never even been ready to discuss it. Is it necessary for us to always profess that friendship very unilaterally?"

"I Am Not Dying to Get Into Cabinet"

At the turn of the year, SKDL will celebrate the third anniversary of its road in opposition. During all that time, the so-called socialists of the party have represented a platform according to which every effort should be made to get back into the cabinet as soon as possible. Even though they are not yet dying to get into the cabinet, several People's Democrats have begun to complain how hopeless it is trying to influence major platform issues while in opposition.

In the next few years Esko Helle will have to notice, probably more than once, that SKDL's maturity to get into the cabinet is measured, above all, by the development of the party's internal situation. It is no use to initiate discussions on distributing the ministers' jobs if the Communists' party disputes do not show signs of ending. It hardly is an advantage, either, that in the mutual disputes dissident party comrades have been branded even with an anti-Soviet stigma.

The chairman admits that the recent events clearly indicate how essential the influence of SKP [Finnish Communist Party] is in the development of the entire movement of People's Democrats.

"An organization is never a purpose in itself, it is a tool which is used to promote certain viewpoints. And a prerequisite for being able to address issues is obviously that the tools are in good shape. Within the past few years, when the main focus has been on organizations, the impact on society itself has remained rather secondary."

As regards the future, Helle is just as optimistic as is appropriate for a newly elected chairman. He thinks he is sensing a desire to get rid of unnecessary organizational policies. At the same time, the entire society is facing big value choices in which SKDL with its prescriptions does not intend to be an outsider.

"I do not foresee any other group which could bring the themes of equality and justice into public discussion in the same way. It is now fashionable to see only the average and the middle class; nobody speaks about the rights of those who are in the weakest position. People have not noticed that, in spite of the fairly advanced legislation, at the same time the support of collectivity has almost disappeared. Somehow, we have left ourselves at the mercy of civil servants and other professional helpers."

"Social benefits are now called income supplement, but to a large extent the spirit still remains the same. It is still humiliating to go to the social service agency where your income, property and consumption are all carefully investigated. The control is really strict. And it is most strongly focused on the people in the weakest positions and not so much on those who are reasonably well-to-do and who, on the other hand, are the first to complain about being mothered."

But who are the people in this class B who have been kicked in the head? Hardly skilled laborers, in whose names at least many Communists still swear as if they had never heard of the structural change in society?

"Well, not really," admits even Helle. "Young people, families with children, and people in the service industry, there we have the real proletariat of today."

"Well, I Am No Thinker..."

At the end of SKDL's last national convention, the chairman-elect wished the participants a hot summer. However, his own leisure time has remained rather sparse. Even July was spent mainly in preparations for the approaching winter of politics. Among the issues ahead is next year's budget, in which the left-wing opposition wishes to incorporate "a more down-to-earth viewpoint" and "an end to the over-emphasis of competitiveness."

"I have spent the past few weeks as if on vacation. I have not made up any tight daily schedules or planned on doing this and that tomorrow. Now, in August, things are already picking up. SKDL has province festivals on four successive weekends; I will be speaking in all of them. The work is piling up."

Esko Helle complains that there is hardly time for reading anything besides professional literature. At the time of the interview he was reading Professor Jorma Sipila's "Vaihtoehtoinen sosiaalipolitiikka" [Alternative Social Policy]. "Which is very interesting; nice thought combinations."

"Then I have tried to read quite a lot of history, Vinnish and even local history. The problem is only that, on the best days, I receive some fifteen papers, so that even skimming through them takes time. There is the difficulty of choice, and I do not think I have quite succeeded at that. I should be tougher and throw away things. But I am quite a collector, particularly paper must be saved."

However, a book by him is not yet to be expected, even though, in the middle of reading, "I sometimes may think of something."

"My goodness, I cannot do that. I do not consider myself a real thinker. But, for the sake of addressing issues, I have aimed at, even in local politics, including wider backgrounds, the framework. And, particularly in those circles, there is laughter and questions about how that applies to this."

To Socialism in the 2000's

The most important People's Democratic book of the year undoubtedly is Ele Alenius' "Sosialismin ideologia ja aikakauden muutos" [Ideology of Socialism and Change of Era]. It is surprising to note that Helle has not yet read it.

In his work, SKDL's former chairman considers the demands that the rapid development of science and technology places upon socialism as a doctrine. Among

other things, in the end he supports the elimination of the conflict-thinking of the industrial age.

"Of course we must keep our eyes open and observe what is going on in the world and how eventual changes are reflected in people's position," Helle comments. "It cannot be denied that this is where many labor leaders have repeatedly made mistakes and been held back. It has been assumed that society is what it seems in one's own thoughts, even if facts had indicated something else."

But in the end, everything depends on people's own actions. No law of nature presupposes that development has to progress in a certain way. Things could be done in some other way, in a way which would be better for a larger group of people. Let us think of economic decisions and their consequences..."

So, people in SKDL still strongly believe that some day Finland will switch over to socialism, even though the present support for the leftwing is less than forty percent.

When can we see such a miracle, Esko Helle?

"I guess I will not name the year. Even though the word socialism already has quite a few meanings now that the press often speaks of even socialist Sweden. In that regard, we could probably say that also Finland is already socialist, as some extreme conservatives think."

"Of course, such concepts as equality and justice do not exist as absolutes, but it does not mean that they could not be goals toward which we should aim. And this definitely requires interference with economic decision-making, at least some degree of its democratization. What sort of socialism it is--they can fight about that, as far as I am concerned--that is no longer essential."

"As far as I can see, this kind of development is gradually picking up speed again. But on the other hand, there is no such dramatic moment in sight that on such and such a day in the year seventeen we will switch over to the socialist system. Let us see when the year begins with the figure two where we are."

Esko Antero Helle

Born on 28 May 1938 at Janakkala.

Graduated from Hameenlinnan Lyseo [Hameenlinna High School] 1958. Licentiate of Dentistry 1966. Specialist in Dental Care 1980. University studies, among others in political history, political science, social policy and national health science.

Health center dentist at Janakkala since 1973; chief dentist 1973-78 and 1981-83.

Member of SKDL's National Commission 1967-70, National Council since 1976. Member of Socialists' Committee 1983-.

Member of SKDL's National Commission 1967-70, National Council since 1976. Member of Town Council at Hameenkyro 1969-73, at Janakkala since 1977. Second vice chairman of Town Council 1977-80.

Member of Presidential Electoral College 1978, member of Parliament since 1983.

Member of National Commission of TUL [Workers Sports League]. Hobbies include biking and spectator sports.

12956

CS0: 3617/158

POLITICAL

FINLAND

STALINIST CP ORGAN, CONSERVATIVE PAPER ON JOINING EUREKA

Siding With West Charged

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 16 Aug 85 p 12

[Commentary by Jaakko Laakso: "Finland is Being Tied to the West"]

[Text] The central goal of the Eureka project, concerned with Western European cooperation in high tech areas, is to create positions for the West European monopolies more competitive than those now in existence. The French government, of course, as one of the founders of Eureka, is at the same time primarily seeking advantages for large French enterprises.

The common research and product development activities planned within the Eureka framework economically supported by the nations participating in the project, lower the expenses of the large firms and thus make them more competitive.

At the same time the intention is to speed up capitalist integration and unification in West Europe and to tie those nations now outside the European Economic Council, EEC, even more tightly into the process. The solution has also its own foreign and security policy consequences. We must scrutinize Finland's participation in Eureka against this background, even though the large Finnish firms may be seeking new advantages for themselves.

According to Pekka Tarjanne, the director general of the Postal and Telecommunications Services, the invitation to Finland to join Eureka is as important to Finland as the EFTA and EEC decisions were formerly. Also according to Foreign Trade Minister Jermu Laine, "We are now at a crossroads. Tariffs have destroyed the ability of free trade to grow. The second generation integration phase is seen as an unavoidable precondition for European economic progress."

According to Laine the question concerning Eureka is primarily "about the ability of Western Europe to quickly realize 'European Technological Cooperation'." The European Economic Council, EEC, already has a plan on paper aimed at this.

Stated in plain Finnish, the statements by Tarjanne and Laine mean that, e.g. for the Finnish conglomerates the advantages brought about by the elimination of tariffs due to the EEC and EFTA free-trade agreements are no longer enough. Even further cooperation is necessary with the EEC.

"Unified Domestic Markets"

According to Minister Laine, "In the higher level unification process it is necessary to strive for realistic and unified domestic markets." And as strange as it may sound, by domestic markets the Finnish minister and former opponent of EEC free-trade agreements means all of Western Europe!

The thought of domestic markets covering all of Western Europe, however, is neither new nor Laine's own. For example, the English government has presented largely the same thesis about "domestic markets" now marketed by Laine. Eureka is being used as one means of strengthening capitalist unity, which has as its goal making Western Europe into a unified market region. The intention is to remove all obstacles in the way of "free trade" and "free enterprise" and to create for all Western European enterprises roughly the same legislative conditions for activity regardless of country. It goes without saying that this benefits the largest monopolies in the first place. The small and medium-sized enterprises functioning in the real domestic markets, on the other hand, will be experiencing even greater difficulties with unification.

In its memo concerning Eureka, the government of England suggests that "fresh initiatives" should be added to the project so that a free flow of labor would be made possible throughout Western Europe. England is especially interested in that "free movement" should apply to researchers. The "brain drain" from country to country should thus be eased with the aid of Eureka, likewise the flow of capital.

In comparing Eureka to EFTA and EEC, Director General Tarjanne is correct in that in all three there is a question of cooperation which is closed, not open, not pan-European, but restricted to West European countries. Socialist countries have been closed out of this cooperation.

The French news bureau, AFP, has noted that the Warsaw Pact countries were left out of Eureka on purpose because the high technology to be developed was intended also for the needs of the arms industries.

Minister Laine holds that possibilities of technological cooperation with socialist countries are restricted by the fact that Western Europe attempts to use Eureka to "speed up the potential of this level of enterprise to exploit research results economically." According to Laine a "decisive obstacle" might arise from the "suspicion of bias in the realization of benefits" since market availability is not "open" in "centrally directed socialist countries."

It is difficult to say whether Laine is fooling himself, since he is at any rate not able to deceive those following the developments with his claim that "Eureka's civilian nature in itself favors an exchange of ideas" with socialist nations. The bottom has completely fallen out from the assurances about Eureka's "purely civilian nature" and ostensibly the question in the assertions is above all about propaganda designed to aid cooperation with Eureka. Even a child understands that the results of high-tech cooperation not only can be, but will be used in the arms industry. Furthermore, involved are hundreds of firms working in the field of armament industries.

State to Pick up the Tab

Although, according to Laine, "the starting point is that Eureka's development projects are ideas that originate from the enterprises, which they are also willing to fund at length themselves, the state also plans to participate in the project by supporting enterprises with loans and guarantees. In "exceptional cases" the direct channelling of government funds may also become possible.

When acceptable presentations and proposals--which could be construed as projects--arise on the entrepreneurial level, public funds will not be lacking either, promises Laine. To be more exact, funds are not a problem, the lack of projects is, says the minister.

Cultural Minister Gustav Bjorkstrand, who had not been able to manage a state budget allocation even for a children's theater, has already hastened to demand "sufficient" funds for Eureka in next year's budget. Trade and Industries Minister Seppo Lindblom, on the other hand, refused to say anything about the funding of the project "until we are clear about the content of the project."

What kinds of sums would be involved then? According to the director general of the Technological Development Center, Juhani Kuusi, the funds needed for the Eureka project at the time of its actualization will be at least 320 million marks.

Who Leads Finland?

To make doubly sure, they have started painting pictures of doom depicting what would happen if Finland were left outside Eureka. According to Director General Tarjanne, being left out would mean "falling, being left behind, isolation, impoverishment and deterioration." The country's right-wing newspapers have written in the same vein in the headlines of their lead articles.

During the summer it appeared as if the large Finnish firms which were interested in Eureka were in control of Finnish foreign policy. A decision, the implications of which the foreign policy leadership could hardly have had time to ponder from all angles in detail, was made in

two weeks. Although the EFTA and EEC agreements were handled in Parliament, Parliament has been kept completely out of the Eureka negotiations. Neither parliament nor even its foreign affairs committee has had an opportunity to evaluate the project's foreign and economic policy consequences. The funding decision, on the other hand, will certainly be left to the parliament.

With Eureka, Finland will be tied to the West in ways which may be favorable to some large Finnish firms, but which in no case will serve the interests of the nation as a whole.

Columnist Answers TIEDONANTAJA Charges

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 19 Aug 85 p 2

[Commentary by Jukka Knuuti: "No Need to Fear Eureka"]

[Text] TIEDONANTAJA, the organ of the Taistolainen faction, devoted its cover and three inside pages of last Friday's issue to expressing its consternation about possible Finnish participation in the Eureka project, the results of which could be used for military as well as for civilian purposes.

TIEDONANTAJA is quite correct. The military can exploit Eureka research results. But by the same token, the military is always on the spot, watching and waiting to see whether industry is developing a new forest tractor or new long-lasting and well-insulating shoe sole material.

Eureka undoubtedly interests the military, especially when they see what matters, among others, are intended to be studied within the framework of the project:

- the development of optics and electronics with the goal of changing light energy into electricity;
- the development of new materials for electronic technology and the search for alternatives to coal fibers from among kevlar, ceramic, titanium, zirconium, aluminum and lithium compounds;
- the development of giant computers
- the development of super efficient lasers
- the development of artificial intelligence.

It would be useless to deny that just those areas which are studied in America in planning the Star Wars space defense system would be found on this list. But on the other hand, the list includes specifically the most important sectors of the most advanced technology.

When Eureka was called the European counterpart of the Star Wars, this did not mean that Europe was planning its own space defense system. No funds for this could be found in Europe. The intention is to gather

all the European industrial powers together so that the Yankees would not leave us a decade behind in development with the results of the great Star Wars research projects.

The Star Wars research will undoubtedly open completely new areas, even though the space defense system itself were never to be built, as is quite possible. According to the latest opinion polls only 41 percent of the Americans are in favor of the project, whereas in the spring 69 percent of the Yankees still believed in this daydream of Reagan's.

In addition, it is by no means certain that Eureka will ever be implemented. Let us use the EFA fighter plane project as a fresh example. On Thursday of last week it was definitively established that France will not join England, Italy, the German Democratic Republic and Spain on the intended common project. The French were insulted when they were not promised a leading role. This they demanded, pointing to the fact that they have the longest experience in Europe in building fighter planes, experience which is founded on the aggressively realized and successful sale of Mirage fighters to the developing countries.

In addition, Paris set its own secondary conditions for the type of plane in order to guarantee that a French-built engine could be installed in it and that it would be easy to sell to those developing countries which previously had bought Mirages as their next generation of fighter planes.

When the French could not get the majority to bend to their will, they withdrew from the game altogether, and now two different fighters are being designed in Europe.

It would not be at all surprising if we run into similar problems with Eureka. France could demand a leading role in it as well because its space technology is clearly ahead of others in Europe. And if all the conditions set by the French are not met, the whole project, which began so promisingly, could fall apart. The fall of the EFA project is the most recent, but probably not the last victim of the Napoleon complex of the French.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

PEACE STUDIES INSTITUTE MEASURES ATTITUDES ON WAR, DEFENSE

Helsinki KANSAN UUTiset in Finnish 16 Aug 85 pp 6-7

[Article: "Finns Believe in Peace Marches and Suspect Reservist Operations"]

[Text] Tampere--When asked, nearly 40 percent of the women and 30 of the men specified peace as the most important value in life.

Health was given second place (21 percent) in the list of priorities, the country's independence was given third place (13 percent), and the salvation of one's soul was given fourth place (9 percent).

Values given less priority were good human relations, the elimination of hunger in the world, a good income, and environmental protection. Such issues as "work for everyone", "equality between peoples", and the opportunity "to accomplish something of importance" were listed last in the order of priorities.

This was the result of a report just completed by the Research Institute of Peace and Conflict. The study, which was funded by means of the parliament's budget, was conducted by Pertti Suhonen, Tapio Varis, Unto Vesa, and Hannu Virtanen.

An Active Foreign Policy Is Guarantee of Security

The researchers presented those being interviewed with 12 such measures by which supposed or real security can be increased. The respondents grouped these measures into three distinct categories:

In the opinion of the respondents security is increased the most by an active foreign policy, the work of friendship societies, work for peace on the part of citizens, the increased role of women in the decision-making process, a more effective civil defense, and the initiation of disarmament.

Such measures as reservist operations, increasing defense appropriations, or the transfer of emphasis to a civilian resistance clearly received less support.

The least support was given to proposals for extending the service time of recruits, compulsory military service for women, and joining military alliances.

A World Government Does Not Receive Support

The respondents were able to select from 23 measures those which they believe would best guarantee world peace.

The most generally supported measures were:

- strengthening of the UN
- increased trade, cultural, and other cooperation
- development of peaceful relations at the family level, in schools, and in the immediate vicinity
- noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries
- the elimination of hunger and poverty from the world as well as increased technical aid to developing countries.

Peace strategies the least supported by the Finns are:

- an effective world government
- the thinking that countries should have less to do with each other
- the proposal that an economy based on the public ownership of capital should be instituted throughout the whole world
- the membership of all states in military alliances as well as
- people becoming more religious throughout the whole world.

Peace Marches Good, Movements Not?

The researchers presented those being interviewed with five arguments supportive peace movements and five against.

On the basis of the study the majority of Finns has a rather positive attitude toward the peace movement. It is considered that it supports a peaceful foreign policy, unites various civic groups, and brings people closer to one another. It is also quite generally thought that the peace movement provides an impetus to governments to adopt peaceful measures and reduce the risk of war.

The question on the representativeness of the peace movement divided the respondents: nearly one-third was pretty much of the same opinion with the argument that the peace movement represents a small minority.

One in ten Finns declared that he had participated in peace marches or demonstrations. More than 70 percent of Finns believes that the reduction of armaments can be influenced by peace marches and demonstrations.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

INTERPOL ROLE IN FINLAND SURVEYED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Aug 85 p 29

[Article by Asta Sjoblom: "Interpol Is Also Investigating"]

[Excerpts] Crime has become increasingly international. International crime means that it is planned and committed in several countries, the criminal escapes from a country after committing a crime or smuggles stolen articles abroad. The characteristics also include the fact that similar crimes are committed simultaneously in several different countries.

When it is suspected that a criminal is attempting to escape abroad, usually the assistance of the International Cooperative Police Organization or Interpol is requested. Recently, Interpol has been needed in solving the shotgun murders in Aatra and the Tillander jewelry theft, among others.

Interpol has 136 member countries, and Finland has been a member since 1928. Only Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia have joined Interpol from Eastern Europe. China became a member last year.

Nearly 10,000 Inquiries to Finland

Even though Finland is considered to be a secure country because of its geographical location, small population, language, and strict legislation regarding aliens, nearly 10,000 inquiries are sent to Interpol's Finland section every year. "The majority of them is connected with drug crimes. The second largest group relates to economic crimes," says Kari Rantanen, chief of Interpol's Finland section.

"Finland's affairs are in relatively good order, but we must still be prepared for all possibilities. The danger of organized crime entering Finland does exist. There have been individual incidents, but no individuals with connections to the mafia, for example, have remained here permanently."

Last year Finland's Interpol communicated with 50 countries. Most frequently it works with the other Nordic countries as well as West Germany and England. "We handle about 50,000 cases a year and we send out nearly 400 surrender requests. For example, property crimes committed by Sweden's Finns cause a lot of work for us," calculates Rantanen.

Countries normally exchange information which will help an investigation, the recognition, finding, and surrender of a criminal. Sometimes the information can, however, be delayed. "We have a general feeling for the way in which countries generally operate, how long an answer will take, or whether it will ever be obtained. There are countries in which answers are difficult to obtain. Interpol cannot issue directives that are binding on a nation."

Terrorism is "small bugbear" for Interpol since crimes which are of a political, military, religious, or racial nature are outside of the organization's operations according to its regulations. Drawing a line is, however, extremely difficult. "Beirut's car bombs do not fall under our jurisdiction. On the other hand, we received information about the recent bombings in Copenhagen and Frankfurt since they were not purely the affair of one country, but concerned several countries."

Interpol also trains the police of member countries, and the trainees are made especially familiar with drug and economic crimes as well as forgery.

The international cooperation of the police could be made easier according to Rantanen. "A European general agreement on legal assistance was concluded in 1981. Direct ties between police were not established in it, but matters should go through legal officials. Unfortunately, in Finland the police is not a 'legal official'. This slows down our work. Some issues with Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, in particular, cause difficulties. Before there was a 'wild situation', matters were handled directly.

Kari Rantanen has been chief of Interpol's Finland section since 1981. Rantanen has experience in Interpol's basic investigations also. Counterfeits of the valuable Helsinki Olympic medal cast in 1951 were disclosed in Finland in the middle of the 1970s. The trail led to Beirut.

"A Finnish intermediary had given the medal to a certain jeweler. We learned the name and I went to Beirut where I had been the year before also.

"The jeweler was waiting for a Finnish intermediary who was supposed to come and pick up a consignment of 'rare collection pieces'.

"I acted as the pick up man, and I had a bundle of counterfeit dollars. The attempt did not succeed the first time, but I had to visit the jeweler five times -- while the Lebanese police were inconspicuously protecting me from behind. Since I had written policeman as my occupation on the the hotel registration, I had to reserve another room. Naturally, I was not in the room when the counterfeiters of the medals called, but they left a message and number, which was transmitted to the police station. It also turned out that Montreal Olympic medals were being made in the same shop."

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

SECURITY POLICE DIRECTOR WANTS INCREASED POWERS TO DO JOB

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Aug 85 p 29

[Article by Harri Nykanen: "Protector of Finnish Lilliputians"]

[Text] "Peaceful Finland is an exception in a bad world," says Security Police Director Seppo Tiitinen. Nevertheless, he wants more authority for the police.

Finland is one of the last lands of the Lilliputians in a bad world; a place where international terrorism does not reach. Finland's protection has been its location, language, a neutral friendship in all directions, and an understanding alien affairs office and a prudent labor policy in addition to national security.

This is the praise given by Security Police Director Seppo Tiitinen.

However, there must be enough snakes even in paradise so that there are sufficient jobs for the Security Police and reason for its existence.

The 7 years that Seppo Tiitinen has directed the Security Police is a short time, but the wish list is longer. For the police and the Security Police he wants a security law which would always be ready for implementation in certain exceptional situations, but still under strict control. Tiitinen also does not oppose granting the Security Police the right to listen in on telephone conversations.

Police directors have wanted a permanent security law since the first CSCE meeting for future conferences. In 1983 the Security Police submitted a memorandum to the Interior Ministry, in which it was stated that a security law or more precisely a protective powers act is necessary.

Tiitinen would like the security law to be a so-called safety box law, which by a decision of the government could be put into effect when required. "In fact, the ratification of an international treaty concerning diplomatic protection would also presuppose sufficient powers based on the law in order to meet treaty obligations," says Tiitinen.

Opponents of the law have pointed out that a security law would restrict civil rights guaranteed by the constitution and would grant the right to interfere in them on the basis of a haphazard assumption. In addition, the government is considered as too small of a group to decide on the application of this law. These arguments were also used against this summer's temporary CSCE law.

In Seppo Tiitinen's opinion the press in the Nordic countries has unjustifiably scorned the security law -- the press in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark without even seeing the beam in their own eye. According to Tiitinen, the CSCE security law temporarily gave Finland's police approximately those rights which are continuously in effect in neighboring countries.

"What got me the most was that in Denmark, a country in which the police can open letters every day, they decried how such a thing can happen in a democracy," says Tiitinen with indignation in his voice.

In Denmark the police can open letters and listen to telephone conversations with the permission of the courts. Also other forms of eavesdropping is permissible if a serious crime can be prevented or solved by this action. Such measures can be taken even without permission of the courts in emergency situations.

Criticism Was Echo from Finland

Tiitinen is not even otherwise satisfied with the articles on the CSCE. "Issues were placed in the wrong order of priority. Security arrangements were made at least quantitatively more important than the meeting itself. This gave cause for foreign writing, for which there was no real basis."

Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish newspaper articles condemning the security law were in Tiitinen's opinion mere echoes of that fuss which was raised in Finland for a lack of other news and correct information.

Neither is any praise given to an article published by a Swedish paper during the CSCE meeting, according to which Finland acts contrary to international agreements and returns all defectors from the east like a boomerang. Tiitinen says that the paper quoted a statute issued with respect to unintentional border crossings, but misinterpreted its application.

In the statute it states that an individual who has unintentionally crossed the border must be returned to his own side of the border as quickly as possible. According to the Swedish paper, the statute is applied in Finland in cases of defection also.

Tiitinen disputes this interpretation: "Intentional border crossings are clarified in accordance with the law pertaining to aliens and international agreements. Finland does not make policy by selecting suitable incidents and does not distinguish from which country a defector comes.

"We observe the international refugee treaty to the letter. Sweden, on the other hand, uses greater deliberation.

Tiitinen recalls at least two incidents in which a Soviet defector has been transported through Finland to someplace other than back to his homeland by means of applying stipulations in the treaty on refugees. These incidents took place in the 1970s. According to the alien affairs office, the same number of individuals attempting to defect was turned back in the 1970s. On the other hand, in a period of a couple years five people defected through Finland without making any contact with local authorities.

"Such peaceful conditions as we have in Finland began to become exceptional in this bad world," says Tiitinen. He joins those who praise the legislation regarding aliens and the results of the precisely selective alien policy accomplished under its control. Its objectives are in line with the objectives established by the Security Police.

"Our alien policy takes our own country's interests into consideration," he emphasizes.

The Security Police even eases the work load of the alien affairs office; it provides a statement on individuals who want to remain in the country. According to Tiitinen, Finland remains an unattainable illusion for terrorists. Information on foreigners is also obtained from other security services. "The Security Police cooperates with those countries which have the same understanding of terrorism as Finland in the question of terrorism," admits Tiitinen.

All the Nordic countries and many Western European countries have nearly the same understanding of terrorism. Finland defines, if the matter is slightly simplified, terrorism as an act of violence, by which an attempt is made to persuade a government to make decisions which do not correspond with a state's own interests.

Tiitinen also praises labor policy. "A correct decision was made on a foreign labor force during the shortage of labor in the early 1970s. It was then decided to get by on our own resources, and now we have avoided those problems which exist in many Central European countries which have used immigrant labor. Foreign immigrant communities promote operational conditions for international terrorism."

Besides Iceland, Finland is the only Western European country in which no actual acts of terrorism have taken place. The reputation of being a good boy is also a weapon according to Tiitinen. Terrorism is partially discouraged by the fact that terrorist acts here do not receive any positive publicity.

"The problem of terrorism is possible in Finland also," points out Tiitinen. "The fomenting of hysteria must, nevertheless, be avoided," he advises. "We have observed the situation rather carefully elsewhere in the world and in Europe, in particular, and preventive measures have been taken," says Tiitinen.

Secrecy of Telephone Conversations Will Not Be Preserved

Over the years the Security Police have many times been accused of tapping telephones. The accusation has been denied just as many times.

Seppo Tiitinen denies phone tapping once again, but admits that he finds more good than bad from tapping telephone conversations.

The police have promoted phone tapping primarily to assist in the investigation of major drug crimes. In Tiitinen's opinion it is not primarily a question of civil rights or their restriction in the matter of phone tapping, but rather the more effective protection of national interests.

Tiitinen justifies phone tapping by, among other things, the fact that the secrecy of a telephone conversation is no longer inviolable even otherwise.

"Each time a citizen makes a phone call abroad, his conversation is subject to numerous violations of privacy. Each time a citizen phones through a domestic telephone link, his conversation can be heard. Every telephone call from an automobile is broadcast to a large audience. The secrecy of a telephone conversation in Finland at this time is fiction," says Tiitinen in answer to those who oppose phone tapping.

The opponents of phone tapping suspect that when this is made permissible, restrictions will be disregarded.

In Tiitinen's opinion the rights to phone tapping should be precisely defined so that abuses can be avoided. Control could be handled in the same way as in Sweden or other Nordic countries, for example, in Tiitinen's opinion.

In Sweden the police can listen to telephone conversation with the permission of the courts. The director of an investigation decides on the examination of telegrams and mail. The so-called terrorist law gives the Swedish police additional rights with respect to foreigners.

In addition, in Sweden there is a permanent law on coercive means, by which an attempt is made to prevent those who would endanger national security and other heinous crimes. On the basis of this law documents can be confiscated and in an emergency, telephone conversations can be tapped without prior approval of the courts.

In Norway the police can listen to telephone conversations and examine the mail and telegrams for a specific reason.

Security Police Emphasizes Prevention

According to Tiitinen, the resources of the Security Police are approximately one-tenth of those of the Swedish Security Police -- they have been alleged to be exaggerated -- and half of the resources in other Nordic countries. The Security Police is placing increasingly greater emphasis on prevention, says Tiitinen. "The purpose is to obtain an operational security system suitable for us, by which we can manage even in the future without the Security Police becoming a mammoth organization."

The system will work in such a way that business firms which are vitally important from the point of view of national security would be trained to develop

their own internal security and surveillance systems. If necessary, the Security Policy will provide training either by means of seminars or directly to individual firms. In addition, the Security Police will give "important" firms and offices information on job applicants, especially those seeking employment in state offices, in accordance with the guidelines of the Interior Ministry.

Nevertheless, sometimes it is possible to deliberately not do anything according to the system. If there is too strong a hold in the wrong situation, the other side may acquire a martyr's halo, which would promote an idealist cause.

The activities could even be so innocuous that the organization being observed is allowed to keep its director who has been labelled peculiar or a buffoon. An organization is a small wheel as long as everyone weighs it according to its leader. For example, the fate of the neo-Nazis is in the hands of their national leader, Pekka Siitoin. The Green movement cut its own throat by allowing Pentti Linkola to speak favorably about terrorism at one of its meetings.

Tiitinen continues to support the idea he proposed years ago. He wants to include citizens in the struggle against spies. "However, there is no reason to foment xenophobia." Tiitinen believes that the Security Police reflects the attitude of the average Finn toward foreigners quite well.

"Our own citizens are not felt to be a threat. The threat comes from somewhere else. And even a small piece of information may be important so that we can succeed in the struggle between states in this bad world."

Tiitinen says that information provided by watchful citizens has been the clue to several cases. For example, information provided by an outsider can be of tremendous importance in the prevention of terrorism.

Seppo Tiitinen concisely defines the task of the Security Police: "The Security Police represents a defense weapon at the disposal of the state against actions detrimental to the interests and fundamental rights of Finnish citizens."

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POLITICAL

GREECE

PAPANDREOU SEEN COMPELLED TO BEAR OWN RESPONSIBILITIES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 5 Sep 85 p 5

[Editorial: "Let Him Stay, To Pay the Bill!"]

[Excerpts] Mr Papandreou has called on the opposition to propose measures for the "stabilization of the economy." It is a logical statement. It is very natural for Mr Papandreou, once he has rejected his own responsibility for the plummeting of the economy to the point of panic, to attribute once again to the opposition the responsibility for... not finding solutions for the economic disaster!

The prime minister and founder of the PASOK believes that this invitation to the ND is a clever maneuver in order to maintain the support of the "progressive" sector of the voting public for the "historic usefulness" of his "movement." Which sector of "progressive" voters will attribute to the opposition the responsibility for denying its assistance to the PASOK in order to extricate the guiltless "movement" from its difficult position!

Unfortunately, Mr Papandreou's calculations are not unfounded. There are some among the 46 percent of the voters--perhaps a majority--who refuse to criticize developments, refuse to admit that the party of their choice has failed. They continue to believe that the various grants and "victories" secured for them by the "movement of socialist transformation" against their duty toward efforts aimed at productivity, will be taken away from them, were the right to return to power. While they would continue to "cash in," to be appointed to the civil service and to demonstrate for 'Arafat and Ortega under PASOK governments!

An attempt to enlighten them about their terrible error will not be very fruitful. Not only because the most persuasive information means--radio and television--are in the hands of the PASOK. But also because experience is not passed on. It is acquired!

From this starting point, we shall disagree with the ND's reply to Mr Papandreou's invitation. That the only proposal it can make is that the party should relinquish power.

This would be the worst blow to the essential and long term interests of the national economy and Greek society. The PASOK must not leave before the

majority of the people who supported it is persuaded that it was a partisan conglomeration clearly inimical to the country's interests. We say inimical, because it never took a positive interest in them. Its only goal was power and its preservation at all costs!

Who can believe that Mr Papandreou, who is now proclaiming that "we cannot consume more than we produce" did not know where his insistence, beginning in 1974, to incite the workers to consume more than they are producing--more than, indeed, the "scorched earth" could produce--would lead?

Why was he saying all this at the time? Why was he repeating it in this year's campaign? Didn't Mr Papandreou the economist know that a direct consequence of this "economic policy" would be the destruction of the economy and, as a result, of the workers' standard of living? Didn't he know that the elevation of the "lesser effort" in labor to an "ideological motto" would turn into a "workers' gain" that no one could easily undo? That would destroy the economy and society?

Mr Papandreou and his staff, who did not react at the time, and are not reacting today to this method of achieving and preserving power, should "remove the chestnuts from the fire" by themselves. They should make their enthusiastic supporters understand that unless they reject what has been termed to date "the course toward socialism" and unless economically wise measures are adopted, our bankruptcy will be unavoidable. Thus will the PASOK contribute, as much as it is possible, of course, to the deliverance of Greek society from the decomposing illusions with which it endowed it. This is the kind of "therapeutical education" that no one else should attempt! And for which no one else should pay!

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POLITICAL

GREECE

INFLUENCE OF NEPOTISM IN POLITICS SEEN NEFARIOUS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 21 Aug 85 p 6

[Article by K. Kollmer: "Neo-Hellenic Nepotism"]

[Excerpts] We are witnessing in our country--and not only in recent years--a phenomenon related to political power, which is called "family-cracy." That is, the appointment and the use of persons from the immediate family entourage of the head of the government and of the leaders of the principal parties, in public administration and party apparatus positions. Which happen to be called, not coincidentally, "key positions."

Today, in the developed countries of the West, the appointment of family members to the party--and even more importantly, the government--is both inadmissible and harmful.

In our country, on the contrary, not only are members of political leaders' families appointed advisors or managers of their personal power, but they are often elected deputies (thanks to the "list"). However, the greatest contribution of neo-Hellenism to nepotism is the appointment of family members to various ministries, solely on the merit of their family membership. Nothing else!

Dynastic Frame of Mind

One should not wonder, perhaps, since our psychology, as a people, still includes the remains of dynastic memories. Moreover, part of our people--approximately 14 percent of the electorate--are vividly influenced by the examples of comrades Ceausescu, Zhivkov and Castro, who--besides the fact that they are well-known "friends" of Greece (or so it is repeated by naive Greek politicians)--are in the vanguard of the road to socialist rationalization through the appointment of members of their families to the government or even to academies of sciences (they are subsequently awarded degrees by dumb Greece).

However, the Greek "characteristic" is that, after San Domingo, our country is the only Western nation where the practice of nepotism is an enshrined institution, against which no one protests any longer. Besides, it is a practice permitted by the constitution, which is very strict in other cases.

The reason for the enshrinement of nepotism derives rather from the fact that the family, in our country, is still a "holy," untouchable institution, ever-present in our tradition.

This, of course, explains why in Greece unemployment is officially put at 3.5 percent (the remaining percentage, up to 11 percent, is taken care of by the unemployed worker's family).

This is easy to understand: just like unemployment in our country is a family adventure, politics is also a family business. And just as the costs of unemployment are borne by the family--thus relieving the OAED [Labor Force Employment Organization]--thus the paraphernalia of power are channeled to the unemployed members of the family who acquire a "secure" political future, at the expense of the country's future.

Close Ties

However, the ties between politics and family are closer in Greece than between family and unemployment.

There are two reasons for that: the first refers to psychology. And a Freudian psychologist would be more competent to analyze it. The libido of power in the family of a politician of Greek "origin and manufacture" resides in the invincible desire to have all the members of the family participate in the orgy of politics. This almost sexual urge is reinforced by the belief of each political leader that there is no "honor"--and thus confidence--beyond the family. Therefore, how could the family trust to outsiders the mysteries of the political orgy?

"Can you trust an outsider with all this?" Never.

However, there is another, more practical reason for the existence of "family-cracy" in our country: the survival of the family. In the past, a good father used to make his only son swear not to get mixed up in politics--with everything else permitted. The reason was obvious: the family name and the family fortune were threatened with certain destruction. Whoever entered politics lost his fortune and almost always left his family destitute.

Today, whenever one enters politics poor, he exits as a plutocrat. Does anyone object to that?

Now the reverse is true: politics must not be avoided: the field of politics is a glorious one, that is inherited with all the rules of inheritance rights, both directly and indirectly (in the absence of direct descendants). As if it were a matter of holdings or latifundia, or a stockbroker firm.

And rightly so! Because politics within the family, or, better, the family in politics secures many advantages--not necessarily all of them financial.

Biological Degeneration

This analysis, however, lacks the critical element of time. The so-called time path [English in the original] where whatever remains static disappears in the long run because of a biological law which has more to do with the endurance of the species than with the struggle by the others to replace it.

Thus, in the post-war years, we witnessed this process, where the absence of biological power in the members of political families did not allow their survival, at least as dynasties. Of course, this does not mean that the country did not suffer from their administration, even if historically brief. This is a fundamental reason for our country's underdevelopment, when one considers the almost fanatical devotion of illustrious politicians to their deficient direct family environment.

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POLITICAL

ICELAND

GENERATIONAL CHANGE, POLICY DECISIONS FACE PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE

Reykjavik MANNLIF in Icelandic Jul 85 pp 12-16, 19-20

[Article by Dr Svan Kristjansson: "People's Alliance at the Cross Roads"]

[Text] It cannot be denied, however, that the Social Democratic Party will die and soon belong to the past. The People's Alliance, however, will aim unwaveringly to fill the gap that the Social Democratic Party will leave behind it. (Ragnar Arnalds, 1974)

When the delegates gathered together at the People's Alliance National Convention in November 1974, they could be contented with the position of their party and with its future prospects. The era of powerlessness, when the biting winds of the Cold War blew around the nation, was long past. The People's Alliance had held its own in the elections of 1971, in spite of the large victory of the Alliance of Liberals and Leftists, the principle leaders of which were once influential in the People's Alliance: Hannibal Valdimarsson and Bjorn Jonsson. Their departure had been serious damage for the party; Valdimarsson was the chairman of the party during the entire period from its foundation in 1956 to 1968 and was likewise president of the Icelandic National Association, while Bjorn Jonsson was both an MP and one of the most important leaders of the labor movement and later Valdimarsson's successor as president of the Icelandic National Association.

The Alliance of Liberals and Leftists was in the dust heap after the elections of 1974; they lost half of their support and received only two Althing delegates in place of five before. Hannibal Valdimarsson withdrew from politics. Bjorn Jonsson entered the Social Democratic Party while Bjarni Gudnason, a former Alliance MP, founded the new Liberal Party, which advanced a candidate for the May 1974 mayoral elections with very little success.

Leftist groups in the People's Alliance for a time maintained a severe criticism against deceit and compromise within the party in the struggle with capitalism. These groups were small but well often well ordered and had a certain influence among young radicals, especially students in secondary

grammar schools, at the Icelandic National University and among Icelandic students abroad. The most radical also worked within various leftist associations. There may be mentioned the Alliance of Military Base Opponents and the Vietnam Movement.

Two leftist groups (The Battalion--a militant association of socialist, and the Communist Alliance--Marxist-Leninist) offered candidates in the 1974 Althing elections and many thought that they would achieve some success, especially in view of the broad discontent with the Leftist government that the People's Alliance had participated in during the years 1971-1974, along with the Alliance of Liberals and Leftists and the Progressive Party. Reference was eagerly made to the fact that the government had promised that the garrison force would leave Iceland, something that did not take place. The electoral campaign of the two "revolutionary parties" did not turn out so well for them, to say the least. One could almost in fact say that they received their death blows as parties: the communist groups offered candidates in Reykjavik and received 121 votes and the Battalion received a total of 200 votes in two electoral districts, Reykjavik and the Reykjanes.

The Social Democratic Party had suffered a loss in the Althing elections of 1971, receiving only around 10 percent of the vote, and the party lost still more in 1974, fell to 9 percent of the vote and received one Althing delegate, Gylfa Th. Gislason, for only one electoral district, and four alternates. The People's Alliance, on the other hand, received half again as much support as the Social Democratic Party in 1974 and 11 Althing delegates, including electoral district Althing delegates in all districts except for the West Fjords District.

People's Alliance on the Rise

Many would say that the development of a three party system in Iceland was underway, whereby three comparatively large parties--a city party (Independence Party), a rural party (Progressive Party) and a labor party (People's Alliance)--would compete for the allegiance of the voters. Thereby the People's Alliance would occupy a pivotal position in terms of coalition with one of the other large parties, or better, in opposition. The prospect was that the People's Alliance would become the integrating force for the Icelandic labor movement, something that the Icelandic socialists had always striven to be and we may mention in this connection the predecessors of the People's Alliance: The National Alliance Party and the Socialist Party. The following was also written in the first article of the People's Alliance Party Charter:

The People's Alliance is a socialist political party, based upon democracy and parliamentarianism. The People's Alliance is the party of all Icelandic leftists that desire to protect and secure Icelandic national independence, guard the interests of laboring people and ensure general progress in Iceland based upon a spirit of society and of cooperation. The primary aim of the party is to achieve socialism in Iceland.

Ragnar Arnalds, chairman of the People's Alliance Party, did not conceal his pleasure in his installation address to the 1974 party congress and others felt the same way. The People's Alliance was a party of a new sort, in the view of its chairman, and was neither a communist nor a social democratic party but a combination of the best from those old opponents. The party thus signified an evolution in the history of leftist movements in the world. Arnalds said:

It was truly noteworthy last Summer when new and powerful leftist forces suddenly sprouted in Norway among the social democrats and put 17 representatives into the Storting after many decades of socialist and communist decline in Norway, and how much this mass movement is similar to the People's Alliance in policy and in political emphasis. Various leaders of the socialist elections alliance have stated in no uncertain terms this victorious alliance is in fact an enlarged reproduction of the Icelandic People's Alliance. (THJODVILJINN 23 Nov 74)

Arnalds saw no need to counter the Alliance of Liberals and Leftists or groups to the left of it and referred instead with these words to the Social Democratic Party, mentioned in the beginning of the speech.

What Were the Hopes Based Upon?

What was the basis of the hopes that the People's Alliance would become the indisputable leader of leftists? What is the position of the party in Icelandic politics in 1985?

Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, chairman of the People's Alliance Executive Committee, has said: "The People's Alliance is in collapse; it claims to be the leadership party for the labor movement without being so."

These are very clear words. Grimsson was close to saying that the People's Alliance is now so far from being the leadership party for Icelandic wage earners that such an assertion is little more than a joke or a sign of the major changes that have taken place in Icelandic politics.

Loss of Support and Resignation

The People's Alliance has been in opposition for around two years. Many commentators have suggested during these years a large loss of party following if elections were held immediately. The greatest loss has occurred in the two most populated electoral districts of Iceland, where some two-thirds of voters live. It is projected that the party would gain 1-2 city delegates but had 5 after the great 1978 victory. Some party supporters have left the party in the last few months. The loss is continuing and many have discontinued association with the party--or intend to stop paying party dues.

Anticlimatic Wage Agreement

Last 14 May the chairman of the People's Alliance Party appeared on television and rejected all assertions on the collapse of the People's Alliance; he persevered with the party's course instead of turning back and regrouping; a coordinated assault of the people and of the labor movement will, in the next months, go into battle against the wage cuts of a capitalist government. The same line was put out to party members, including the political writers of THJODVILJINN. With the Labor Movement, better said, with Gudmund J. Gudmundsson and the People's Alliance (Svavar Gestsson) leading the way the troops were called to the assault.

A month later a new wage agreement was made with nearly unchanged purchasing power, which was approved by the labor unions. Neither Gestsson nor THJODVILJINN dared to take a position against the agreement, although it went against their own policies. Gestsson spoke in effect in an interview with MORGUNBLADID against voting against and rejecting the wage agreement.

A meeting of the Labor Council of the People's Alliance, on the other hand, opposed the agreements strongly and had hard words for labor movement leaders; the most important People's Alliance labor leaders did not attend the meeting and are not even part of the Labor Council administration. Bjarnfridur Leosdottir is in charge of the Council.

At the same time that these disasters beat over the People's Alliance, it turned out that other opposition parties secured their positions. The Women's List and the Social Democratic Alliance have held their own while the Social Democratic Party, which Ragnar Arnalds cast into the scrap heap in 1974, has become, according to public opinion polls, the second strongest party in Iceland with twice the following of the People's Alliance.

This evolution is curious in more ways than one and it is being widely asked: why is the People's Alliance in such a weak position?

A Changed Nation

The People's Alliance originally functioned as the elections association of the Socialist Party and the Conference of Liberals, the group of Hannibal Valdimarsson supporters who left the Social Democratic Party with him. In 1968 the People's Alliance became an actual political party with an organization similar to that of other Icelandic political parties--there was no special youth or women's groups operating in the party. The history of the People's Alliance is closely associated with a period of great movement in Icelandic politics that began with the 1968 presidential election, when the voters had clear reservations about Gunnar Thoroddsen, who was supported by most Icelandic political figures. They elected Kristjan Eldjan, "the people's candidate," president.

The Government of Recuperation, which had been in power since 1959, lost its majority in the elections of 1971 and a new party, the Association of Liberals and Leftists won, as we have said before, a great victory.

Great variations in the followings of political parties have characterized Icelandic politics since. Thus, for example, the Social Democratic Party and People's Alliance received a total of 28 Althing delegates in 1978, but now have only 16. The Association of Liberals and Leftists has collapsed and other parties have appeared so that there are now 6 parties in the Althing, including two founded just before the last elections.

It may be asserted that the influence of political parties in Icelandic national life has by and large decreased in recent decades. The influence of experts and specialists has increased in many areas: in the courts, in government, in banks, in the mass media, in health and in education. Special interest groups of various sorts, including the labor movement, are now also much more independent of parties than before. Parties are not totally without influence, but they have had, so to speak, to share power with other parties.

Demands for the participation of the public in politics have also increased, especially among young people and women. Some political parties have begun, moreover, open primary elections and grant, thereby, those outside the party the right to take part in the choice of the party's candidates.

In general, the voters now make more demands on the political parties. If parties or individual politicians are not felt to have done what they should, in the view of the voters, it is very likely that the voters will turn their support to other politicians and other parties, other than those supported before. Political struggles have thus become more difficult than before: the possibilities of the politicians to achieve their goals have decreased, their coordination efforts have become more complex while, at the same time, demands placed upon them for success and the sharing of power have increased.

The People's Alliance has functioned in a very uneasy period in Icelandic politics and in essence it may be said that the party has remained in one place while all conditions around it have changed. Now the situation is such that within the party and within the party organ no one is even going through the motions of discussing the "collapse" of the party in a clear-cut manner. It may be asked whether or not the assertions on the stagnation of the People's Alliance may not be somewhat trivial. Are there not in play here analyses that are written on ivory after the development has taken place that we are striving here to explain.

But there are, to be sure, no clear and definite answers to such questions. Concerning the People's Alliance, however, my answer can be clear: the collapse of the People's Alliance has been brewing for some time and individuals do not need to have had foresight to have foreseen the situation that now is the case, rather it has been a matter of mode of operations, style and policy of the party. I will now state the reasons for my answer.

Calm--and Ground Swell

Small groups to the left of the People's Alliance began, before and after 1970, to be a great hindrance to the party; working in them were radical

young people in opposition to the party--considering it even their major opponent. More important for the party, however, was the fact that criticism of these small groups had a certain influence upon young people not connected with a party. Many thought it anathema, for example, for radical young people to work in the People's Alliance, even though they had certain things in common with the party and supported it in elections, above all as a counterweight to the Independence Party.

During the years after 1974, young people, primarily men, joined forces to some degree with the People's Alliance in Reykjavik and the same thing took place elsewhere, for example, in the south. The party also became more open to discussion. I presented, for example, a talk on "The Party, Young People and the Labor Movement" in the Autumn of 1975 that was published in THJODVILJINN. I said, among other things:

But it must be realized that some of those who have looked outside the People's Alliance, or will not take part in its activities, have much basis when they criticize the party. They think that it is too narrow in its Althing activities and in terms of its election support and disregards mass struggle--at the work place, in the schools, in the cooperative movement, etc. The powerlessness of the People's Alliance units in Reykjavik has had a negative influence upon such persons--party decisions are in fact made elsewhere--in the party congress, by party ministers taking part in the government, in the party central committee, or in the offices of THJODVILJINN. This seems to them to reduce political discussion and its importance, calling to mind more a bourgeoisie party than a socialist.

During the years 1974-1977, Throstur Olafsson was People's Alliance party chairman in Reykjavik. Some older and more experienced party men thought Olafsson somewhat abrupt; there was grumbling within the Reykjavik unit, although no open disagreement. But Olafsson was considered a client of Magnus Kjartansson, then an MP, former minister and chief leader of the party in Reykjavik.

Storm Blows Up

About the time of the 1977 People's Alliance Party National Congress it emerged that there was much distrust among the old nucleus from the Socialist Party for the younger people that had begun to work in the party. A meeting was held in October in the Reykjavik unit to elect delegates to the convention, which by party regulations had to choose a new chairman and deputy chairman to replace Ragnar Arnalds and Odda Bara Sigfusdottir, both elected in 1968.

The meeting was extremely well attended--around 150--or half again more than usually attending such meetings. Later it emerged that the experienced herdsmen (including the editors of THJODVILJINN) had been at work and seemed to know exactly what they were doing in spite of little experience since 1967, when the Valdimarsson supporters were acidulous at a Tonabio Meeting

in efforts regarding the structure of the People's Alliance list of candidates in Reykjavik.

A proposal concerning 62 delegates to the national congress and as many alternates from the elections committee, chosen without disagreement at the unit meeting shortly before, lay before the "sheep finder's fee meeting," as the meeting soon came to be called. The list presented by the elections committee was somewhat conventional: political leaders and labor chiefs with the addition of young people, both intellectuals (for example, Gisli Palsson, Jon Asgeir Sigurdsson, Gudmundur Olafsson and Thorsteinn Magnusson) and from the labor unions (for example, Gudmundur Hilmarsson, Vilberg Sigurjonsson, Hallgrimir G. Magnusson and Gudmundur Bjarnleifsson). There was a struggle for many changes at the meeting and then there was a vote. The result of the vote was that 19 primary delegates from the elections committee list were rejected--among others, all of those mentioned above--and in their place older people were elected. There were for example, 16 persons on the elections committee list under thirty, but of primary delegates elected only 6 (it was said that these six had in common that they were born into the party). On the other hand, 9 primary delegates were over 60, the oldest 79. The average age of all delegates was a mature 45.

I have lingered over the "Sheep Finder's Fee Meeting" since it clearly reveals the weaknesses of the People's Alliance. There was nothing which could be called cooperation between the age groups within the party; middle aged and older members did not, by and large, work for the party but were called upon when some party leader found his position in danger. Certainly those thus called would choose well known faces and their children, and not unknown new growth. The young people that had done all the party's hard work were thrust aside.

The shepherders later said that the meeting was unintentional. It was not their intention to reject almost all the young people--but the damage was the same. Young people construed the meeting as a rebuff from the older members of the party and that it was possible for them to lick stamps and hawk lottery tickets but not to make decisions on party policy and choose its leadership.

Women's Movement and People's Alliance

The connections of the People's Alliance, or rather its lack of connections, with the new women's movement of the eighties is a chapter by itself and worthy of more detailed consideration than is the case here.

Some women--especially Svava Jakobsdottir and Vilborg Hardardottir--were, to be sure, women of influence both within the People's Alliance and the new women's movement, but on the whole few women worked in the party and the position of women within it was weak. Thus only 10 women were chosen full delegates to the 1977 party congress in Reykjavik (as many as were on the list of the elections committee). Two were under 30 and one between 30 and 40. It must be emphasized that this was in 1977--seven years after

the foundation of the Red Garter Movement and two years after the Women's Strike. The awakening to consciousness of Icelandic women had not much shaken the timbers of the People's Alliance (or of other parties, it may be mentioned).

Also telling its tale about the position of women in the party is the fact that only one woman has been chairman of the People's Alliance in Reykjavik since the unit there was founded in 1966, or nearly two decades. However, in discussing the position of women in the party it is particularly worthwhile to recall briefly what led to the election of Margret S. Bjornsdottir as chairman of the People's Alliance Council in the Summer of 1980.

When the party administration nominating committee began its work at the end of April, it quickly emerged that the retiring chairman was not going to stand for reelection and the members of the committee were in agreement in nominating Bjornsdottir as chairman. The business of the committee would have been completed in a few months under normal circumstances. But such was not the case and the committee met 12 times--including Whitsun--and announced its conclusions at the end of May. They were agreed to at a general meeting, put off because of the matter.

There were no differences of opinion within the nominating committee, and only one person was responsible for the dispute that harmed its activities: Svavar Gestsson, MP and then minister, Svavar Gestsson, who expressed to the chairman of the nominating committee that he was very displeased with Bjornsdottir as chairman; she enjoyed neither his trust nor confidence. No further justification followed.

Now it is not by any means being asserted that Svavar Gestsson is an opponent of the leadership of any women within the People's Alliance. He was, for example, very much in favor in 1979 of having newspaper reporter Alfheidur Ingadottir as the successor to Svava Jakobsdottir in position three of the Reykjavik party list. This was a secure Althing seat. Gestsson was unable to achieve his goal; a primary election was held for the first time and the arrangement of the party list was in accordance with the primary election: Svavar Gestsson, Gudmundur J. Gudmundsson, Olafur Ragnar Grimsson and Gudrun Helgadóttir, Ingadóttir did not, on the other hand, receive much support in the primary election.

The results of the 1979 Reykjavik primary election seem to have resulted in no aftermath within the People's Alliance. The People's Alliance took part in the government of Gunnar Thoroddsen; Hjorleifur Guttormsson, Gestsson and Grimsson became ministers and Grimsson chairman of the party. In the next primary elections, held in January 1983, it emerged on the other hand, as will be noted later, that certain influential persons in the party had not laid aside their dissatisfaction with having Olafur Ragnar Grimsson receive a secure position on the party list; they wanted the party Althing delegation chairman out of the Althing.

Looking Out for the Party

Historically, the Socialist Party, and later the People's Alliance, made great efforts when they were first founded to obtain the cooperation of persons outside the party, as they should have. Thus the Socialist Party, during the beginning of its cooperation with the Conference of Liberals, an organization with far fewer members, had provided two of three party Althing seats in Reykjavik to its cooperation partner.

In the elections of 1953, a new party, the National Defense Party, was victorious and received two Althing delegates: Gils Gudmundsson and Berg Sigurbjörnsson. The Socialist Party had done badly, lost support and Althing delegates. It received 7 Althing delegates in place of 9 previously (this was in fact one major explanation for the desire of the Socialists to cooperate with the foundation of the People's Alliance). The following of the National Defense Party did not prove secure and in 1963 the members of the party combined forces with the People's Alliance. Gils Gudmundsson was first on the party list for the Reykjanes and was elected an Althing delegate, while the former members of the National Defense Party were high up on the Reykjanes region list and in Eastern Northern Iceland.

Similar desire for cooperation with new forces or individuals outside the party emerged from the decision to put Svava Jakobsdottir into the third position on the party Reykjavik list in 1977, although Svava Jakobsdottir was not a member of any party, was known as a writer and had worked for the mass media (MORGUNBLADID and State Television). The candidate of Stefan Jonsson, People's Alliance Althing delegate for the Eastern Northern Iceland District from 1974-1983, was on the same basis as that of Jakobsdottir: he was not in the party and the party sought him out.

When various members of the Modruvöllur group (named after a building of the Aukureyri Secondary Grammar School where they met), originally in the Progressive Party, joined forces with the People's Alliance, they were received with open arms. Two of them, Olafur Ragnar Grimsson and Baldur Oskarsson came to be among the leaders in the 1976 party central committee elections and at the 1977 national convention. Oskarsson later sought the party Southern Iceland Althing seat in the 1979 primary election and came only a few votes short of winning the first position and pushed aside MP Gardar Sigurdsson. The leaders of the People's Alliance made efforts before the 1978 elections to have Grimsson in the fourth Reykjavik seat.

Fear Eats the Soul

The old Socialist Party nucleus, however, was not happy with the election of Grimsson to the third seat in the 1979 primary election; the seat was intended by them for Alfheidur Ingadottir and at a People's Alliance conference in Reykjavik after the primary election Ingri R. Helgason called upon Olafur Ragnar Grimsson to give up his position to Gurdrun Helgadóttir, who had been elected to the fourth position. Helgadóttir said, on the other hand, that she was unwilling to allow herself to be shifted between positions. The majority of those participating in the conference, however, were in agreement with the outcome of the primary elections and it was let stand.

In my view, the opposition of the "owners of the party" to Grimsson arose during efforts the previous year to draw up a list of candidates. There was no disagreement that Edvard Sigurdsson should continue in the second position on the 1978 list. The nominating committee, which included, among others, Ingri R. Helgason and Kjartan Olafsson, had come to an agreement on proposing Sigurd Magnusson for the fifth position. The committee then had to select an alternate for Sigurdsson for the second seat and a Reykjavik labor movement Althing delegate, with provision being made for Sigurdsson to give up his seat in the following elections, which he did.

The Labor Alliance, chaired by Gudmundur J. Gudmundsson, who was also deputy chairman of Dagsbrun, had been a leader in the 1977-1978 struggles of the labor movement and many in the People's Alliance thought that it would be the most reasonable thing to put Gudmundsson into the fifth position and that he should take over subsequently from Sigurdsson. Labor movement leaders of the party were also as a group opposed to placing Magnusson in that position.

It turned out that most labor movement leaders contacted by the nominating committee refused to take a position on the party list. In the end the committee was able to draft a list--mostly due to the cooperation of Grimsson and Gudmundsson. The draft was presented and approved largely unchanged: Svavar Gestsson, Edvard Sigurdsson, Svava Jakobsdottir, Grimsson, Gudmundsson, Sigurdur Magnusson and Stela Stefansdottir.

After this event, Grimsson was no longer in good graces with the party, as a kind of client of the "owners of the party," but rather a strong leader on his own merits with wide-ranging connections within the party, particularly with Gudmundur J. Gudmundsson, whom the party "owners" intended to keep from a position of political influence and membership in the Althing.

Grimsson's Departure

During the 1983 primary elections it emerged that the "owners of the party" from the socialist group had never reconciled themselves to the strong position of Grimsson in the party; Svavar Gestsson alone was to enjoy such power. The fear of Grimsson later increased greatly after he was overwhelmingly elected to the editorial board in a public meeting of THJODVILJINN publishers, whereas Svavar Gestsson was elected by a much narrower margin.

The message was issued to old party members before the 1983 primary elections that Grimsson intended to knock Svavar Gestsson out of the first position on the list. Some of the old Socialist Party nucleus thought that the time had come to make clear that their desire for cooperation with newer party members, which they considered not to be real socialists, had one condition: that the newer members of the party would neither seek nor seem to seek a stronger position in the party. The results of the primary elections were that Svavar Gestsson received 383 votes for the first position and Grimsson 20. Gudmundur J. Gudmundsson received 16 votes for the first position and Gudrun Helgadottir 13.

No attack had been made upon the chairman of the party as the figures indicate. An attack against Grimsson, on the other hand, was successful; he fell from the third into the fourth seat and lost his Althing seat in the elections. Some of the "owners of the party" thought the fourth position in fact too high for Grimsson--a former member of the Progressive Party. Of 456 persons voting in the primary elections, 102 chose Grimsson for no seat, 20 voted for him in the fifth seat and another 20 in the seventh seat. Around a third of those participating wanted Grimsson completely out of his position of influence within the party. Such action against one of the most influential persons in the party, to be sure, was not accomplished without opposition, but Grimsson said in a DV [Dagbladið-Visir] interview on 31 January 83, the day after the primary election: "It has emerged recently that there are strong forces in the party which have worked systematically against me and their efforts have clearly been successful."

What to Do?

The examples that have been mentioned--the 1977 "Sheep Finder's Fee" Meeting, the 1980 election of a People's Alliance chairman for Reykjavik and the 1983 primary election--show clearly, in my view, that the underpinnings of the party have not been strengthened since 1974, quite the opposite. It appears that the old nucleus, born from the Socialist Party in Reykjavik, has not forgotten its old methods and clique activities from the times of the Socialist Party. This group has, in fact, put aside the old rules on how to deal with new forces within the People's Alliance.

That is a harsh judgement. But it is, in my view, fully justified and clearly a fact. Many examples could be given, in fact, to support this conclusion, but I will let it suffice here to examine a recent example of how Svavar Gestsson--the first and only People's Alliance chairman with political roots in the Socialist Party in Reykjavik--has made a habit of working as party chairman.

During the entire period since the formation of the present government, the opposition parties have been little in accord. There have been many reasons for this: past bickering, the almost deadly hatred of the People's Alliance and the Social Democratic Party; and then two new parties, the Social Democratic Alliance and the Women's list, have good reason to remain as independent as possible from the four "system parties," as they call them.

In July of last year, Kjartan Olafsson, former deputy chairman and MP of the People's Alliance and editor of THJODVILJINN, published an article in THJODVILJINN that was attributed to an old fellow warrior and party brother. Olafsson announced there that the People's Alliance should look down new paths, the old party formula was good no longer:

People have ignored too long the need to look down new paths in conceptual matters. We have been punished for our sins too long. You and many others who stand near you look upon it as a principle goal to show the "party" and its leadership nearly unlimited loyalty. The old conceptions of the labor movement on solidarity and the

great "Arbeitereinheit" have been in your pith and blood-- you will forgive if I slip into German, as in times past. Great victories have been won in the past and recently widely in the world under the banner of loyalty and unity, and I do not intend to disparage good people, who consider their trust in men and things as the most important thing. But reality is now suddenly full of paradoxes. And it has come about that, in times of upheaval such as those we live in, loyalty is not everything. We must look down new paths, however painful that is, and whatever the grievous losses. The failure of the generations, to which you belong, has been as we deserved since we have let loyalty too long stand in the way of a rethinking called for by the times.

When the primary need is for a deep, remorseless review and the breaking of new ground, we have delayed too long in our old tracks and have become a generation without a clear political self-image, historically seen.

For various reasons, including the candor and courage of Kjartan Oalfsson, conditions were created within the People's Alliance last Summer favoring a review in terms of the continued pretensions of the People's Alliance to be the unquestioned leadership party for the Icelandic labor movement. Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, chairman of the People's Alliance Executive Committee, published an article in THJODVILJINN in August wherein a call was made for cooperation of opposition parties on a basis of equality and without preconditions of any sort.

The People's Alliance Party Council held in November 1984, sanctioned a political resolution that states, among other things:

At the present time four parties are in opposition to the government that, to one degree or another, look for solutions to problems in terms of a socialist point of view. They have not, however, been able to cooperate sufficiently so as to be able to demand leadership in the area of government.... The most urgent task for the next few months will be to achieve, in various areas, the cooperation of all those who repudiate the actions of the government.

There have been various points of view within the People's Alliance concerning which political parties the party should work with in government if the party is to have the possibility of participating in the government. Four groups may be distinguished by and large:

1. Cooperation with the present opposition parties. Among the supporters of this point of view are the following: Einar Karl Haraldsson, Vilborg Hardardottir, Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, Odda Bara Sigfusdottir, Kristjan Valdimarsson and Margret S. Bjornsdottir.

2. Cooperation with the Progressive Party. This point of view enjoys the support of rural party representatives: Hjorleifur Guttormsson, Ragnar Arnalds and Kjartan Olafsson.

3. Cooperation with the Independence Party or a reorganized government of the People's Alliance, Social Democratic and Independence Parties. Gudmundur J. Gudmundsson and Throstur Olafsson have shown their support for such a government.

4. Cooperation of the Social Democratic Party and the People's Alliance, or of "labor movement parties." Elements that have recently joined forces with the People's Alliance and are a minority but attuned to it have come out in favor of such a policy.

From such a division of opinion the conclusion should not be drawn that there finally prevail within the People's Alliance deep disagreements due to the divergent points of view on desirable cooperation partners. No party in Iceland rules out coalition with any other party; there exist varying points of view within all parties but decisions have been customarily made in this matter depending upon the political circumstances on each occasion.

Working Against Party Agreements

The party council, the highest authority in the People's Alliance between the national conventions, without any significant disagreement, determined a policy, where no mention was made of any special leadership role of the party in movements of Icelandic leftists but which rather encouraged the formation of new government forces among opposition parties.

Around a month after the meeting of the party council the People's Alliance Chairman published a long new year's article in THJODVILJINN, as has been the custom. It is safe to say that the article aroused much interest, not the least among People's Alliance protagonists. No reference whatsoever was made to the policy setting of the party council and the same old line reiterated:

The People's Alliance is the only party that embraces in itself both the will and the policy of standing at all times for the interests of wage earners. The increase of parties and trial balloons solves no problems, other than the fact that the Progressive Party is out of the picture as the standby of leftists.... Since the leaders of these parties have no proper view of their calling, the people will have to take the matter into their own hands. There is inherent in the People's Alliance that strength and purpose, that policy that can solve problems and change humanity in the interests of community. Schism is grist for the mill of antagonism. Unification about the powerful People's Alliance is the way out of difficulty.

What is to be done?--was the question. What line is the chairman offering?

The answer emerged shortly thereafter in a NYTIMAN report of 7 January 1985:

Sources that NYTIMAN considers reliable say Svavar Gestsson considers cooperation with the Independence Party a desirable choice, but he has no hope that leftist discussions will lead to anything.... The sources of NYTIMAN say that Svavar has carried out discussions with the leaders of the Independence Party, but Gestsson has denied it. He said, on the other hand, in an interview with NYTIMAN last week, that there was a thirsting in the nation for these two powers to combine efforts to solve the difficulties that we struggle against in Icelandic politics.

My reliable sources within the People's Alliance assert that the interest of Svavar Gestsson, Gudmundur J. Gudmundsson and Throstur Olafsson in government coalition with the Independence Party have also emerged clearly in their efforts to arrive at an agreement on the so-called tax cut approach in discussions of labor unions with the Icelandic National Association last Autumn, but in the view of many in the Association of State and Municipal Workers, the purpose of the discussions was to weaken the solidarity of the Association in its wage disputes with the government.

Svavar Gestsson has never explained in detail publicly why the People's Alliance and the Independence Party should cooperate now. These forces have, in fact, worked together provisionally during "times of crisis," first to destroy the connections of the Social Democratic Party with the Icelandic National Association during the 1940s, later with the foundation of the republic and in the first government formed after the establishment of the republic, the Reorganized Government.

The idea of cooperation of socialists and the Independence Party is thus neither new nor original. What is of interest here is that the People's Alliance party chairman should work against the decisions of the highest institution of his own party.

Where Is the People's Alliance Heading?

The conclusions that I draw from my consideration of the development of the People's Alliance since 1974 should now be clear: the maneuvering room of the party has decreased and its following has fallen off: this is especially striking among young voters. The timbers of the party have weakened and it has been unable to respond to neither the demands of the people for democracy nor to the natural differences of opinion within the party. Neither has it changed its approach to establish contact with patterns of thought, social movements and special interest groups of Iceland. In general terms, the party has become insensitive to its environment;

envoys of new movements (young people, women) have not set down roots in the party. There has been no effort to achieve cooperation with new forces and rules for cooperation within the party have often not been respected. In party publications by socialists it is implied that those who are real socialists are conscious of the fact that they have acquired an infallible judgement of men and affairs and that a class enemy can lurk anywhere, even in the actor Duran Duran or in Andres Ond as a perfidious labor union chief. All discussion within the party thus becomes dangerous, before we know it, all matters of opinion can turn into disputes on "fundamental issues": is that the right line or not? The result is that all potential items of dispute are pushed aside--since dispute on the right line is absolutely associated with the danger of a party split. Under such conditions effort is preferably made to stand together on what the party members--in agreement--do not want, rather than to deal with the question what kind of society the People's Alliance is aiming at and how it will be achieved.

In people's minds, especially among the younger generation, the People's Alliance is consequently considered to be a rather negative and even doomsday party that is "against everything." The People's Alliance was recently in the government and the question is raised what it achieved in this. For those that are opponents of the present government other choices are also in the offing: The Women's List with emphasis on the women's struggle and a "gentler" society; the Social Democratic Alliance that desires to make fundamental changes in the system of government; the Social Democratic Party, which intends to equalize living conditions and has representatives of the "new politics" in control. By comparison, the People's Alliance emerges in the minds of many as system party of the old days with outdated policies of little value.

The collapse of the People's Alliance party is thus both wide and deep. This development is naturally a subject of concern to the members of the People's Alliance and to its leadership, but it should also concern all socialistically minded people in Iceland--including, among others, the author of this article--people who would create a reliable and strong political counterweight against the cold winds of self interest and a increasing misdistribution of wealth and power in Iceland. What does the People's Alliance need to do to increase the possibilities of the party to recover its position in Icelandic politics, not to say advance its influence?

There is no simple answer to this question. The problem is complicated, as has emerged from the discussion, and has historic implications. I will, however, mention three things in conclusion:

First of all, people do not need to be in a political party to have an influence upon their own environment and living conditions, there are many other ways of achieving this--for example participation in special interest groups and in societies of various kinds. The People's Alliance, on the other hand, cannot function without party members, no more than can other parties. If people sit in their theater chairs and applaud, politics will be no more than a play or an athletic event. In politics people are especially interested in having an influence upon the formation of policy. Democracy

and a natural manner of intercourse should prevail within the People's Alliance.

Secondly, the People's Alliance should reacquire the custom of looking for cooperation partners outside the party, of working with them on a basis of equality and of sharing power with them both within the party and without. There will be risks and costs for the party in so doing. The risk will be extremely small if the People's Alliance desires to continue as a party and survive.

Last but not least, the People's Alliance should consider what kind of party it wants to be and can be. Policy seems now in essence erratic and variable: how, for example, will the People's Alliance establish connection with the labor movements and what kind of cooperation will there be between the party and the labor movement. Is the People's Alliance, in its own view, the leadership party for workers and for leftist movements in Iceland or will or can it cooperate with other associations and other parties of a leftist leaning and recognize them as partners with equal rights? What kind of government does the People's Alliance wish to be in power and how are the preconditions for such a government to be created? The People's Alliance will soon have to consider the questions--or otherwise decline still more.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

SOVIET PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES DETAILED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 29 Jul 85 pp 30-35

[Text] The Soviet Union has given specific instructions to its embassy in Spain, to joint Spanish-Soviet enterprises and to the Eastern bloc embassies in Madrid to give their total support to the pro-Soviet Communist Party (PC) headed by Ignacio Gallego, a longstanding member of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party]. As far as the USSR's current leaders are concerned, Ignacio Gallego's group is the only possible response to the failure of Santiago Carrillo's and Gerardo Iglesias's PCE and of the Eurocommunist philosophy in Western Europe. In little more than a year, the PC's men have taken over the Spain-USSR Association, control much of the trade and cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union and have placed themselves in the forefront of peace and antimilitary organizations in Spain. With no accurate information on the source of some of its money, just a few months after it split from the PCE, Ignacio Gallego's party has opened up headquarters in almost all Spanish provinces, is about to unveil a new building in Madrid that cost more than 100 million pesetas, and is organizing a big post-summer party with a budget of some 50 million pesetas. Its abundance of money was also obvious during President Reagan's visit to Spain on 6 May, when the pro-Soviet Communist Party headed up a protest campaign against the American chief of state and wall-papered the country with posters showing Reagan dressed as one of the invader lizards from the TV series "V." According to government sources, the poster was designed in the Soviet Union. As a result, Ignacio Gallego is becoming known in official circles as "Moscow's lizard." This article was produced by CAMBIO 16's research team.

Last 17 June a group of "lawmakers" from the Soviet Union, led by Boris Mikhaylovich Ponomarev, an alternate member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, paid an official visit to Spain to strengthen relations with the country's democratic institutions.

Ponomarev is the man that the CPSU has put in charge of maintaining contacts with Communist parties on the Iberian Peninsula, and his trip had another less well-known purpose: to provide unqualified political and financial support for the Communist Party that Ignacio Gallego had founded a few months before as a splinter group from the pro-Soviet branch of Santiago Carrillo's and Gerardo Iglesias's PCE.

Although there was no official meeting between Ponomarev and Gallego, so as not to annoy other communist political groups, the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU imparted this message to his fellow communists in Spain: henceforth, the International Section of the CPSU, which sees to relations with sister parties outside the socialist area, was going to throw all its support behind Ignacio Gallego's party.

In the wake of Eurocommunism's failure in Parliament and of PCE's split into two factions headed by Carrillo and Iglesias, the Soviet Union was thus siding with a hard-line group that could try to reconcile the communist family.

Regarded by all as the successor to Mikhail Suslov, the USSR's number one ideologue in recent decades, Boris Mikhailovich Ponomarev was the first high-ranking Soviet official to denounce Eurocommunism, calling it "bourgeois propaganda to discredit the experience and policy of the CPSU."

In October 1979 the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee also asserted that the deviationism of certain European Communist parties from Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism had to end.

On his recent trip to Madrid Ponomarev repeated the call and told a number of Spanish communists that since a broad Communist Party could not be created at the moment, the CPSU was forced to give its total support to a dynamic force that could convince other democratic parties and unions to take up its ideas and rallying cries and bring together hundreds of thousands of people in campaigns such as the Peace Movement, Solidarity with Nicaragua or opposition to an arms buildup in Europe.

Meetings in Moscow

Ponomarev did not conceal his liking for Gallego's PC. As one of the most active promoters of the demonstrations against Spain's full-fledged membership in NATO and the Common Market, the PC dominated the campaign protesting President Reagan's visit to Spain on 6 May and was the second signer of the appeal for the general strike on 20 June.

Government sources have told CAMBIO 16 that this shift in strategy has not taken them by surprise. The government has known for a year now that much of the money that the CPSU's International Department sends overseas to support sister parties has, in Spain's case, gone to Ignacio Gallego's Communist Party through the Soviet Embassy in Madrid, several joint Soviet-Spanish enterprises and certain ranking officials in the Spain-USSR Association.

It was the Soviet Embassy in Spain that arranged for the launching of Ignacio Gallego's party after the very poor showing (3.8 percent of the vote) that the PCE made at the October 1982 elections.

Administration sources say that after the communist fiasco at the polls ranking leaders of the PC held several meetings in Moscow; in attendance

were Ignacio Gallego and the "troika" of the CPSU Central Committee, the three men who are in charge of maintaining contacts with Communist parties outside the Eastern Bloc.

The three are: Boris Mikheylovich Ponomarev, alternate member of the USSR's Politburo; Vladimir Zagladin, the CPSU's chief of international affairs; and Vladimir Pertsov, one of the men in charge of monitoring the development of Communist parties on the Iberian Peninsula.

Once the OK had been given for the launching of the new party, Ignacio Gallego paid several visits to the Soviet Union, at the suggestion of the Soviet Embassy in Madrid, to receive instructions. According to sources in the Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry, one of the trips came in February 1984, when Soviet leader Yuri Andropov was laid to rest, with the next one on 21 May of the same year. "Both times," sources in the Spanish Embassy in the USSR told this magazine, "Ignacio Gallego met with the top officials in the CPSU's International Relations Department, Boris Ponomarev and Vladimir Zagladin, the men in charge of supervising the Communist parties outside the Soviet sphere of influence."

But this is not the only support that the Soviet Embassy in Madrid has given Gallego's group. In recent months Spanish secret services have detected dozens of meetings between PC officials and members of the Soviet diplomatic delegation. Other PC leaders have traveled often to the Soviet Union on tickets supplied by the embassy, and the ambassador himself, Yuri Dubinin, has made an effort to be present at or to send representatives to the opening of PC headquarters in many Spanish provinces.

Keeping the Carrillo People Out

The Soviet Embassy in Madrid has also maneuvered to give the "Gallego people" total control in the Spain-USSR Association, the only institution of its kind at the moment. Grouping together all longstanding communists, it was run until a short while ago by people close to Santiago Carrillo.

The takeover of the Spain-USSR Association, whose headquarters is at 60 Gran Via in Madrid, began in September 1984 when Soviet diplomat Zurab Abashidze, a CPSU hard-liner with probable links to the KGB, arrived in the Spanish capital.

The 34-year old Zurab Abashidze was born in Kiblisi, is married to a language teacher and served as the Soviet consul in Bombay in 1978. His mission in Madrid was to coordinate relations between the Spain-USSR Association and the Soviet Embassy in Madrid. His first job was to push all of the PCE's officials out of the association, including its president, the renowned biologist Faustino Cordon Bonet.

"Abashidze's coup d'etat in the association triggered an exodus of members, some of them well-known intellectuals such as Buero Vallejo, Francisco Garcia Pavon and Joaquin Rodrigo, and started infighting between

supporters of Ignacio Gallego and Santiago Carrillo," association sources told CAMBIO 16.

Some well-known members of the association with links to the PCE even personally complained to the civil governor of Madrid, Jose Maria Rodriguez Colorado, and Interior Minister Jose Barrionuevo that several million pesetas had vanished from the institution's coffers and were apparently used to finance the launching of Ignacio Gallego's pro-Soviet party.

In a last-ditch attempt to prevent the association from becoming a branch of the Communist Party instead of a place where all Spanish communists belonged, the association's president, Faustino Cordon, met on 9 January at the La Panocha Restaurant in Madrid with PCE members Simon Sanchez Montero and Manuel Sandoval to find a way out of the dilemma.

But the "purge" of the Eurocommunists had already been decided on, and on 25 February 1985 Faustino Cordon called a special meeting of the state board of directors of the Spain-USSR Association and submitted his resignation as president. Supreme Tribunal Prosecutor Jesus Vicente Chamorro, a member of the Anti-NATO Commissions whose ideology is close to the PC's, was named interim president at the same meeting.

Chamorro took a vacation trip to the USSR shortly thereafter, and upon his return Ignacio Gallego's men took control of the association. The strongmen are journalist Antonio Alvarez Solis, the former editor of the magazine INTERVIU; the traumatologist Jesus Bartolesi, the editor of the Marxist theory journal ARGUMENTOS; Miguel Galindo Garcia, a member of the PC's Executive Committee in Zaragoza; Rosa Elulalia Ramon Caudet, the emissary who traveled to the USSR to negotiate Gallego's split from the PCE, and Gerardo Gonzalez, a native of Asturias who spent his childhood in the Soviet Union after the Spanish Civil War and who heads the Spain-USSR Association in Tenerife.

Circles close to the Foreign Affairs Ministry feel that the Spain-USSR Association is being used to get Ignacio Gallego's party off the ground. In recent months the association has opened up about a dozen new provincial headquarters that also serve as Communist Party offices. The most obvious cases are in Zaragoza, Cordoba and Alcoy, where the heads of the Spain-USSR Association and of the PC are practically the same people.

The expansion of the association, which last March had close to 30 branches throughout Spain, has become a source of concern to the Defense Ministry. Headquarters have recently been opened in Cadiz, Cartagena, Murcia, Alicante and Zaragoza, where U.S. forces are deployed in Spain and the Spanish Armed Forces have strategic installations.

"The Spain-USSR Association's headquarters in the province of Cadiz, for example, is located on 6 Granada Street in the town of Rota, where the United States has its second largest foreign naval base and where the Spanish Navy's Combat Group is stationed," sources in the Superior Center of Defense Intelligence (CESID) have told CAMBIO 16.

High government circles are worried that foreign powers might be using both the association and Gallego's PC to unite the antimilitary and anti-NATO protest movement, in the manner of the German and British fringe groups that have succeeded in setting local townspeople at odds with nearby military bases.

Recent reports in this magazine and over other media have disclosed that the police's Domestic Intelligence Brigade and the CESID have infiltrated agents into the Spain-USSR Association and Ignacio Gallego's party to keep track of their activities. Approached by CAMBIO 16, the heads of the two secret services refused any comment.

Administration sources, however, have assured this magazine that there are security reasons for ascertaining what is going on inside the two groups. According to the same sources, the pro-Soviet faction of Workers Commissions (CCOO) controls the company Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. (CASA), the country's main weapons manufacturer, which is going to do the periodic checkup work on the F-15's and F-18's, the most modern aircraft that the United States currently has in service.

The top man in CASA until a recently was CCOO leader Fidel Alonso, one of the early promoters of Ignacio Gallego's party and regarded as another "Moscow man" (see issue 584 of CAMBIO 16) because of his close ties with officials at the Soviet Embassy and CPSU leaders.

CASA is currently conducting tests on the ACE [European Fighter Plane], which NATO will rely on to maintain its air superiority over the Warsaw Pact in the 1990's. One of CASA's employees at present is a son of communist leader Santiago Alvarez, who is also close to Ignacio Gallego's party; the son began his aeronautical engineering studies in the Soviet Union.

According to sources in the Foreign and Defense ministries, another source of power that the Soviet Union has put in the hands of Ignacio Gallego's backers is control over most of the cultural activities that the USSR carries on in Spain and the right to select the young people who will continue their studies in Moscow and Leningrad on scholarships from the Eastern Bloc nations.

High-level officials in the Spanish Foreign Ministry have told CAMBIO 16 that one of the people who approves the fellowship recipients is the son of the vice president of the Spain-USSR Association, Jesus Bartolesi.

The man who makes the choices in the USSR is the "diplomat" Bendich Vinogradov, an individual who served as first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Spain until September 1984. During his time in Spain Vinogradov, whom Spanish secret services regard as close to the KGB, was also in charge of relations between the Spain-USSR Association and the embassy and of making contacts with Spanish intellectuals and academics.

"Many of the youngsters receiving scholarships are the children of longtime Spanish communists, people with high profiles at rallies and leaders of CCOO in major companies, all of them orthodox Marxist-Leninists with ties to Ignacio Gallego's party or to the Communist Movement," former association members told this magazine.

Furthermore, sources in the Interior and Foreign ministries suspect that a good bit of the profits that the Soviets make from the joint enterprises set up in Spain are channeled through certain individuals to aid Ignacio Gallego's party. This is reportedly the case with Sohispán, a concern based in the Canary Islands and Madrid that was founded to provide logistic support for the Soviet fleet.

Tecnorama is another company that Spanish secret service reports link to financing of the PC. This joint enterprise is involved in the import-export trade with Czechoslovakia, the first Eastern Bloc country in which Ignacio Gallego resided after the Spanish Civil War.

According to information in the hands of the administration, Tecnorama, whose offices are in Madrid, was the Spanish conduit for money to defray the cost of the First Congress of the Communist Party in January 1984 and to finance other internal activities.

Money from the GDR

The GDR has also apparently helped the pro-Soviet communists, though its assistance went to the Catalan factions that broke off from the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC) and that today follow the line of Ignacio Gallego's Communist Party.

This sort of outside aid is reportedly what has enabled Gallego's pro-Soviet backers to open up several dozen party offices in the main Spanish provinces and to buy part of a building in Madrid, valued at almost 100 million pesetas, where the Communist Party will set up its main headquarters.

In statements to DIARIO 16 a few months ago, Ignacio Gallego asserted that the money to buy the party's headquarters, which he said would cost 75 million pesetas, had come from the sacrifices of its activists and a 35-million peseta loan from the Banco Popular.

They must be well-off, though, because Ignacio Gallego told this magazine that his party is preparing a celebration for this coming fall that is going to cost close to 50 million pesetas and whose participants will range from Angela Davis, the Black Panther leader, to the Antonio Gades ballet company, which is going to put on "Carmen," and, last but not least, a major choreographed musical spectacle from the Soviet Union.

Secret service sources are also trying to ascertain whether some of the businessmen trading with the USSR might be channeling money to the Eurocommunist and pro-Soviet parties. In its 23 December 1984 issue, the

French magazine LE POINT reported that 57-year old businessman Ramon Mendoza, the president of Real Madrid, who is linked to the new aristocracy of the "Red millionaires," received about 250 million pesetas in 1980 for his role in trade between Spain and the USSR through his Prodag firm.

Juan Garrigues Walker, the owner of the Ciex firm, which is involved in import-export with the socialist countries, has given financial support to the Spain-USSR Association, though he is not known to have given money to political parties. Garrigues, who is still vice president of the association, told CAMBIO 16 that his post is merely honorary and that he has never played a major role in the association.

Boris Ponomarev's visit to Madrid in early July had Spanish secret services on alert for several days.

His philosophy about the role that Communist parties ought to play in democratic societies is that they should covertly seek to have the majority of political parties take up their ideas and rallying cries so as to mobilize the masses (MUNDO OBRERO, 25 October 1979). His ideas were put into effect last 20 June when the Communist labor union CCOO, the PCE, Ignacio Gallego's PC and many peace, antimilitary, environmentalist and anti-imperialist groups called for a general strike against a socialist government.

Administration sources were surprised by major role that Gallego's Communist Party suddenly assumed in this rally, as it was listed in all the posters as the second signer of the appeal for a general strike. This had also been the case with the street demonstrations and rallies during President Ronald Reagan's visit to Spain on 6 May.

Administration circles were doubly surprised when they found out that Ignacio Gallego's communists were wallpapering Spain's main cities on the occasion of Reagan's visit with a poster that portrayed the American president as a lizard from the TV series "V."

Only a few people knew that the anti-American posters that PC activists had pasted up had come from the Soviet Union, according to reports from prominent militants in Ignacio Gallego's party who were involved in the Reagan welcoming operation.

8743
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POLITICAL

SPAIN

CHURCH DIFFICULTIES WITH ADMINISTRATION HIGHLIGHTED

Madrid EPOCA in Spanish 5 Aug 85 pp 38-44

[Commentary by Father Jose Luis Martin Descalzo: "Mounting Church-State Conflicts"]

[Text] Jose Luis Martin Descalzo, a journalist and a Catholic priest, completes his analysis of relations between the Church and the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], reviewing some of the most recent crises: the de-Christianizing of schools, the "war of catechisms" and the legalization of abortion on demand.

If we wish to seriously analyze relations between the Church and the PSOE since it took office, we must begin by answering this basic question: Is the PSOE a political party that seeks to run Spain "politically" while leaving the vast field outside of politics in the hands of other social forces? Or does the PSOE seek to be an all-embracing [totalizante] movement that aspires to establish a new culture, a new ethic, a new lifestyle and a new way of thinking in Spain? I realize that I am using the word "all-embracing" in a sense close to that of "totalitarian." My intention in so doing is to ask whether the PSOE is staying on a truly democratic path or is falling prey to the totalitarian temptation and leaning towards extremely dangerous decisions, one of which would be to condemn religion to private status, if not control by the State [cesaropapismo].

This, it seems to me, is the key question. And from what I can see, the Church is beginning to fear that the PSOE is, in fact, leaning towards the worst choice. It is only beginning to harbor those fears. It still trusts that the PSOE will stop before it is too late and return to its rightful role as the defender of all our freedoms. But for months now fears have been mounting that the PSOE is moving slowly but surely in the direction that it showed at its 27th Congress, the conclusions of which were a perfect example of the all-embracing model.

From a strictly religious standpoint, the question can be posed thus: Is there a plan to de-Christianize Spain and, if so, is the administration organizing, promoting, encouraging or supporting it? Is the PSOE simply a lay party, which it is fully entitled to be, or is it a party

that practices a militant, belligerent laicism that seeks to replace the religion of most Spaniards with a new lay religion or a nonreligion and a new ethic whose fundamental values are no longer Christian?

I would not care to answer these questions too hastily, much less give categorical responses. But I would be less than truthful if I said that Church leaders are not visibly concerned.

Campaign Against the Church

Just a few short days ago the bishop who is secretary of the episcopate described the situation very accurately at a meeting with journalists:

"We must strive to counter the ongoing campaign (it does not matter to me whether it is orchestrated or not) to discredit religion socially and culturally. Religion is being portrayed as obsolete, God as repressive and everything having to do with Him (prayer, morals, etc) as contrary to progress and the modern world. Anticlericalism would be the least of it (many of us clerics are in a sense anticlerical too). The worst part is antitheism. There is also a campaign to discredit the Church. An attempt is being made to portray it as obsolete. The attacks on the pope are continuous, no matter what he says. The bishops are constantly being disparaged."

The facts are obvious: the Church feels under attack, and Catholics often feel their faith is being offended. Attacked and offended by whom? I sincerely believe that it would be very unfair to claim that the socialist government is pulling the strings of this campaign, which really exists. I feel that new-found freedoms have simply removed the lids from many pots and that from these pots have emerged not just the legitimate views of those who do not choose to be religious but also attacks on and disrespect for those who do choose to be. I must admit, however, that the fact that a very high percentage of these attacks come from circles run or controlled by the government causes us to wonder about its responsibility in the matter. The bishops often wonder about it. And I could string together dozens of texts to prove my point. I will cite some later.

A second problem is tied in with the first: how to view the State's laicism. The Church was not too reluctant about accepting the abolition of an official state religion in our constitution. It found this logical, given contemporary thought. The day of official state religions is past. It is also true, however, that there are two very different ways of viewing the absence of an official state religion. One accepts the completely autonomy of Church and State but expects the State to respect religion and to protect it when it is among the values of the people whom the State is governing. The other deliberately ignores the value of religion, even advocating a sort of "antireligion" that would push for the explicit ostracism of a faith that exists in society. Broad segments of the PSOE unfortunately seem to espouse this second approach.

The War of the Catechisms

A glaring example of this belligerent laicism was the famous article that Reyes Mate, a former Dominican and today the director of Minister Maravall's technical cabinet, published during the crisis of the catechisms. In it he charged that the bishops were afraid of democracy because they wanted to keep religion in education. The secretary of the episcopate, writing under the pen name of Pablo Aguilera, replied in the newspaper YA to his article. His reply marked the high point of the conflict with the covert antireligious feelings of certain groups in the administration. I am reproducing the text here because it is highly significant.

"Democracy seems to be something more than the complete secularization of public life. Otherwise, why don't we recognize fascist regimes and communist dictatorships as democracies? They have been and are secular. Or is it that the democracy they have in store for us has something to do with them? Can a few gentlemen in government institutions impose their view of modern life on the rest of us? Did the 10 million votes also enshrine the political and theological theories of a few gentlemen? According to Mr Reyes Mate, the Socialist Party knows what democracy and modernity mean. Those who do not accept this view are obscurantists. And if a large majority of citizens believe in God and Jesus Christ and are part of an association called the Church, this fact cannot come out in public life, because modernity demands that public displays be free of religious overtones. Democracy consists of having the Socialist Party lead us gradually to a total secularization of education, without religious instruction in public or private parochial schools. Is this where they want to take us? It surely seems as though the technical cabinet of the Education and Science Ministry does. Is the administration going to tell us what Catholic doctrine is too? The Church and many of our citizens are mistrustful not of democracy but of Mr Reyes Mate's view of democracy, which we see as laicist, intolerant, domineering and one-sided."

Two Cultures, Two Ethics

I think that these remarks clearly show that there is quite a bit more to the Church than a "chill" and that the prime minister refuses to see it.

These are the issues that are at the root of the mounting conflicts between Church and State over the past 3 years. I will try to indicate the most striking of them.

The basic conflict is the one we have already indicated. We are witnessing a varyingly tense struggle, sometimes covert and sometimes overt, between two cultures, two ethics (Christianity and socialism) for the future. The struggle is being waged in three main areas: culture and education, the mass media, and morals and customs.

A) Culture and Education

The most important battle, albeit the most recent as it is taking place now, is in education in general and, more specifically, in religious instruction.

I was recently forced to speak out in an article in ABC against the deliberate, systematic and hardheaded omission of all religious values from the education reform plans that are being tested. The plans came somewhat by chance into my hands, and I was genuinely terrified when I saw how thoroughly, systematically, pathetically and contemptibly they make no reference whatsoever to religious sentiments or even spiritual or transcendental values. I will repeat this telling example. These texts say that teachers should tell their pupils to "empty their bowels properly" but never say a thing about man's soul, conscience or spirit. It is striking that not even the cultural aspect of religion is mentioned and that teachers are asked to take children to museums and parks but not, even by accident, to cathedrals, as if one could learn anything about Spanish national art while ignoring our churches. I never thought that the desire to secularize our society would have reached such uncouth, uncultured extremes. I would add that these texts clearly reflect a Marxist humanism, which is of course at odds with the Christian humanism that is at the root of our entire history and culture. How could the Church and citizens with common sense not be worried?

Religious Instruction, Previously Optional, Now Only on Demand

Religious instruction in schools is a very serious problem, and its history is even somewhat amusing. When the Church and the State were drafting their accords, it was asked (and quite rightly) that religious instruction cease to be mandatory in schools. The Church logically agreed. The children whose parents did not want them to receive such religious instruction would not. The Socialists then wanted parents who were believers to ask specifically for religious instruction, instead of having nonbelievers ask for an exemption. The Church thought it would be more logical, in a mostly Catholic country, to have non-Catholics ask for an exemption, but it again consented to the Socialists' request: the parents who were believers would ask for religious instruction for their children.

Perhaps the Socialists were confident (they made it a cabinet issue so as not to oppose the accords) that not many parents would request it. What actually happened was that 90 percent of Spanish parents wanted religious instruction for their children. And so an arrangement was worked out in the form of a regulation from then Minister Otero Novas, whereby children could choose between a religion class and an ethics class, so that the nonbelievers would not be forced to study religion and the believers would not have to take an extra class. The arrangement was fair and seemed satisfactory. But a difficulty soon arose: so few children did not want religious instruction that their numbers could not justify hiring a large pool of ethics teachers.

What is actually happening today? Well, a great many schools are not giving the religion class that the legally valid Church-State accords stipulate. And when such classes are imparted, they are scheduled outside regular hours, which means that these children are forced to stay an hour later or attend a class and listen to their schoolmates playing during break. Unfortunately, not all believers are heroes.

The most amusing development, though, is that the theories now circulating in the Education Ministry and in many Socialist city halls and autonomies will further complicate the problem. What they are now saying is: Why should the Catholic children do without ethics classes? They propose to make ethics mandatory and offer religious instruction only on demand (not optionally) after school. They are thus insulting religion teachers, who in explaining morals are teaching ethics (the words morals and ethics speak to the same concept; one is Latin, the other Greek). Above all, however, they are showing that what they want is to indoctrinate all children in a certain ethic that espouses values that are quite different from Christian values.

Catechisms and the School Pact

A second conflict, which was really quite trivial but highly significant, was the so-called "catechism war" in July 1983, which almost jeopardized the Church-State accords themselves because the Education Ministry wanted to censor the ideological content of the catechisms that the bishops had officially approved. This war will go down in history as an example of what cannot be done. Although the ministry was right in demanding that the bishops comply with functional regulations, its censorship request obviously went far beyond its purely lay bailiwick. The Church fortunately did not yield; if it had, it would have set an extremely dangerous precedent for political interference in a purely ecclesiastical matter such as explaining the Catholic position on abortion.

The third major, and permanent, source of conflict has to do with the Church's private schools. This, it seems to me, is the central dispute between the two institutions. At its root is not the administration's understandable desire to "democratize" education but its eagerness to exercise absolute control over it. We can never regret too strongly that a responsible school pact was not worked out in this area.

Was such a pact impossible? Certainly not. I again quote the secretary of the episcopate:

"I think that such a pact is not only possible but relatively easy to achieve if we are all respectful and conciliatory. No one is asking for privileges or making irrational demands. We simply want an effective recognition of freedom of education for all on an equal footing within the bounds of the constitution and in accord with the judicial principles that Western democracies recognize. All of this should be consonant with the traits of our society, looking more to the future than to the past and

forgetting once and for all the mutual wrongs belonging to eras that have no return."

Unfortunately, this sincere, forward-looking approach does not seem to be the one that prevails in the Education Ministry, specifically on Mr Maravall's part, as he relentlessly hews to the most radical path of the PSOE, which indicated at its 27th Congress that one of its fundamental goals is the destruction of private schooling and the total control of education.

Little Hope

The bishops have lost most of their hopes for a real understanding on this issue. This is because the administration's tactics have been very obvious, so far at least. It has until now rejected any sort of dialogue with the groups that are directly involved in the problem (parent-teacher groups, FERE) and waged a lengthy and virtually futile war of words with the bishops, while trying to remove them from the associations that it has labeled extremist. In the dialogue with the bishops, which it has never rejected, the administration has made only minor concessions that have never reflected a sincere desire to compromise. The bishops suspect that these minor concessions are merely window dressing or diversions, while the administration relentlessly pursues the goal set forth at the PSOE congresses (1976, 1979, 1980) and at the UGT [General Union of Workers] congress in 1980: to take complete control of the school system. In the words of Monsignor Yanes, the bishop in charge of this issue, "this leads many to believe that the LODE is nothing more than a provisional stage, a tool that the administration can use to eventually achieve what it has talked about at its congresses, through regulations and other means."

Moreover, the facts seem to be confirming these fears. All of the anticipated applications of the apparently mild LODE suggest that because it gives the administration broad enforcement latitude, it will use it as a tool for harsh action.

Today, in the wake of the Constitutional Tribunal's ruling that paves the way for the law, many fear that the pessimists are right in announcing that private schools will no longer exist in 5 to 10 years. This would be a grave loss to Spanish culture and, above all, a curtailment of our freedoms. Let us hope that the ministry's belated offers of a dialogue in the wake of the tribunal's affirmative ruling can ward off this danger.

B) The Battle in the Mass Media

A high-level administration representative remarked smilingly to me recently that he could not understand why the bishops are so up in arms about TVE [Spanish Television], as if it were the only problem in Spain. I don't know whether I managed to explain something very simple to him, namely that a customer is put off much more by rotten items in a display window than by the possibility that everything in the store is rotten. Whether we like it or not, the small screen is a display window of social

realities in our civilization. Everything that appears on it goes through a sounding board that other things do not. Hence, to safeguard our freedoms, special care should be taken so that no one is unjustly attacked on TV broadcasts. It is quite astonishing that the Socialist government, which has agreed with dignity to keep certain religious programs on TV, even if it has relegated them to minimum-audience time spots, does not seem worried about the adverse effect that attacks on religion have on the administration itself and on the public peace. And it cannot be said that the administration is not responsible and that this is merely the upshot of new freedoms, because viewers know that the government would never allow similar treatment of other equally important institutions such as the Armed Forces and the crown and they know too that there must be a distinction between the exercise of freedom and the right to criticize and something completely different, that is, the false right to attack and insult values that deserve, at the very least, respect. Does the administration, which is ultimately in charge of the TV monopoly, realize how deeply Christians are offended on certain broadcasts? How can it continue to tolerate news on the Vatican in which the ignorance about religion is comparable only to the systematically biased ill-will with which it is written?

It should come as no surprise that Monsignor Cirarda, for example, has been forced to state that "this appears to be a premeditated attempt to alter the fundamental values of Christian life," or that Monsignor Sebastian has asserted that "it is truly an exercise in spiritual violence to impose a militant laicism on a society that is not lay," or that the Episcopal Commission of the Mass Media has repeatedly (and futilely?) published notes protesting broadcasts that would hardly be seen on any other European television network.

C) The Battle in the Moral Arena

I sometimes wonder how future historians will explain why the PSOE administration was in no hurry or perhaps failed to keep its social promises, the major ones in its platform, and, in contrast, was in such a hurry to make changes in morals, which have to do more with radicalism than socialism and seriously wound the conscience of a large part of the nation. I suppose the only logical explanation will be that it is quite easy to introduce an abortion law (when you have a majority) but that it is not at all an easy matter to reduce unemployment. Or they might conclude that an attempt was made to cover up policy failures by tossing a morsel in the direction of the party's radical factions.

It is a dangerous morsel, however, because the abortion law (and especially the way it was enacted) is going to cause many more problems than it has resolved. First of all, it has set the administration at odds with the Church on one of its most gut-level issues. The president is right in saying that "not everything in Catholic morals can be automatically reflected in our laws," but at the same time he is also being enormously naive. Even if we assume that he is right, he ought to realize that every law that is forced down someone's throat winds up

giving indigestion to the person who forced it down. The wound will remain "forever" in the Catholics who have not been contaminated by cheap progressivism, especially since the problems that the law seeks to solve could have been addressed, without affecting principles, by simply adding to the extenuating circumstances or even the exceptions in the Penal Code, in which case the administration would have met with little or no opposition from the Church hierarchy. To make matters worse, the bishops felt deceived, because we now know that just a few days before the elections Alfonso Guerra assured them that the issue of abortion would not be addressed during this legislative session.

It should thus come as no surprise that the pope reminded Felipe Gonzalez of this during their tense meeting in the Vatican in 1983. The Holy See's official communique, something highly unusual in such cases, left no room for doubt:

"As we know, on the sixth the Congress of Deputies passed a bill amending Article 417 of the Penal Code and decriminalizing voluntary abortion in certain cases. The Church's stand on this issue is well known. Deeply concerned, the Spanish bishops have made their views known in this regard, not only in individual statements but also through a joint declaration, clearly asserting the ethical principles that under no circumstances permit the voluntary and direct elimination of the unborn. The holy father clearly set forth this doctrine during his visit to Spain." If this does not clearly draw the battle lines and if the prime minister fails to see it as serious, ongoing grounds for chilly relations, then he is refusing to face the facts. And I don't think it takes a prophet to predict that the new law, aside from leading to increasing deaths of innocent victims, will create more political problems for the administration than it will supposedly resolve.

The Independence of the Church and Its Pastoral Activities

I would now like to talk about a second area of conflict. I will summarize for the sake of brevity and because, strictly speaking, we are dealing with threats rather than actual problems. I will cite at least three that seem to be in the offing: the new law on ecclesiastical patrimony (which the Church feels clearly discriminates against it); the future presence of religion in hospitals (where the first sparks are beginning to fly); and religion in the Armed Forces. At present, these three issues are merely worrisome, but we can see the administration dealing with them in the same narrow-minded way, which could inflict wounds at any moment.

The Bridges of Dialogue

I will now dwell on something more positive: the paths towards an understanding or, at least, coexistence.

I think it obvious that neither the administration nor the Church wants a breakdown in relations, from which they would both lose. The Spanish

church hierarchy has learned one lesson very well: not to side with any political persuasion. It wants to and does feel that it is the Church of the Spanish people, and in a country with a bipolar political system, it realizes that head-on opposition to the Left would inevitably pigeonhole it on the Right. And the Church does not wish to be pigeonholed. Hence it is taking the utmost care to be moderate. This is not because, as Alfonso Guerra says, it is a "paper tiger," because it knows very well the influence that it still exerts on people's minds; it is because it "does not want" to attack anyone. This is its duty, its mission. On the other hand, though, there are stands that it cannot renounce and rights that it must defend.

It is this conflict of duties that at times makes the Church seem as though it is vacillating. A good politician ought to realize, however, that the Church's vacillations have a limit and that one day Thomas More the courtier could become the forthright Thomas More, even if only because he is not too worried about losing his head since he knows that he is guaranteed life elsewhere.

It is a fact, though, and I hope the administration realizes it by now, that the Church hierarchy will always stubbornly call for a dialogue, unless it feels that it is being systematically deceived. It is the Church, therefore, that is constantly seeking to build bridges. There are two very important ones today: the administration-Vatican contacts and the meetings between ministers and bishops. I think that the administration has handled the former acceptably and the latter rather poorly.

We have to acknowledge ungrudgingly that the Socialist government has behaved generously (calmly) during the pope's two trips to Spain. It was helpful, not just courteous. The Spanish people were visibly enthusiastic about his presence, and thus the administration was merely fulfilling its duty regarding something that the people wanted.

I also regard its established relations with the Holy See and the Nunciature as positive, though I will not hide the fact that some of us were upset by certain moves to influence the choice of the future nuncio. In any event, I think that all of the politicians who travel to Rome are being somewhat naive in feeling that they have to underscore how "extremely cordial" their Vatican audiences are. Tell me where your strengths lie, and I'll tell you where you're weak.

The Aroma of an Upcoming Election Campaign

The Socialists are making the same mistake as the last Franco governments, though. They are downplaying their contacts with the bishops and seeking to go over their heads to Rome. A faulty, fruitless approach! Today, in fact, contacts between the administration and the Episcopal Conference are at a low ebb, perhaps because the bishops are tougher negotiators than the Roman diplomats inasmuch as the wounds strike closer to home. For example, the famous Joint Commission (made up of Alfonso Guerra, Ledesma and Maravall on the one hand, and Bishops Delicado, Yanes and Sebastian on

the other) was supposed to hold periodic sessions but has held practically none. It had not met until a few days ago since the tense and tough session on 27 December 1983, and only after the bishops complained about the hiatus. It must be said that the air was noticeably more breathable at this latest gathering, so much so that the bishops said as they left that there was "a certain aroma of an upcoming election campaign" in the air. The problem is, though, that the bishops feel that they are hearing nice words at these meetings but that in most cases they do not translate into action. Also, they fear that the dialogue is merely the administration's way of being pleasant and gaining time, because even when they get "concessions" on certain issues, actual developments soon bring further setbacks. At times they emerge breathing easy, but the trust is not there.

This is the state of affairs today, I feel. The Church is not, of course, seeking a breakoff of relations. But it is certainly not unaware that serious problems exist. And it wonders how long it must remain silent.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

GONZALEZ UNDERGOES PERSONALITY CHANGES

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 5 Aug 85 pp 6, 7

[Commentary by editor Julian Lago: "What's Happening to Felipe Gonzalez?"]

[Text] That morning in Madrid, with the temperature nearing 105 degrees, Prime Minister Gonzalez, his sleeves rolled up, the dark circles under his eyes more pronounced and his shoulders more hunched than ever, was pacing back and forth in his office. Lost in thought, he glanced out the window towards the garden. "But what have I done?" he asked out loud. Txiki, the loyal Txiki Benegas, only listened. That was all he could do. "Why are the reporters out to get me? I don't understand. What have I done to them?" he kept saying as he walked about. Txiki would have gladly given him an answer that morning, as he had so many other times, telling him no, Mr President, it was not true. "Just read EGIN and you'll see what they're doing to me every day." But this time Txiki realized that Felipe, his friend Felipe Gonzalez, was at one of his lowest points, the lowest no doubt since 28 October. The commentaries on the crisis were still heated, and Felipe was angry about the way that Miguel's departure was being interpreted. "He's leaving simply because he's tired." The man who was and is really tired is Felipe.

He had really never been so down, not even last summer when he escaped to Orchila. Or so misunderstood, or so alone amid the vast solitude of the small palace. A few days, maybe a couple of weeks before, after David, Pablo and Maria, little Maria, the apple of his eye, had gone to bed, he confessed to his wife Carmen one night: "There are times, you know, when the benefits of power are not worth it." Just one force kept him and still keeps him going: an enlightened sense of his role in history. Felipe operates on the basis of that personal perspective: for better or for worse he is the prime minister because fate wanted it that way.

For the first time in 2 1/2 years, Felipe Gonzalez, the erstwhile great communicator and brilliant teacher, has lost the thread of his message, the freshness that he conveyed with each of his public appearances, each of his gestures, each of his outbursts. Felipe is no longer Felipe. If you don't believe it, look at the tapes of his most recent speeches, his last news conference: his mouth, dry; his smile, put on, forced; his words, more devoid than ever of political substance, trying to convince others of something that not even he is convinced of: that the government's arguments are always right.

In something of an escape from himself, Felipe Gonzalez is starting to apply formulas for government control over society, pure and simple, formulas that modern psychiatry has already studied. The prestigious German professor Phillips Lerch made a most lucid diagnosis in this regard: "Government leaders wind up suffering from inflated egos and a distortion of reality." This is what tends to happen to politicians, our politicians too, as we can readily infer from Prime Minister Gonzalez's recent behavior. And I am including the "Azor" incident, in which just one detail was missing: getting a diver to gaffe a giant tuna for him so that he could then pose for a photograph with it, smiling from ear to ear for posterity, next to Carmen, Romero of course.

Herein lies his mistake. Felipe carries the spirit of contradiction within himself, as he systematically denies anything that fails to dovetail with his absolute truths. His self-defense mechanism is therefore causing him to exhibit irrational or at least uncalled-for behavior, to raise the entire emotional charge of sociological Francoism from the subconscious to the conscious, to allow himself to be carried away, in the public's eye, by messianic delusions that are becoming dangerous, to him and to everyone else. He always has one last recourse: the reporters are making everything up, even the crisis, his crisis too. No one can deny the evidence, though. Journalists could not have been more understanding about the mistakes that Felipe does, in fact, make, even if he does not believe it. Adolfo [Suarez] would have welcomed comparable treatment, or Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, or anyone. His explanation of the crisis cannot withstand the slightest criticism, plain and simple. In another country, at another juncture of history and with another individual, the criticism of his appearance in front of the cameras would have been implacably devastating. No doubt about it.

Think back to 4 July. Seven pm. Controlling his nerves, Felipe showed his hidden face. A perfect speech that said absolutely nothing, devoid of substance, what the psychiatrists call "metalinguage." Repetitive and ornamental wordiness, as if we were listening to those unintelligible monologues in a Cantinflas film. "No way," "You will agree with me," "I can assure you." Three examples of Felipe's poverty of expression, in stark contrast to his previous articulate self. He was not relaxed in front of his audience, as before, and he did not even add a touch of irony. What is happening to the prime minister then?

Several conclusions can be drawn from simple observation, without delving into further adventure stories. Here we go: a) Felipe Gonzalez is under heavy emotional strain that is causing him to lose control; the situation has become too much for him; b) He can no longer advance strong, sound arguments; c) The wear and tear of power is having a serious impact on him; Felipe is being forced every day to resolve the contradictions between his ideas and reality, and so far he has chosen to deny reality; d) He is visibly exhausted: his nose thinner, his eyes sunken, his face bloated, and e) Deep down, he is sad. In the thick of the crisis Felipe himself unexplainably referred to "sadness as a disease of country folk." A revealing symptom that is almost always associated with an anxiety about

life, with anguish, with a pessimistic view of reality, with lowered expectations and no future.

All of this raises some questions in our minds. First of all, is Felipe's behavior normal? Second, what are the causes of his abnormal conduct? And third, might the Spanish prime minister be suffering from some illness? The president of the United States was, and the White House behaved in exemplary fashion. Ronald Reagan had a cancer operation, and no one kept it under wraps.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

GALLEGO IN INTERVIEW REVEALS MARXIST-LENINIST ORTHODOXY

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 29 Jul 85 pp 36-38

[Interview with Teodoro Ignacio Gallego Bezares, secretary general of the Communist Party (PC), in his office at Fuencarral Street in Madrid; date not given]

[Text] Teodoro Ignacio Gallego Bezares, the secretary general of the PC, says that his party has never received "a single peseta or ruble" in financing from the Soviet Union or any other foreign country. "There are people in the PC who go hungry," Gallego claims, "people who have to hitchhike on trucks to our provincial headquarters. If we had money, we would be going faster. Now then, the lie that we are being financed by the Soviet Union, after being repeated a million times, has wound up catching on."

In a modest office at the party's provisional headquarters on Fuencarral Street in Madrid, the shirt-sleeved PC leader lights up a Winston and adds: "If we were awash in plenty, our activists, who are simple folk, would draw the conclusion that we are a strong party but would think right away that that's not right for a Communist Party and would leave. Now then, when they hear us tell them that we are really hard-up and that the party's celebration is going to cost some 50 million pesetas, they all pitch in."

CAMBIO 16: Is the PC a pro-Soviet party?

Ignacio Gallego: We are internationalist communists. It is true that we get along well with the Soviet communists, the Cubans and the Nicaraguans...but why shouldn't we? When all is said and done, all Communist parties share the same ideal, which is to do away with the capitalist system.

Yet calling us pro-Soviet is an attempt to discredit us. It's a trap. They used to call us Reds and foreigners to discredit us.

CAMBIO 16: Yet the Soviet press treats you better than the other Spanish communists.

Ignacio Gallego: That's true, quite a bit better. Perhaps it's because the press in the USSR and the socialist countries prefers to be treated well rather than poorly. We do not resort to insult. We do not say that things are horrible over there. We do not engage in anti-Sovietism and we receive the same treatment from them. Aside from this, I don't think that there has been extraordinary propaganda for our party in the USSR.

CAMBIO 16: Administration sources say that your party has stronger than normal relations with the CPSU.

Ignacio Gallego: We have friendly relations, but there is no interference. We do not try to influence them, and they do not try to influence us, because just as we wouldn't think of telling them what to do in their country, we don't accept them telling us what to do in Spain.

The Communist International no longer exists. There is an international communist movement, but unlike in the past the parties do not accept the idea of a dominant party to guide them. If it were as easy as they say to set up artificial Communist parties, then the strongest Communist Party in the world would be in the United States, to keep Reagan in line. And it isn't.

CAMBIO 16: What are the main differences between the PC and the Eurocommunist party of Santiago Carrillo and Gerardo Iglesias?

Ignacio Gallego: Eurocommunism is reformist. We, as communists, do not rule out reforms, but we feel that the capitalist system cannot solve the problems facing mankind, no matter how many internal changes are made.

Unlike some Eurocommunists, we communists are in favor taking power to transform society and abolish the capitalist system.

CAMBIO 16: So do you think that Eurocommunism has become the ally of the bourgeoisie and the capitalist system?

Ignacio Gallego: In my opinion, Eurocommunism could wind up like many Socialist parties, which can be around for years but without ending the capitalist system. Inspired by the doctrines of Marx and Engels, Socialist parties have been in power in major countries, have had influence for many years but have shown their inability to transform society.

We are saying that it is not enough to patch up capitalism, as the socialists are doing; it has to be destroyed. Capitalism entails war. Capitalists were responsible for the First and Second World Wars, and now American imperialism is setting the stage for the third. They don't want war in the United States but they don't take too dim a view of a third world war in Europe.

CAMBIO 16: Do you feel that Marxism-Leninism is still valid today?

Ignacio Gallego: No doctrine other than Marxism-Leninism has been discovered that can lead the workers to power. It's not that some forces haven't tried, but none of them have been able to supplant capitalism and impose a classless society that could abolish man's exploitation of man.

CAMBIO 16: Do you feel that the PC is going to play a major role in Spanish society in the near future?

Ignacio Gallego: The Communist Party was born very small and remains very small. Today in Spain we have an organization of 35,000 communists. Looking at our internal history, though, we have grounds for saying that communist ideas in Spain have at least half the influence they do in Portugal. With just half as much influence as in Portugal and the degree of organization that France has, we ought to have some 400,000 members. Why isn't this the case in Spain? Because communists have not had a party that meets their goals they are everywhere except in the PCE.

CAMBIO 16: So the PC seeks to be a party that mobilizes the masses rather than a parliamentary party?

Ignacio Gallego: The two are not contradictory. On the contrary, they complement each other. What we want is what many people in this country want, people who cannot conceive of a democracy without a Communist Party. The proof that things are evolving in this regard can be seen in the march on Torrejon. After we organized them, some 100,000 people showed up. How many people demonstrated before the PC emerged? Some 15,000 or 20,000, according to the organizers themselves. The case was the same with this year's May Day, when we got a large contingent of marchers out on the streets, or when we said hello to Reagan. We were there, and the posters are still on the walls. We were not alone at these demonstrations, but our presence encourages many other parties. With a strong PC, the administration would not be able to pursue the policies it now is.

CAMBIO 16: Some people feel, however, that the PC is manipulating the environmentalist groups and anti-NATO committees...

Ignacio Gallego: For a long time the anti-NATO committees, the environmentalists and others were carrying a just banner against NATO, in defense of life or the environment. We took up their concerns and said, we have to be involved, but we are not trying to be opportunists or to manipulate these groups. What we are saying is that a defense of the environment, the quality of life and all such things have to be included in a movement to transform society. Protecting trees in a capitalist society will keep them alive only as long some real estate firm wants it that way. Uprooting capitalism puts an end to all problems.

CAMBIO 16: How do you judge the administration's NATO policy?

Ignacio Gallego: This is one of the biggest frauds that the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] has committed. They said first that we would leave the same way we entered: via a parliamentary majority. They had a parliamentary majority, and we did not leave. They then claimed that there would be a referendum and finally they said that the referendum would not be binding. One day the Socialists say yes and the next day they say no. Now they're trying to see how they can pull the wool over our eyes by staging a referendum that they can win or, if they somehow don't, that doesn't count.

CAMBIO 16: What do you think about the cutback of U.S. bases in Spain?

Ignacio Gallego: My view is that the PSOE is trying to get us into NATO and, at the same time, trying to manipulate us with the alleged cutback in the bases. The bases have to be dismantled, not reduced in number. What do I care if they remove a thousand soldiers from Torrejon and Rota if they install missiles in Europe, which are a bigger threat.

CAMBIO 16: Do you think that the United States is pressuring Felipe Gonzalez on the NATO issue?

Ignacio Gallego: It's more than pressure. It's coercion and orders. When the PSOE administration spoke of a cutback in the bases, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and other American politicians stated clearly what they would and would not tolerate. This is preposterous. If Spain stays in NATO, tied hand and foot to the Common Market, renounces an economic policy of its own and, as Boyer said, waits for things to pick up in the United States so that the U.S. locomotive will pull us along, we are headed straight for a catastrophe.

CAMBIO 16: Why does the PC oppose Spain's membership in the Common Market?

Ignacio Gallego: It is neither in the economic interest of the workers nor in the national interest to join the Common Market. The European Economic Community is dominated by the strongest European powers and is heavily influenced by U.S. imperialist policy. The Common Market is not a panacea. We have joined so that they can tell us that we have to get rid of our cows, that Galician fishermen have to tie up their boats and that this is what we should and should not be producing. Under those conditions we are always going to come out losers.

CAMBIO 16: Why has the PC called for a general strike against a socialist government?

Ignacio Gallego: The argument that there should be no general strike under a socialist government suggests another to me: that the constitution ought to say that the workers should keep their right to a general strike in reserve and never use it; otherwise, what good is this right to us workers.

When the Socialists criticize us for having called a general strike, what they are really saying is that they want a sort of privileged impunity whereby we have to stand idly by even if wages are cut four percent, even if three million people are unemployed, even if half of our young people have not gotten their first jobs and even if pensions are slashed. All the Socialists need to do now is tell Nicolas Redondo to do with the General Union of Workers exactly what the Francoist Jose Solis Ruiz did with the vertical labor unions.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

ADMINISTRATION'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICY DETAILED

Madrid REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES in Spanish Jan-Mar 85 pp 111-124

[Article by Luisa Trevino]

[Text] In an effort to make an assessment of the foreign policy of the socialist government with regard to Latin America, with special emphasis on its Central American aspect, it should be noted that the task is not easy, 22 months after the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) was installed in the government, because of the limited perspective due to the recent nature of events. However, despite these limitations, there are some general guidelines which may provide a more or less clear idea of the Spanish position with regard to this region.

The Spanish socialists used the so-called "policy of change" as an electoral and government thesis. However, one of the main difficulties encountered in "change" in the international sector is due to the fact that because of its "own identity, it tends toward repetitive stability," as Spanish internationalist Roberto Mesa Garrido explains.¹

The general outlines of the socialist foreign policy, according to the statements made by Felipe Gonzalez himself in June of 1980 (when he headed the Spanish opposition), do not differ substantially from those proposed by the Democratic Center Union (UCD), the party then in power. For example, EL PAIS editorialized as follows at that time: "The statements by Felipe Gonzalez on foreign policy have not improved on either the quality or the precision of those pursued by Mr Oreja"² (who was then minister of foreign affairs. In fact, the main subjects of Spanish concern were and continue to be integration in Europe, the form of participation in Western defense, and relations with the neighboring European nations, the United States, Latin America and the Arab world. Despite this thematic continuity, it must be recognized that substantial differences do exist concerning the treatment and attitude the socialist government has adopted in this short period of administration, if a comparison is made with the policy pursued by the preceding centrist governments, and without a doubt, if it is contrasted with the foreign policy in the Franco era.

In fact, the democratization of the Spanish political system, and more specifically the electoral triumph of the socialists, have made the

formulation of Spain's foreign policy more complex, above all due to the need to redefine it. Spain is seeking, then, to find the space it should occupy in the international sector following the changes resulting from the successes in its democratic process. In this connection, it would be enlightening to quote a statement by the Spanish political scientist Ignacio Sotelo. "The more autonomous the conduct of Spain on the international scene is...in those sectors which do not coincide with those of hegemonic power, the greater the difficulties, the more viable the contradictions, the larger the risks and the more probable the partial defeats will be. On the other hand, if we return to the fold, if we accept the role assigned us from outside, if we reject having a foreign policy and go along with the mere administration of foreign relations, the greater the tranquility and seeming consistency will be."³ Spain, as its present minister of foreign affairs has repeatedly stated, is seeking to achieve a greater degree of autonomy in the international sector, and this has brought upon it a series of criticisms coming from one sector of public opinion, from the opposition parties farthest to the right in the political spectrum, and from the most conservative sectors, which would like to be "aligned" with the foreign policy of the West, led by the United States.

In addition to the priorities in the negotiations with the European Economic Community and the links with the West in general, it is a well-known fact that Spain, for historical and cultural reasons, has traditionally had a special interest in the policy with regard to Spanish-speaking America, which has since the reestablishment of the monarchy been strengthened by the interest of the crown. Since his coronation in November of 1975, His Majesty Juan Carlos I has shown a great interest in everything pertaining to relations with Latin America. It should be recalled that one of his first trips abroad was to America in 1976, and that the Western hemisphere has been paid frequent visits by our monarchs (Dominican Republic, United States, Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Canada, Mexico, Peru, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay). Also, our monarch, since his initial activities, has evidenced great interest in the proposed creation of a community of nations in the area which would include Spain and Latin America, to be known as the Ibero-American Community of Nations. Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, for his part, has voiced his predilection for and attraction to the Latin American continent. Prime Minister Gonzalez is universally regarded as one of the present European leaders who best understands the situation in the area. His position as vice president of the Socialist International (SI) for this zone and his special concern with Latin American themes have contributed to the development of this image. It is widely recognized, then, that Latin America "is the sector on which (Prime Minister Gonzalez) has focused all his priorities."⁴ Similarly, one must take into consideration the characteristics of the present minister of foreign affairs, Fernando Moran, a known intellectual, the author of one of the first monographs on the foreign policy of Spain since the Franco era and one of the few Spanish internationalists who could not be classified as Eurocentrist. In fact, Moran is a diplomat specializing in African affairs, which without a doubt implies a more open approach toward the understanding of situations outside the boundaries of Europe, as in the case of Latin America.

All of these elements have come together to bring about, in fact, a substantial change in Spanish policy toward Latin America. And although

during the Franco era this policy had no major projection, but was rather viewed in terms of the imperialist past, and under the centrist administrations, an effort was made to fill the relations with Latin America with content, it is without a doubt now that we are achieving a change in image which will put the memory of imperialist Spain definitively behind us.

In connection with the principles of foreign activity by the Spanish government with regard to Latin America, it would be well to refer to the "Government Statement on Foreign Policy" published in the BOLETIN OFICIAL DE LAS CORTES GENERALES on 22 October 1983.⁵ In this connection, the desire to pursue "a conversion of "...the traditional policy on Latin America, moving from the rhetorical level to that of reality," was set forth.

Similarly, it was indicated that Spain has engaged in actions and will continue to do so with a view to defending human rights on that continent, and has shown interest in supporting the emerging democratic processes in some of the countries in the area.

Now then, it should be noted that Spain is applying the principle of universality in diplomatic relations, and is thus maintaining formal links with all of the Latin American countries.

The Spanish government has placed stress on the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of the nations in the region, and therefore, rising above its ideological and political differences with some of the regimes in the zone, it maintains good relations with all of them. In the case of Guatemala, an exception was made because of the attack on the embassy of Spain in Guatemala in January of 1980, resulting in led to the suspension of diplomatic relations, which were only reestablished after lengthy negotiations in September of 1984. Despite the existence of good relations with all of these countries, there is without a doubt closer exchange and cooperation with those with which, in addition to the historic and cultural links, political-ideological similarities are shared. In this connection, Minister Moran said before the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission that "we maintain the principle of nonintervention, but not the principle of equality and intensity of treatment."⁶

The subject of Central America has been the focus of attention on the part of the socialist government, and more particularly, Prime Minister Gonzalez. In this connection it should be recalled that it was at the request of the PSOE that the UCD government supported the Joint Mexican-French Declaration pertaining to the recognition of the revolutionary forces in El Salvador during the last legislature. Later, when this initiative failed to prosper, Felipe Gonzalez began to publicize his view that it would be desirable to convoke a conference in which all of the countries in the area, including Cuba and the United States, would participate, in order to seek a solution to the conflict. This idea came to be called the "Little Helsinki," which without a doubt implied placing the Central American conflict within the context of the East-West confrontation. However, following his investiture as prime minister, his position began to alter. Thus in December of 1982, in an interview granted to EL PAIS, he said that "the greatest error committed in politics is seeking to be a protagonist at a time when one is not called upon

to lead any cause. The political leaders in all the countries I have visited (before becoming prime minister) are aware of my readiness and that of the Spanish government to cooperate in a project of peace, democracy and Latin American continental development." And he added that "I am going to begin to discuss this readiness with the individuals I know, but cautiously, because I do not want to act too early or too late. I do not want Spain to take steps in advance of the countries in the region which are pursuing the path toward peace, because otherwise the intervention would come down to this: intervention in quotation marks and underlined, something which does not seem to me to be positive."⁷ It is worth recalling in this connection that in October of 1982, there was talk of a peace effort in which the United States participated, together with some Latin American countries, excluding Cuba, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Mexico and Venezuela, which had initially been invited, did not attend the meeting held at that time. In this context, it is safe to suppose that Spain did not want to commit itself to supporting or launching new initiatives until it had some clear idea of their viability. The experience in supporting the joint French-Mexican communique on El Salvador very possibly contributed to the pursuit of a cautious policy. In this connection, the statements made by Minister Moran are indicative. "No ground was lost in Central America, but very simply, the initiatives have not been taken up. We might do something very spectacular from the ideological point of view, like the Franco-Mexican declaration in 1980, but what would be gained by doing so if we then bogged down, as occurred in that case?"⁸

In January of 1983, the foreign ministers of Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela agreed to meet on the Panamanian island of Contadora, where they drafted a joint declaration with a view to attempting to resolve the conflict through diplomatic actions and policies based on dialogue and negotiation. They issued a warning, moreover, that it would be highly undesirable to incorporate the Central American conflicts in the context of the East-West confrontation.

Minister Moran, for his part, said during a luncheon at the International Press Club in January of 1983 that "the idea of a 'Little Helsinki' is one which would be complicated to implement, and unfortunately, I do not think its execution could have immediate success. The situations in Central America are not all black and white, and they cannot all be related exclusively to the East-West situation." He also announced that Spain would work "bilaterally with Cuba..., with the countries at the Contadora meeting," but he specified that it was not a question of any "spectacular Spanish initiative."⁹

In March of this year, Bernardo Sepulveda, the Mexican secretary of foreign relations, visited Spain, and although one of the main subjects of his talks both with the prime minister and with the Spanish minister of foreign affairs without a doubt involved an analysis of the Central American situation, no decision for joint action in this regard was adopted on that occasion, and it can be said that it was basically a matter of making a first contact on the issue. Secretary Sepulveda said in response to a question from the press as to whether Mexico had asked for some collaboration from the Spanish government that "there is no focus of this sort as such. What is wanted is for the countries with similar projects and in agreement on the best way of resolving the crisis to unite their efforts in joint and continuous action."¹⁰

The following month, in other words April of 1983, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, Fernando Moran, visited Mexico and Colombia. In the joint statement issued in connection with his visit to Mexico, a considerable part of the content of the first Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Group was set forth.

On 20 April, the day following Minister Moran's return to Spain, the Council of Ministers published a statement in support of the peace undertaking of the Contadora Group. Similarly, the press reported, Minister Moran indicated his desire to promote support for the Contadora Group from the countries of Western Europe, if and when it was solicited by the members of that group.

Between 27 and 30 April, the meeting on the theme "Ibero-America--Encounter With Democracy," organized by the ICI [Ibero-American Cooperation Institute] and attended by a number of political and intellectual leaders from the various Latin American countries, was held in Madrid. Invitations were not issued on the government level, but personally, for the purpose of gathering together individuals regarded as capable of contributing to the democratic process in that region. In this connection, Prime Minister Gonzalez said about the Central American conflict: "The greatest merit of the Contadora Group is that it exists, simply that the effort exists. For although there is no concrete formulation at a given moment which is acceptable to all, the fact that two individuals, who in the final analysis feel that they are brothers, negotiate at a table makes it much more difficult for them to take up machine guns against each other when they leave that place. The Contadora Group has tremendous value in that the parties involved sat down to engage in dialogue, respecting the positions of all, maintaining an exchange which replaces death with words...."¹¹

In May of 1983, the ambassador of Spain to the United Nations Organization (UN) spoke before the Security Council in defense of the efforts of the Contadora Group as an undertaking seeking a just and reasonable solution to the Central American conflict.

Between 30 May and 5 June, Prime Minister Gonzalez made a tour of Latin America, paying official visits to the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela, Panama and Mexico. Apart from establishing closer bilateral links, this trip was designed to multiply the contacts with the leaders in the Contadora Group, with whom, in the words of Minister Moran, "there is a high level of agreement in the analysis of the Central American crisis."¹²

The visit paid by Prime Minister Gonzalez to the United States of America that same month provided a major opportunity for exchanging points of view on the Central American conflict. In this connection, it is worth recalling that the U.S. undersecretary of state for Latin America, Thomas Enders (currently the ambassador in Madrid) had visited Spain in January of that same year, and in this connection a joint communique had been issued in which agreement on some points in the respective foreign policies with regard to Central America was set forth, but on the other hand, the existence of different points of view in the analysis of the situation was also noted. The prime minister, on his return from his trip, placed stress on the fact that his country was the only

European nation to which the United States was prepared to listen concerning the Latin American issue, this area being regarded as its "back yard." He said that "we have succeeded in becoming the only European country which has been able to set forth its positions concerning the Latin American continent clearly to the United States."¹³

On the other hand, the summit meeting of the Community nations held in Stuttgart in June of this year included in its final communique a paragraph indicating support of the undertaking of the Contadora Group sponsored by the Spanish government, while it said that if indeed Spain was not the agency for winning this support, it did indeed contribute to a better understanding of the situation in the area on the part of the countries on the old continent.

In July of 1983, the chiefs of state and cabinet heads of the member countries of the Contadora Group met in Cancun, where they issued a document known as the Cancun Declaration, setting forth a first approach for the formulation of a plan and concrete proposals for the pacification of the area. The Spanish government, for its part, issued a press statement on the day following the publication of the document in question in which it reiterated its support of the Contadora Group and gave a very positive assessment of the contents of the Cancun Declaration.

On 9 August of that same year, the Diplomatic Information Office (OID) released a press statement in which it indicated the concern of the Spanish government about the joint (U.S.-Honduras) land and aeronaval maneuvers in Central America, recalling that this type of action violated the spirit of the Contadora Group, which the United States had supported.

On 19 August, the diplomatic representatives of the Contadora Group countries accredited to Spain delivered a document from the chiefs of state and cabinet heads in their respective countries to President Gonzalez. In it, they expressed their thanks for the Spanish support of the peace initiatives for Central America.

In September of that same year, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs reiterated Spain's support of the Contadora Group within the framework of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

In October of 1983, Richard Stone, the special U.S. envoy to Central America, visited Madrid and met with Prime Minister Gonzalez and Minister Moran to exchange views on the Central American conflict.

On 26 October, the Spanish government published a statement on the invasion of Grenada, condemning the action. Later (in November of that year), Spain voted for a resolution condemning the invasion of Grenada in the United Nations General Assembly.

In December of 1983, Prime Minister Gonzalez went to Buenos Aires for the purpose of attending the inauguration of President Raul Alfonsin. There he held talks with a goodly number of Latin American political leaders to analyze the situation on the continent and the Central American conflict.

At the beginning of January 1984, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs paid official visits to Cuba and Costa Rica, and met in San Jose with the Spanish ambassadors accredited to the countries in the area, with a view to standardizing criteria and studying how to make the foreign policy of his country with regard to this region more effective.

Henry Kissinger, the former U.S. secretary of state, paid a private visit to Spain from 17 to 22 January 1981 for the purpose of making known the contents of the so-called Kissinger Report on Central America, drafted by members of a bipartisan commission made up of representatives of the two leading political forces in the United States, the Republican and Democratic Parties. To this end, the visitor had an audience with His Majesty Juan Carlos I and meetings with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, Vice President Alfonso Guerra and Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernando Moran. The American statesman termed the meeting with Prime Minister Gonzalez "extremely friendly," and he said that in fact they analyzed the Central American conflict, although he made it clear that he did not ask for Spanish support of the contents of the report drafted by the bipartisan commission.¹⁴ Prime Minister Gonzalez, for his part, later said in Caracas: "It is necessary to insist on peace as the only solution to the problems in the area," thus revealing his differences with the thesis in the Kissinger Report, which proposed military aid to the governments of the countries regarded as "allies." The Spanish official said in connection with the document that he agreed with the "diagnosis" of the problem and he ascribed a positive value to it, noting that the situation in Central America had been set forth in overall fashion for the first time. However, he said that "we do not agree on the remedy. One must not offer the option of peace or war," because military intervention "would return Central America to the root of the problem."¹⁵

With regard to the interview with Minister Moran, it should be noted that he pointed out the unease caused his government by the criticisms in the Kissinger Report directed at Spanish colonization in Central America, to which blame was ascribed for the structural problems of the region. The Spanish minister termed these considerations "profoundly unjust," and he pointed out that while there was some truth involved, later factors were omitted, clearly alluding to the U.S. influence. In this respect, the U.S. visitor noted that the Spanish minister "was right."¹⁶

In Kissinger's view, the role Spain can play in Central America involves basically preventing the political situation from deteriorating by acting as a mediator, while contributing, in the economic sector, to the development of the countries in the region.

In January of 1984, Prime Minister Gonzalez made special reference to Latin America in speaking to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, going into detail on the Central American aspect. "The tension and the violence in Central America have continued to be a constant threat to peace. Spain has supported the efforts of the Contadora Group without reservation, in the profound conviction that if these efforts fail, it will be difficult to prevent war from breaking out. Europe cannot remain aloof from this situation but must make its voices heard and must render its concrete aid, so that these peoples can emerge from the suffering in which they are

plunged. It is important to Latin America that Europe understand its problems."¹⁷ As a first step, Prime Minister Gonzalez proposed that representatives of the democratic forces in Latin America, both in the government and in the opposition, visit the Council of Europe for the purpose of setting forth their problems and aspirations directly and without intermediaries. Also, he suggested that a mission representing the Council of Europe visit the Central American countries and those in the Contadora Group to learn about the problems of the region at close hand. Finally, the Spanish official urged Europe to make a greater effort to implement the aid to the emerging democracies in Latin America efficiently.

At the beginning of February of this year, the prime minister attended the inauguration of the new Venezuelan president, and he signed the document known as the Caracas Declaration, voicing total support of the efforts of the Contadora Group, in the Venezuelan capital, along with seven Latin American chiefs of state.

On this occasion, Prime Minister Gonzalez once again explained his government's position with regard to the Central American conflict, stating that "to the extent that the presidents in the Contadora Group ask us for something, we will always be available to them. The protagonist's role falls to the Contadora Group, and I believe that it is playing it well, making a magnificent effort in direct and active diplomacy from every point of view, and avoiding an increase in very delicate tension. Peace in Central America is a necessary condition. In other words, a program for development, for struggle against injustice and for strengthening of democratic institutions must be added to it, but there is a prerequisite without which all the rest is practically impossible. And the effort of the Contadora Group is oriented basically toward achieving peace, without forgetting the other proper conditions, that is to say the need to make progress in development and to affirm the democratic institutions."¹⁸

In March of this year, the Ibero-American Cooperation Institute, together with the European Journalists' Association (APE), held a seminar on the subject "Europe in View of the Changes in the Ibero-American Southern Cone" in Madrid, as yet another demonstration of the desire of Spain to assist a democratizing process in the Latin American countries. On this last point, mention should be made of the visit paid Argentina by Prime Minister Gonzalez in December of 1983; that of Brazilian President Joao Baptista Figueiredo to Spain in April of 1984, and that of Argentine President Raul Alfonsin, from 11 to 14 June. In this connection, the Spanish government has stressed the need to strengthen and support the emerging democratic processes. Similarly, the socialist organizations, specifically the PSOE, have convoked and participated in popular demonstrations protesting the dictatorial regime in Chile, and the government has insisted to the Uruguayan authorities that human rights must be respected.

President Luis Alberto Monge of Costa Rica paid an official to Spain from 28 May to 1 June. In this connection, the Spanish government made numerous references to the need to support the Contadora Group, because it believes it represents a viable alternative in the search for a peaceful solution.

During his stay in Madrid, President Monge announced his desire to convoke a joint meeting of foreign affairs ministers of the EEC and Central American countries, with the foreign ministers of Spain and Portugal and the Contadora Group nations participating.

Spain accepted the invitation, and although some problems arose because there were no diplomatic relations with Guatemala at that time (since that country apparently vetoed Spain's participation), diplomatic relations were in fact reestablished before the San Jose meeting was held.

In the work of preparation for the San Jose meeting, Spain participated actively with the Community nations, reiterating the need to provide the Contadora Group with political support and stressing the desirability of aiding the Central American nations economically in an effective way.

At the conclusion of the San Jose meeting, which was held on 28 and 29 September, Spain, along with France, Greece and Portugal, stated its intention to sign the protocol supplementing the revised version of the Contadora document, in yet one more demonstration of its support of the regional pacification effort.

In analyzing the results of the meeting, Minister Moran said that it confirmed the wisdom of the Spanish foreign policy in announcing its integration in the EEC, without neglect of its presence in Latin America. He said that "today, for the first time, we can see how the two main axes of Spanish foreign policy converge, how not only is there no contradiction between our commitment to Europe and our commitment to America, but that it is also possible for Spain to make a substantial contribution to this new dialogue which it has always urged."¹⁹

Spain, fearing that the San Jose meeting might provoke U.S. fears, said through its minister of foreign affairs that the meeting was not of an anti-U.S. nature, explaining that in its view, a situation in which only one Western country, the United States, had had an influence on this zone was "unhealthy."

It can be said that the San Jose meeting was a success, in the sense that a dialogue between the two regions was possible, and support of the Contadora Group undertaking as the means for achieving pacification was strengthened.

Moreover, the Spanish Principality of Asturias Foundation awarded the governments of the Contadora Group member nations the Ibero-American Cooperation Prize for 1984. In this connection, the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela and the former foreign minister of Panama met in Spain from 15 to 17 October. Also they took this opportunity to meet with His Majesty Juan Carlos I, Prime Minister Gonzalez and their Spanish counterpart, Fernando Moran. The Spanish press, generally speaking, reported this event in positive fashion. The commentary by the diplomatic correspondent of DIARIO 16 was illustrative. It said that "...the importance to democratic Spain of playing an active role in the process of peace on the American continent justifies the statement that we are dealing with what has been called the most important foreign policy undertaking pursued in Spanish

diplomacy during our political transition." And he added that "Prime Minister Gonzalez knows how delicate the issue is now, and has offered his full personal support, but with such great tact as to avoid those aspects which would justify charges of interventionism."²⁰

The Spanish monarch, for his part, said at the ceremony at which the prizes were awarded: "...I hope you will allow me, in addition to the awards, and as a supplement to and summary of all of them, to make special mention of the presidents of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, represented here by their respective foreign ministers, whose valiant efforts for peace have cleared a hopeful path toward concord and understanding among the peoples and toward progress in freedom. These are efforts which merit our support and applause, as the jury was most capable of recognizing in awarding them this high distinction."²¹

The representatives of the Contadora Group held a working meeting in Madrid and issued a joint statement in which, in addition to agreeing on the need to incorporate some of the comments of the Central American countries in the text of the Contadora Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, in its revised version, voiced their "special gratitude" to His Majesty Juan Carlos I for the Principality of Asturias award, "indicated their satisfaction" with the audience they had with Prime Minister Gonzalez, and expressed their thanks for the hospitality and friendship of the Spanish people and authorities, making special mention of Minister Fernando Moran.

In addition to actions of this formal nature, it cannot be denied that Madrid has in recent times become a focus for the meeting of political leaders, both from Latin America and the United States and Europe, for the analysis of Ibero-American problems. The foreign ministers of the majority of the Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Cuba, Panama) and some other Latin American countries have visited Madrid. Similarly, the chiefs of state of Colombia, Brazil, Costa Rica and Argentina have paid official visits to this city. Stopovers in the Spanish capital include those made jointly by Cuban President Fidel Castro and the coordinator of the Nicaraguan Government Junta, Daniel Ortega, last February. Private visits have also been paid by a number of Latin American leaders representing different ideologies, from the representative of the Salvadoran opposition, Guillermo Ungo, to the anti-Sandinist Eden Pastora, and including Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez. Meetings have also been held in Madrid by leaders of the Socialist International, such as Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky, and they have taken up the Latin American situation, with special reference to the Central American conflict.

The Spanish authorities have also paid a series of visits to Latin American countries. Since the socialists came to power, the king has visited Brazil and Uruguay, the prince of Asturias has visited Colombia, Prime Minister Gonzalez has visited Argentina, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Panama and Mexico, and the Spanish minister of foreign affairs has visited Brazil, Uruguay, Cuba, Costa Rica, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, the Dominican Republic, etc. The president of the ICI, for his part, has visited the majority of the countries in that region.

On the other hand, it should be noted that both the king and Prime Minister Gonzalez and Minister Moran have frequently made use of international forums and interviews with the political leaders of Third World countries to take up the subject of Latin America, with special reference to Central America, and specifically to Spanish support of the Contadora Group peace effort.

The economic aspect merits special comment, because of the seriousness of the crisis, and specifically because of the problem foreign indebtedness represents. In its double position as a debtor and creditor country, Spain has made an effort to understand the situation of Latin America. Its entry into the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) as an observer nation in December of 1982 has doubtless contributed to a better understanding of the situation. Similarly, the visits paid to Spain by the executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Enrique Iglesias, have certainly helped Spain to gain an overall view of the economic problems of the region. Its position as an observer nation both in the Organization of American States (OAS) and in the Andean Pact is also a factor to be taken into account in assessing how familiar Spain is with Latin American problems.

Now then, on the practical level, as a creditor nation, Spain has agreed to renegotiate the debts of some Latin American countries bilaterally, although the conditions have not always been fully satisfactory to the debtor countries. In this connection, Prime Minister Gonzalez has stressed the difficult economic situation which Spain too is experiencing.

Parallel with this, Spain has also, as Minister Moran has repeatedly pointed out, contributed to the achievement by Latin America of better conditions in the negotiations on the refinancing of the foreign debt within the context of the Club of Rome.

Similarly, in its capacity as a debtor country, Spain has evidenced its discomfort with the recent increases in interest rates in the United States, thus (although for its own special reasons) joining in the Latin American protest on this matter.

The Spanish monarch, for his part, supported the so-called Quito Declaration, and the ICI has implemented a program of economic and technological aid for the Latin American countries, the first phase of which began with the dispatch of Spanish technicians to certain countries in Central America (Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua).

Spain has also been one of the countries which, as an observer, has participated most enthusiastically in support of the Committee To Aid Central American Economic Development (CADESCA), recently established (December 1983) within the context of the Latin American Economic System (SELA), which in a way serves as the "economic arm" of the Contadora Group.

The Latin American nations, for their part, have insistently voiced their concern about the effects Spanish membership in the European Economic Community may have on Spanish-Ibero-American relations.

By way of final comments on the foreign policy of the socialist government with regard to Latin America, it could be said that in fact the government of Felipe Gonzalez has made an effort to intensify relations with the countries in the zone. However, the world economic crisis and the serious problem of Latin-American foreign indebtedness have had a negative effect on the volume of trade with Spain, which can basically be explained in terms of the reduction in imports urged by the International Monetary Fund, and bilateral problems, above all the private debt. Therefore, despite the political will evidenced by the socialist government, these relations are not easy.

Within this context, the Spanish government has chosen to work toward a major political rapprochement, which if compared with the situation which prevailed during the UCD administrations, is truly substantial. The idea underlying this whole rapprochement is without a doubt preparation for the celebration of the fifth centennial of the discovery of America, which it is hoped can serve as a future plan working toward the creation of an Ibero-American community of nations.

Madrid, October 1984

FOOTNOTES

1. Roberto Mesa Garrido, "Socialist Foreign Policy," published in the daily newspaper EL PAIS, Madrid, 3 May 1984.
2. EL PAIS, editorial entitled "The Foreign Policy of the PSOE," Madrid, 2 June 1980.
3. Ignacio Sotelo, "The Identity of Spain," EL PAIS, Madrid, 15 December 1983.
4. Roberto Mesa Garrido, op. cit.
5. Spain, "Government Statement on Foreign Policy for Debate in Plenary Session," published in the BOLETIN OFICIAL DE LAS CORTES GENERALES, 22 October 1983, and reprinted in "Activities, Texts and Documents on Spanish Foreign Policy," 1983, Madrid, pp 825 and 828.
6. Fernando Moran, address to the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission, 30 June 1983, published in "Activities, Texts and Documents on Spanish Foreign Policy," 1983, p 410.
7. Felipe Gonzalez, interview carried in EL PAIS, Madrid, 12 December 1982.
8. Fernando Moran, statements to the magazine MAYO, Madrid, March 1983.
9. Fernando Moran, statements made at the International Press Club, 26 January 1983, published in "Activities, Texts and Documents on Spanish Foreign Policy," 1983, p 82.
10. Bernardo Sepulveda Amor, statements made to the weekly EL SOCIALISTA, Madrid, March 1983.

11. Felipe Gonzales, address delivered at the closing ceremony of the seminar on "Ibero-America--Encounter With Democracy," Madrid, 30 April 1983, reprinted in "Activities, Texts and Documents on Spanish Foreign Policy," p 297.
12. Fernando Moran, statements made to EL PAIS, Madrid, 22 October 1983.
13. Felipe Gonzalez, speech during the debate "On the State of the Nation," Madrid, 20 September 1983, reprinted in "Activities, Texts and Documents on Spanish Foreign Policy," pp 465-466.
14. See EL PAIS, Madrid, 21 January 1984.
15. See YA, Madrid, 3 February 1984.
16. See EL PAIS, Madrid, 22 January 1984.
17. Felipe Gonzalez, address delivered to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 31 January 1984, reprinted in ESPANA HOY, No 7, January 1984.
18. Felipe Gonzalez, statements reprinted in the daily newspaper ABC, Madrid, 3 February 1984.
19. Fernando Moran, statements made to EL PAIS, Madrid, 2 October 1984.
20. See DIARIO 16, Madrid, 16 October 1984.
21. His Majesty Juan Carlos I, speech carried in EL PAIS, Madrid, 17 October 1984.

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CSO: 3548/148

MILITARY

DENMARK

SDP DEFENSE SPOKESMAN EXPLAINS PARTY'S ARMS, NATO STANDS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 8 Aug 85 p 6

[Op Ed Article: "Budtz on Danish Interests" by Lasse Budtz, M.P. (Social Democratic Party)]

[Text] It seems to me that the commentary in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE on 2 August by Niels Jorgen Haagerup, director and editor, is a reasonable contribution to the foreign policy and security policy debates which all parties should be interested in seeing carried on in the media as well.

In so saying, I have, of course, not stated that I agree with Niels Jorgen Haagerup on his position in principle. He, however, writes quite correctly that it is not possible to lay down in purely objective terms in all respects what serves Danish interests best. Nevertheless, he actually states both in the introductory and conclusive statements of his commentary that the foreign policy pursued by the majority is not concerned with safeguarding and promoting Danish interests.

Niels Jorgen Haagerup is well within his rights in making this statement, but it is clearly a subjective point of view which is not shared by the Social Democratic Party. We, of course, find that the disarmament policy and policy of detente to which we would like to contribute are in the very interests of Denmark.

Niels Jorgen Haagerup, on the other hand, is quite right in stating that the positions taken by the Social Democratic Party in several areas differ from those of the Socialist People's Party and the Radical Liberal Party. We have no doubt, for example, that Denmark ought to remain a member of NATO. We are also of the opinion that unilateral Danish steps toward a nuclear-free zone are detrimental to the possibilities of establishing a Nordic zone and the possibilities of including the Baltic in that zone.

We support efforts to prevent the deployment of nuclear arms on Danish soil in times of peace, emergency and war. We find, however, that such a freedom from nuclear arms may be best achieved on a Nordic basis--also because the nuclear-free zone will thus become quite large. As Niels Jorgen Haagerup

also writes quite correctly, we do not believe that the zone will provide us with any definitive guarantee that Denmark will not become subject to nuclear attacks, but we believe that the zone may contribute to promoting the possibilities of detente.

One of the basic positions in Niels Jorgen Haagerup's commentary is that the common denominators of the foreign policy and security policy, advocated by the majority despite disagreements on important points, will reduce Denmark's influence internationally. But that viewpoint involves that, in order to obtain influence for Denmark, we have to advocate a foreign policy toward which we are more than skeptical and which, in a number of areas, we directly oppose. That cannot possibly be right.

But to this comes that supposing that in the coming years possibilities are created for Social Democratic governments in countries such as Great Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands and Norway, a Danish foreign policy implemented in accordance with the position of the majority of the population on foreign policy issues will suddenly exert an influence or contribute to producing new joint European disarmament initiatives, which are lacking at present. As is well-known, the present Danish government does not make any efforts to actively implement the foreign policy of the majority.

Somewhere in his commentary, Niels Jorgen Haagerup writes that Egon Bahr of the German SPD has a bigger influence on the Danish foreign policy than the chairman of the Danish Foreign Policy Committee. That ought to be a piece of truth with modifications. The truth is that, via the so-called Scandilux cooperation, it was found that the interests of a number of Social Democratic parties coincided, which is an entirely different matter from attributing any major influence to Egon Bahr, as is done by Niels Jorgen Haagerup. One might as well say that it is the other parties that have influenced the foreign policy of the SPD.

And with all due respect to the chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee--he wants to act as an intermediary and acts with authority and occasionally with a pleasant sense of humor--it has never been the chairmanship itself as an institution that has exerted an influence on the foreign policy.

Niels Jorgen Haagerup is entirely wrong in claiming that the European policy is not being pursued on the basis of thorough analyses of what serves Danish interests best. The Social Democratic Party itself has carried through very thorough analyses of this issue, and we are at present in the middle of a new extensive study in a committee in the hope of arriving at what might be called a modernization of the European cooperation. We have no doubt that a closer European cooperation has become increasingly necessary as a result of the negative effects of the policies pursued by the superpowers. However, we also find that an expanded European cooperation must not cause small countries such as Denmark to become the prisoners of the major European countries. For, in that case, we shall really lose our influence. However, I shall honestly admit that it is difficult to find the right cooperation model. We should all of us respect one another's opinions and intentions. Niels Jorgen Haagerup and those similarly disposed should, therefore, also respect the fact that

the Social Democratic Party naturally wants to participate in formulating a foreign policy and security policy which, in our opinion, will safeguard and promote Danish interests in the necessary international cooperation.

7262

CSO: 3613/183

MILITARY

FINLAND

FORCES' COMMANDER WANTS MORE ANTI-AIR MISSILES FOR LAPLAND

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 11 Aug 85 p 8

[Article: "Valtanen Dissatisfied with Reserve Training. More Missiles for Lapland"]

[Text] Lapland's air defense will be improved by procuring more missiles and by renewing air defense cannon equipment, told the commander of the armed forces, Gen Jaakko Valtanen in an interview published in the POHJOLAN SANOMAT on Saturday. In addition to the defense equipment, efforts will be made to enhance the capacity of the air space surveillance system in Lapland.

In the interview, Valtanen gave a very satisfactory grade to the total defense of Lapland. According to Valtanen, in the next few years, combining some military districts will become of current interest, along with the organizational reform. He also hoped that the number of men trained in reserve exercises will be raised from the present, 40,000 men, to 80,000 men per year.

According to Valtanen, presently only half of the requirement is trained annually in the reserve training exercises. "We have proposed that we should train about 80,000 reservists per year. In that way we could obtain a training cycle in which the troops to be established in mobilization could be assembled from the units trained in the reserve," he calculated.

Valtanen's interview was published in the POHJOLAN SANOMAT.

12956
CSO: 3617/158

MILITARY

SWEDEN

REPORTERS EXAMINE SUBMARINE INCIDENTS IN ARTICLE SERIES

'We Acted Too Slowly in Karlskrona'

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 29 Jul 85 p 8

[Article by Lars Christiansson]

[Text] Once again the military has found seabed tracks from a minisub. They probably are from a submarine operation that took place last year before the water froze over. The tracks are similar to those found previously.

In answer to a direct question, Defense Staff chief Bror Stefenson confirmed this information previously obtained by SVENSKA DAGBLADET. This occurred in an interview that came after the most recently reported violation. Vice Admiral Stefenson said there was no doubt that in 1983 and 1984 Sweden had been the object of several operations by foreign submarines. With regard to 1985, he said that observations so far had been less certain. They are substantial enough to conclude, however, that underwater activities by foreign nations may be continuing.

The Defense Staff chief will not rule out the possibility of a connection between the underwater activities by foreign countries and activities on land and in the air.

Are these underwater activities continuing?

"This year the evidence is not as clear as in the past."

"There is less certainty in this year's observations, but there is enough evidence to say that the underwater activities by foreign countries may have continued."

SVENSKA DAGBLADET has learned that you discovered tracks on the seabed last spring. Why was this information not included in the most recent report of violations?

"We regularly inspect the seabed where tracks were previously found and where previous experience has shown us that there is some reason to examine the area. It is true that we found tracks last spring, but they were not fresh."

Same Kind

"Because we must consider sedimentation and other such factors, we cannot determine to the exact centimeter where our previous discoveries were, but they are of the same kind as the tracks we found previously. When we speak of tracks, we always mean tracks similar to those found previously."

Do the recently discovered seabed tracks not confirm that the submarine activities continued during the fall of 1984?

"The tracks we discovered recently must have been made before the water froze over for the winter, but it is difficult to state an exact time."

At the Defense Committee's press conference last May, you said that the submarine intrusions were continuing. Have you had any reason to change that opinion, since you said in your most recent report that these activities "may" be continuing?

"At that time, I was speaking about 1983 and 1984. It was important for the Defense Committee to determine what the situation was after Harsfjorden. I expressed myself clearly at that press conference--the violations continued during 1983 and 1984. We cannot speak with any great certainty about 1985--at least not yet. We must wait and see."

What Actually Happened?

When you used live ammunition during the chase last spring near Karlshamn, was the operation a genuine flop?

"We are always patrolling the Swedish coast. There may be a number of factors involved when we go to a certain area. It may be guesswork, we may have drawn some conclusion from our statistics on how violators have acted in the past, or we may have some other information. All these factors determine the pattern according to which we operate."

There Was A Sub

"In addition, when we are operating in a certain area, we often receive reports of such substance that we cannot put them aside without taking a closer look."

"In the Karlshamn case, we had chosen to patrol the area and, during this work, we received indications that a foreign submarine was active there."

According to information received by SVENSKA DAGBLADET, you recorded a sonar signal from a large foreign submarine. There also was a preliminary determination of the bloc to which the submarine belonged, based on its sonar signal. Is this true?

"What we heard under water could not be attributed to any particular nation. It was also impossible to determine whether its position constituted a

violation. We are not sure whether or not the large submarine was in Swedish territorial waters."

Photographic Evidence?

I learned that photographs were taken during one of the events in the Karlskrona region that resulted in a submarine hunt near Karlshamn. What do the photographs show?

"There are no pictures that just anyone could look at and say what it is. We have been unable to obtain sufficient clarity. We have obtained several photographs during some of these events and we have made enough progress to say that some of the photos may actually show something."

"We have reached a point where we can just scratch our heads and wonder whether there is something in the picture or not. But we have not come to the point where photographs may be used as clear evidence."

Major Operations

The Defense Staff chief reminded us that since the submarine hunt in Harsfjorden and the report from the Submarine Defense Commission, the military has believed that it is dealing with large-scale, coordinated operations over a large geographic area and a long span of time. He explained that the violator's operations may proceed for weeks and that it is difficult for the military to know how long countermeasures should be carried out. Stefenson also pointed out that, in the past, several large and small submarines have been involved.

He emphatically denied what he called conspiracy theories, according to which the submarine observations are fabrications. He also denied that the military concealed submarine violations.

No Clear Relationship

You speak of extensive operations. Is there any connection between what is going on in the water and any other activities on land and in the air?

"We are constantly looking for any such connections, but we have found no clear relationship."

Is there any such connection at all?

"None that I could elaborate on in an interview of this type."

You said there were about 20 solid observations in 1984 and a similar number in 1983. At the same time, you have raised the standards for determining whether or not foreign submarine activities actually have occurred. Does this not mean that there have actually been more violations?

Solid Reports

"It is difficult to make a comparison with the statistics we have available. During these years there were about 20 reports that would seem to indicate that underwater activities by foreign countries have taken place. Among them, there were five or six reports each year that were so solid that I could stare anyone in the eye and say that there was no doubt whatsoever that foreign submarine activities had continued."

"With regard to the question of raising our standards, you could say that this applies to observations that, after analysis, have been classified as 'probable' violations by foreign submarines."

Requirements For 'Violation'

The vice admiral stated, however, that in all cases described as "violations" by the military, the requirements have been equally as rigid. He also stressed that, on the basis of the available statistics, it is impossible to say whether the number of violations has decreased or increased, even though the situation in late 1984 was similar to that of this year.

In the latest report on violations, Commander in Chief Lennart Ljung wrote that there had also been reports of foreign divers. SVENSKA DAGBLADET learned that observations had been made in the Stockholm Archipelago. Bror Stefenson said that divers were reportedly observed from time to time, but these reports were fewer than he expected and they are more difficult to analyze than reported submarine sightings.

One reason is that the navy knows where Swedish submarines are. Of course, there is no similar information on divers. In most cases, it is difficult to determine whether it is a matter of Swedish divers or divers from other countries, the chief of the Defense Staff said. In this case, he said, it was a question of two observations made at the same time.

There may be several reasons why reports on submarine sightings have been less solid in the past 6 months, according to the chief of the Defense Staff. He said there was no doubt that the level of risk had increased for anyone who decided to send submarines here. This could mean that the submarines are behaving differently and more cautiously than before. It is also possible that these activities have been reduced, occur periodically, or have ceased.

"It may be that there are periods in which our waters are empty for months. We have made the fence a bit higher, but it is still possible for them to come in undetected. We are gradually increasing the level of deterrence."

"It could also be that we do not detect everything, that there is some underwater activity that we have not noticed or that we have not perceived with full clarity in our analyses and reports. It is possible that what we see is just the tip of an iceberg that contains much more than we know about. But we also detect many things that turn out to be nothing."

It should be possible to draw some conclusions from your report as to whether or not the enemy is behaving more cautiously--by not showing such large sections of the submarine tower, the periscope, or the masts.

Constant Duel

"Of course, there is a constant duel in which the defender comes up with new methods, to which the intruder then adapts himself. Our opponent is more cautious and better adjusted to the steps we are taking."

The most important lessons from the major, unsuccessful submarine hunt near Karlskrona last year are, first of all, that it is necessary to arrive on time if there is to be a chance of accomplishing anything and, secondly, that it is useless to escalate one's efforts gradually.

"If we are to succeed, we must not hesitate to step in with full force immediately. The gradual escalation at Karlskrona was not good."

Have you arrived too late in every operation so far in which you have had good observations?

"Yes, that is obvious, since we have been unable to get anything up to the surface."

But have you not been extremely close in several cases, such as last summer?

New On West Coast

"We do not really know how close we have been, but there have been cases in which we could have . . . well, there is good luck and bad luck there, too."

Previously, Sweden has been visited by foreign submarines in all military regions on the eastern and southern coasts. Now there are reports of submarines along the western coast. What conclusions do you draw from this?

"This may be a change in tactics by the intruder. It could also mean simply that units along the west coast have now reached the same level as in other sections of Sweden."

"The submarine violations are not the whole story, but now we have adapted ourselves mentally to a totally new level of preparedness and to a completely different way of thinking."

Are there additional dimensions to this problem, beyond the foreign submarine activities?

Fishing Zones

"Undoubtedly, it is also important to keep an eye on Swedish air space. This means that we must keep our house in order here, too. Another factor is the open sea and how we act there. It is important that we defend the Baltic Sea

and observe what goes on there. There is talk about fishing zones and there is talk of conflicts in that connection. We must be prepared for situations that are neither war nor peace."

Are you talking about the so-called gray zone, i.e. a condition between war and peace?

"Some call it that. I call them crises, because they may be situations that need not lead to war if we handle them correctly. Then we can take care of such situations without seeing them develop further."

Foreign Helicopter Landed Soldiers

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 31 Jul 85 p 6

[Article by Lars Christiansson and Roger Magnergard]

[Text] During the summer of 1975 foreign soldiers landed by helicopter on a Swedish island in the archipelago where secret military installations are located. The landing was reported by a guard.

The foreign helicopter flew in over Swedish territory at an extremely low altitude. Two people who were uniformed and armed got out of the helicopter on an island in the northern part of the Stockholm Archipelago where a mine station is located.

The helicopter and the soldiers were discovered, however, by the same guard who discovered divers near the line of mines near Lerskar Island in the northern part of the Stockholm Archipelago in September 1983.

Greatest Seriousness

"The testimony of the guard must be taken with the greatest seriousness," said one of the investigators of the incident with the divers in 1983. "We have made a careful and extensive analysis of him and found that he is completely reliable."

"In fact, the published report on the divers was based primarily on his testimony."

The guard discovered the helicopter on a routine patrol of the island and the line of mines. The soldiers who landed did not see him immediately. He moved slowly along the bank in his small motor boat.

Suddenly he saw several silhouettes that, immediately thereafter, proved to be living people--soldiers in some type of uniform.

Differing Accounts

The accounts of what happened then are in disagreement. One of SVENSKA DAGBLADET's sources, who was able to speak with the guard at some length, said that the soldiers aimed at him while they concluded some type of investigation on the island.

Others claim that the soldiers jumped back into the helicopter immediately. Then, they say, it lifted off and disappeared toward international waters at a low altitude.

There is a low-altitude radar system on another island in the vicinity. It is reported to have been out of order at the time of the intrusion.

Oath Of Silence

The guard himself chose not to speak with SVENSKA DAGBLADET about the incident. He pointed out that he was under an oath of silence.

"But personally, I believe that the archipelago is a training ground for a foreign power," he said. During the incident in 1975 the Swedish military dragged its feet the entire way.

He would say no more.

The guard immediately reported his observation to the military authorities and to the police. The police in Norrtälje soon abandoned their investigation, however, since there was "no response from the military."

In the military, the report made its way to the commander in chief. In 1975 when this occurred, Sweden had not yet been subjected to the numerous submarine violations that began with the Uto incident of 1980. For this reason, the report was received with some skepticism.

The commander in chief ordered several investigations, however. With the help of the guard's detailed description, Defense Staff experts were able to narrow it down to two possible helicopter types--both used exclusively by the Warsaw Pact.

It also became clear that, because of its operating radius, the helicopter could not have come from a land base unless it came from Åland. The helicopter was believed to be based on a ship.

Not In Statistics

This violation was never published, not even as probable or possible. No public reports of violations were published in 1975.

Lt Col Lennart Borg, chief of the security section of the Defense Staff, said in an initial conversation with SVENSKA DAGBLADET that he "knew about the incident."

In the next conversation, he changed his mind. He did not know about the intrusion by the helicopter, but that did not mean he denied it.

"This violation is not included in any of the statistics," Borg said. "That must mean that the report was not considered to be sufficiently reliable."

And there is no reason to reevaluate the matter today?

"No, the incident occurred far too long ago for us to draw any new conclusions today. Witnesses forget details over such a long time."

What would you say about it today?

"I do not comment on individual events."

Much Shame

SVENSKA DAGBLADET asked one of the investigators of the diver incident of 1983 if he believed the guard spoke the truth about the helicopter incident.

"I know that he suffered a lot of shame because of what he claimed to have seen. Because of what happened later, however, and because of the extremely extensive investigation we made of his life, person, and psyche, I must answer 'yes' to that question."

'No Coincidence that Mines Disappeared'

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Aug 85 p 8

[Article by Lars Christiansson and Roger Magnergard]

[Text] Last fall a mine was stolen from a secret mined area located along the northern part of the east coast. A technical investigation showed that it was removed from its anchoring and taken away.

This is not the first time that mines have disappeared in this manner.

Another mine disappeared in 1983 from a mined area that protects a major harbor in Skane.

In 1976 a mine was removed from a mined area around Almon near Sundsvall where some mines were triggered in connection with a submarine hunt near Sundsvall in the spring of 1983.

Modern Mines

In all three cases, modern and technically advanced mines were involved. Investigations showed that none of these cases could have involved an accident in which the mine broke loose on its own. None of these mines have been found. Technical analysis of the cut surfaces in the anchoring cables and

other parts, as well as other circumstances, have led to the conclusion that the mines did not disappear by coincidence.

Foreign Divers

Moreover, in several cases in recent years the military has discovered that firing mechanisms in some mined areas have been examined and, in certain cases, they have been sabotaged.

SVENSKA DAGBLADET's information has been confirmed by inside military sources.

Officials at the Defense Staff suspect that the stolen mines were removed by foreign divers and that this probably has occurred in connection with submarine operations. One clear pattern with regard to both mines that have disappeared and mined areas that have been examined "without permission" is that recently placed mines or mined areas with modern, extremely advanced mines have been involved.

Such was the case at Lerskar Island in the Stockholm Archipelago on 27 September 1983 when foreign divers investigated and measured the line of mines there.

Sweden is extremely advanced in mine technology. Defense experts told SVENSKA DAGBLADET that, in order to effectively combat Swedish mines, one would simply have to take apart the mines and study them.

The military has received more reports about foreign divers working near defense facilities or around islands in the Swedish archipelago than those published so far.

This was confirmed to SVENSKA DAGBLADET by a high-ranking member of the Defense Staff.

"There are numerous reports, especially from 1983," one source told SVENSKA DAGBLADET. "But we have been unable to prove the occurrence of this activity as clearly as in the incidents in the northern part of the Stockholm Archipelago in September 1983 or at Almon near Karlskrona on 28 February 1984, which were publicized."

Information on the divers around Lerskar Island was first revealed in the mass media. The event was made public much later by the Defense Staff under the title "Diver Activity in September 1983." Translated into plain language, this title gives away the fact that activities by foreign divers have been much more extensive than indicated by the military.

The incident was investigated by Peter Baltzer of the Defense Staff, chairman of the Commission of Inquiry Goran Steen, and court of appeals division president Sigvard Mejegard. The latter two are judges and are accustomed to distinguishing truth from falsehood. It was Defense Staff chief Bror Stefenson who believed that the reports of divers near Lerskar were so clear and noteworthy that they should also be investigated by someone outside the

military apparatus. After all, the witness to the activities of the foreign divers was an employee of the military. This was the first time that Goran Steen and his coworkers participated in an investigation of this type.

Enough For Conviction

"Our criterion was that the evidence should be sufficient for a conviction in the highest court," one of the investigators said. The evidence is indeed very strong, otherwise the report never would have been published.

During their work, the investigators realized that their report would be used as a model for evaluating other reports involving divers.

Since the diver incident was investigated in such detail, Defense Staff experts were able to conclude that other incidents involving divers had also been carried out by foreign powers--if they were confirmed by similar accounts by witnesses. This form of "evidence" is insufficient, however, to warrant publishing these reports.

In late 1983 a secret expert report on observations of divers was compiled by the Defense Staff. It reported at least five violations by divers, in addition to those previously publicized.

All these incidents are reported to have occurred in the Stockholm Archipelago near Huvudskar, on Namdo, on Hasselo, near Runmarfjarden, and on Rodloga, Svartloga, or Langskar, all islands in the archipelago.

Tracks From Frogmen

The military has photographs and plaster casts of frogman tracks from one of the intrusions. The tracks were extremely clear in new snow. They led from the sea up to a secret military installation and back to the sea.

"We have thought a lot about who these people may be who are investigating our secret facilities," said one source who has evaluated several of the reports. "We cannot rule out the possibility that they may be thieves or terrorists who are trying to obtain explosives, although the most probable answer by far is that they are soldiers from the same nation that is responsible for the submarine intrusions."

During the submarine hunt in Karlskrona during the spring of 1984, the military obtained clear evidence that foreign powers are using frogmen in our waters and that their activities are related to the submarine intrusions. It was in connection with the Karlskrona hunt that the Defense Staff started talking about "foreign underwater activity" instead of the previous term "foreign submarine activity." The term "foreign underwater activity" includes operations involving submarines, minisubs, vessels with divers, and divers.

Late Wednesday, 29 February, a diver in dark clothing came up on the eastern shore of Almon in the western part of the Karlskrona Basin. He quickly ran

across the 400-meter island and disappeared out into the sea.

"He probably never realized he had been seen," said one of the experts who investigated the incident. The military and the police did not follow his tracks until 45 minutes after he had run across the island.

Additional Confirmation

The military obtained additional confirmation of this theory, since a frogman attempted to come ashore at that exact location 3 days later--on Saturday evening. He was forced to turn back, however, when the Swedish military opened fire on him.

The latest report of intrusions, which includes the second quarter of 1985, also mentions that divers have been observed.

Constant Sub Hunt Along Coast

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Aug 85 p 8

[Article by Carl-Ake Nilsson]

[Text] Gasefjarden--Since the large-scale submarine hunts took place in Harsfjarden and Karlskrona, the military has had to rethink its plans. Now there are constant patrols in both inner and outer Swedish waters and a constant state of preparedness toward violations of our boundaries at sea.

During the fall of 1981, Gasefjarden became known worldwide when the Soviet submarine U-137 went aground one dark October night in waters in which it was absolutely forbidden to sail. This event gave rise to hectic activity in the Karlskrona Archipelago and it was even more hectic in the spring of 1984 during the hunt for a foreign minisub and its crew.

Calm has now been restored, although several things have changed since then. The military no longer looks the other way when inhabitants of the archipelago go ashore to fish from an island in a restricted area. The military also has changed its organization somewhat and is now conducting constant patrol activities by ship, air, and from islands where special forces have been placed with only one task: to see, but not be seen.

We are aboard the vedette HMS Viken, which is participating in these activities. The word "vedette" comes from the Italian "vedetta," which means outpost or lookout. This is precisely the ship's task today.

We have just left the naval base at Karlskrona and are sailing eastward into the inner waters. Here and there a rock or reef may be seen between islands, indicating that these waters are difficult to navigate for anyone not familiar with them.

Six depth charges are located astern. There are three on each side. They

contain several hundred kilograms of TNT each. A cover conceals an old 40-mm Bofors artillery piece. Under the deck is a machine gun and several sub-machine guns. These weapons would be used if something drastic should occur.

Effective Preparedness

The HMS Viken is part of a vedette division that consists of two small vessels and one larger vessel that also serves as the mother ship for the division. This division began operating after the most recent submarine hunt in the Karlskrona region in order to improve incident preparedness. It operates from Vastervik in the north to Ystad in the south.

"Previously, the coastal fleet was responsible for this activity, along with its training tasks. But we can maintain a higher level of preparedness and our ships are cheaper to operate," the division chief, Capt Bo Parmelov, said. He is 35 years old and is the fifth generation of Parmelovs in the navy. We stand at the railing and talk as we pass Mocklo Bridge.

Lonely Watch

In the spring of 1984 the bridge was guarded by military personnel and the passage was blocked with a submarine net. Now the civilian guarding the bridge sits alone in his little cabin and opens or closes the bridge as required by the traffic. It is warm and the pleasure boats abound.

"It is wonderful to be at sea at this time of the year. It more than makes up for the bitter winter half of the year," said Capt Parmelov, who worked almost continuously at the Combat Information Center during the 42-day submarine hunt here just over 1 year ago.

"Some mystic events still occur here, but I do not know whether they are more frequent now or if we are just more suspicious than before. Obviously, we have a different attitude now that minisubs and divers have entered the picture," Parmelov said.

The HMS Viken rumbles on and we arrive in Gasefjarden. An idyllic summer scene presents itself here. The sea is smooth and some fishermen are throwing out or bringing in their flounder nets. One is sitting in his small rowboat several hundred meters from the spot where U-137 went aground. He watches us from there. The passage is narrow here. It is no more than 300 meters wide and the shoals appear yellow-green in the water near a skerry. We pass right by the shoal. There is another skerry 200 meters on the other side.

Treacherous Waters

The protruding rocks and light areas under the water indicate how treacherous it is to travel here. This is especially true at night. Farther out toward the open sea it looks even more dangerous.

"Some people claim that the Russians have better nautical charts than we do,"

Captain Parmelov said.

After leaving Gasefjarden, we sail toward the 12-mile boundary, south of Oland's southern shoals. We will show the flag and, at the same time, let the Naval Surveillance Center in Karlskrona know what the dots on the radar screen represent. The traffic is heavy here and the sea is covered with foam. The commander, the second-in-command, and the helmsman are sitting in the wheelhouse in sturdy chairs of the type used in semis, mounted on a crude hydraulic shock absorber that is bolted to the floor. The seats move up and down as the HMS Viken slams against the sea. The windshield wipers work busily to remove the spray.

Vessels Photographed

The first vessel that is identified is the small coastal tanker Mattvik from Karlshamn. Next is a Soviet container vessel of about 10,000 tons. It probably has two cargo decks. The vessel is photographed by the crew of the HMS Viken. The numerous antennas are probably of the greatest interest.

We continue for several hours. Once a ship has been identified and sometimes photographed, we catch up to the next one and the procedure is repeated. Sometimes this takes a while, since the HMS Viken, once a torpedo boat and a greyhound of the sea, now has a relatively moderate top speed of 28 knots.

"We could use a few more knots, since an ordinary refrigerator ship can move at 22 knots. Sometimes it takes far too long to catch up with another vessel," Captain Parmelov said.

Perhaps the most important task of the vedette division is to turn back foreign naval vessels that violate our waters. The most recent serious incident occurred 1 year ago. At that time, the HMS Viken had to go out late in the evening to turn back a Polish patrol boat that was operating well into Swedish waters.

"Farther out there were several naval vessels that seemed to be looking for something. We never found out what," Captain Parmelov said as we passed Kungsholm Fort on the way in through the island barrier that, for centuries, has been seen as a good protection against uninvited guests in our southernmost naval base.

We pass the small citadel Godnatt and approach Smorasken Island, which was a surveillance station during the time of sailing ships. I ask Captain Parmelov where the minisub and the divers who were the objects of the latest submarine hunt in Karlskrona could have gone.

"The sea can conceal many things and we may be small compared to it, but our level of preparedness is higher now than ever before," he said.

A staff officer is waiting on the dock with word that the HMS Viken must not turn off its engines and that the crew must be prepared to go out again if ordered.

Someone has telephoned in saying they had observed something. Perhaps the reported observations is part of the 99 percent that is nothing at all for the military to worry about. Perhaps it is part of the 1 percent that may be something. Perhaps it is the beginning of another hunt.

Soviet Protest Against SVENSKA DAGBLADET

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Aug 85 p 8

[Article by Petr Kuguenko, Embassy Counselor, Embassy of the Soviet Union]

[Text] On 28 July your newspaper began publishing a series of articles that, judging from the material published to date, contains sordid fabrications indicating that the Soviet Union is "threatening Sweden." By referring to "information" supposedly obtained from the Swedish Security Service, you seriously contend that 30 to 50 percent of the personnel at the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm participate in "subversive activity" against Sweden and that embassy personnel use diplomatic mail to smuggle "weapons, uniforms, and explosives."

All these and other so-called revelations which are not worth repeating because of their total absurdity are false from beginning to end.

We at the Soviet Embassy are disturbed by this groundless slander that your newspaper is systematically forcing on Swedish readers and which is intended to poison the good neighborly relations and atmosphere of cooperation that characterizes Soviet-Swedish relations.

We hope that this statement will be published in your newspaper and that you will stop publishing false, anti-Soviet fabrications on the "subversive activity" of the Soviet Union against Sweden.

Petr Kuguenko
Embassy Counselor
Embassy of the Soviet Union

'Embassy Counselor a KGB Officer'

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Aug 85 p 8

[Text] According to the book Industrispionage (Industrial Espionage), Petr Nikolaevich Kuguenko is an intelligence officer in the KGB. As such, he holds at least the rank of lieutenant-colonel.

"Kuguenko is one of the most prominent figures in the PR field at the embassy in Stockholm," Joakim von Braun wrote in the book from Timbro Publishers.

Together with author Charlie Nordblom, von Braun has charted the activities of Soviet diplomats in Sweden.

"Kuguenko's activities include political parties, mass media, and the peace

movement. His job is to recruit agents in these areas so they can spread the Soviet message and provide the embassy with information."

Public Statements

Last year Kuguenko began his second period in Sweden. He served here from 1976 to 1981 as first secretary.

His first public statement after his return to Sweden was in connection with the defection of Leila Miller and Valdo Randpere from Estonia last year. The couple left their 18 month old daughter in Estonia and attempted to persuade embassy personnel to help her come to Sweden.

"The defectors have only themselves to blame," Kuguenko told EXPRESSEN. Now the Soviet state will take care of their child.

He has also stated in public what he thinks about the deportation of Soviet diplomats in recent years.

"The Swedish government has deported our diplomats on false grounds."

Caterpillar Tracks Near Musko

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 4 Aug 85 p 5

[Article by Lars Christiansson and Roger Magnergard]

[Text] Foreign submarines have operated in an especially sensitive area within the important naval base at Musko in the Stockholm Archipelago. Late in the fall of 1983, navy divers found an entire "switchyard" of fresh tracks from minisubs within the Musko base.

According to military experts, the caterpillar tracks were made during a submarine operation that probably occurred in late October or early November.

Considering seabed currents and the sedimentation rate in the area in question, as well as other evidence, it is believed that this estimate of when the submarine operation took place could not be more than a few days off.

SVENSKA DAGBLADET can now publish a map showing the extent of the clear tracks made by the minisubs during their operation against this important naval base. The pattern of the tracks shows that the minisubs probably carried out some type of assignment within the Musko base.

Many Violations

At the request of SVENSKA DAGBLADET, the Defense Staff has declassified the map for publication.

Just over 6 months before these tracks were discovered, the Submarine Defense

Commission had presented its report. It was determined that large and small Soviet submarines had violated Swedish territory. The report stated that the Soviet Union had violated Swedish territory not only in October 1982 in Harsfjarden, which is located in the prohibited area near the Musko base, but also was guilty of all the submarine intrusions that took place from 1980 to 1982.

The events in Harsfjarden resulted in a protest in Moscow by the Swedish government.

The seabed tracks at the Musko base look the same as the caterpillar tracks found in Harsfjarden. Some of their measurements are slightly different, however. Military experts believe that a slightly different type of minisub is involved than those used in Harsfjarden, although the technology seems to be the same.

Certain Margin Of Error

It is not ruled out, however, that the differences in measurements, which are small, may be a result of sedimentation and/or the fact that the measurements were made by different people. There is a certain margin of error in the measurement technique itself.

The location and appearance of the tracks, as well as several other factors, have led military experts to believe that the submarine operation within the Musko base was not intended simply to study certain secret installations under water, but also to carry out direct operative tasks. One such task could be to examine the possibility of tapping into the communications and/or alarm systems of the base for future use.

One quite solid theory as to why the minisubs have caterpillar tracks is that they are used to create a steady platform when work is to be carried out on the seabed. It is also possible that the caterpillar may be folded up or drawn into the body of the submarine once the seabed operation has been completed.

Sensitive Area

Some of the information was kept secret, since the extremely clear caterpillar tracks indicated that the minisubs had carried out an extensive operation within a sensitive area of the naval base. The official statement said only that the clear tracks were found "in the vicinity of military facilities."

Seabed tracks were mentioned in more general terms in the commander in chief's report on violations of 20 December 1983. However, that report indicated only that there were "extensive and easily recognizable caterpillar tracks." Further, it was indicated that they were similar to tracks found in Harsfjarden, although some of their measurements were different.

The commander in chief stated in his report on submarine intrusions during the fall of 1983 that "foreign submarine activity has taken place during the fall both in Swedish territorial waters and in inner Swedish waters."

During the fall, the military made about 15 high-quality observations. Several were in the Stockholm Archipelago. Several observations of foreign submarines and minisubs were made during the East Coast military maneuvers which took place between 22 September and 3 October. The clearest was in Arkosund. In addition, the foreign divers who appeared at Lerskar on 27 September were also reported to the government.

On 20 December Defense Minister Anders Thunborg stated, in response to the commander in chief's report, that the government viewed the report with "extraordinary seriousness," but he concluded that he "could not rule out" the possibility that violations may have occurred again.

In a TT (TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBURO) interview 14 days later, on 3 January 1984, Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom stated that "We should be able to restore friendly relations with the Soviet Union, resulting in closer political, cultural, and commercial ties."

He pointed out that the Soviet Union had given assurances that Swedish neutrality and territorial integrity would be respected and that the Soviet Union wanted good relations with Sweden. The foreign minister explained that "We have no basis to state the nationality of the submarine that may have been in Swedish waters since the violations in Harsfjarden."

Soviet Union Continued

Internally, however, military analysts made no secret of the fact that all observations made in 1983 contained portions of the chain of evidence that the Submarine Defense Commission used in the Harsfjarden to determine that the submarines violating Swedish waters were Soviet vessels.

Although not all the links in the chain of evidence could be found in connection with each individual submarine operation against Sweden, the individual links provided sufficient information to convince the military specialists that the Soviet Union was continuing its submarine operations. In addition, there were no indications whatsoever that submarines from anywhere other than the Warsaw Pact had been in Swedish waters.

The government told the military leadership, however, that this evidence was insufficient to warrant singling out the Soviet Union. At least the entire chain of evidence from Harsfjarden must be available before the nationality could be determined. Since this was not the case, it was believed that there was insufficient evidence to tie the continued violations to the Soviet Union.

Several Foreign Subs Operated Outside Base

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 4 Aug 85 p 5

[Article by Lars Christiansson and Roger Magnergard]

[Text] The caterpillar tracks at Musko, which cover an area 40 meters long, come from one or more minisubs. Defense experts are absolutely sure of this.

They are less certain, however, as to how the overall picture of the seabed tracks and their pattern should be interpreted in detail.

The caterpillar tracks from the minisubs are 2 meters apart. The experts believe that the caterpillar tracks probably are used only when some kind of task is carried out on the seabed and a steady platform is needed. It is clear that the tracks are not used to move any considerable distances.

Many Theories

The military experts have several different theories as to how the overall picture at Musko should be interpreted.

The oval on the diagram, labeled seabed imprint, was probably formed when the minisub landed on the bottom. A depression was formed there similar to those found near tracks elsewhere by the military.

In this case, the submarine then began operating with its caterpillar tracks and moved forward under their power in various directions to carry out some type of assignment. The trail shown in the picture would have been formed by the submarine's sliding a short distance on the bottom before coming into position to let down or out its caterpillar tracks.

Larger Vessel

Another theory is that the seabed impression was caused by some type of docking mechanism on a larger submarine that was used to take one or more minisubs on board.

The pattern is then interpreted to indicate that the minisubs, with the help of a signaling mechanism placed on the seabed at the intersection of the caterpillar tracks, were directed in exactly the right direction to be taken aboard the larger vessel or attached to its bottom.

This may be indicated by the fact that there are four tracks that become one, which then leads directly to the seabed impression (mother vessel).

Another possibility is that the impression was caused by a minisub docking with its mother submarine from directly underneath.

No Agreement

Military experts have been unable to obtain a 100-percent certain explanation as to how to interpret all parts of the seabed tracks.

All that can be said is that the impression on the seabed is about 4 meters wide and just over 9 meters long.

It may seem difficult to imagine that a large submarine could operate in such a sensitive area where the risk of detection should be great.

In response to this question, defense experts told SVENSKA DAGBLADET that the water was sufficiently deep and that the impression in the seabed could have been made by a larger underwater vessel with some special apparatus on the bottom for docking with minisubs.

Similar Tracks Off Japan

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 4 Aug 85 p 5

[Text] The "switchyard" discovered by the navy at the Musko base is strikingly similar to tracks discovered off the coast of Japan in the summer of 1983.

The diagram below was published after Japanese investigations in Soya Sound and Tsugaru Sound which are north and south, respectively, of the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido.


The Japanese Defense Ministry sent divers down to photograph the tracks, but the pictures were of such poor quality that they could not be used.

After news of the tracks leaked out, a Japanese government source stated that "Soviet spetsnaz forces (special forces) had been operating in Japanese waters."

The minisub had operated at a depth of 28 meters. Some of the tracks could be followed along a straight line 180 meters long. The Japanese sources estimated that the minisub was about 5 meters long.

Similar To Sweden


Conditions in the Japanese islands are similar to those in Sweden. The depth of the sound, as well as the Swedish archipelago and coast, are obstacles to the freedom of movement of the Soviet naval forces.



Despite hour-long contact with a foreign submarine, the military was unable to use weapons against it near Karlskrona on 26 February 1984. Now Bror Stefenson says they will act faster next time.

Key:


1. Contact lost about 1500
2. First contact with submarine at about 1400
3. Mine station
4. Surveillance loop
5. Looking for submarine
6. Submarine low speed



According to one theory of the military, the oval on this diagram was formed by minisubs landing on the seabed. Then they used their caterpillar tracks to move forward and in various directions to carry out some task.

Key:

1. Caterpillar tracks
2. Seabed impression
3. Track from sliding
4. Impression from tracks



A Japanese newspaper published this drawing. The tracks are quite similar to those discovered at the Musko base.

Key:

1. Seabed
2. Point from which measurements were made

9336

CSO: 3650/325

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

GOVERNMENT FAILS IN GOAL TO REDUCE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Aug 85 p 1

[Article by Henrik Skov]

[Text] It appears that Denmark's balance of payments deficit will be as large this year as last year.

The statement for the first 6 months of 1985 points to this, and Minister of Economic Affairs Anders Andersen (Liberal Party) recognizes that the government cannot expect to reach its goal for the balance of payments this year.

The government's goal for 1985 was a balance of payments deficit of 15 billion kroner, but that has been almost achieved in half the time.

The deficit for the first 6 months was today computed at 12.7 billion kroner. In 1984 the deficit was 17 billion kroner. In the opinion of the government, that was too much, but it was explained by the upswing which ostensibly had taken place in the industrial sector. The government gives the same explanation today.

Prime Minister Poul Schluter, at the same time, points to the increasing interest payments, the high dollar rate and the increasing energy imports following the cold winter.

The political spokesman for the Social Democratic Party, Svend Auken, says that the Danish economy is in an untenable development despite the drop in the interest rate, the lower oil prices and the lower dollar rate.

He would welcome a tightening of the economy, as long as it does not affect ordinary families.

That proposal is being rejected by Minister of Economic Affairs Anders Andersen. The decisive thing is, in his opinion, that, at the end of this year, a considerably lower deficit may be expected next year.

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CSO: 3613/183

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

ECONOMISTS EVALUATE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONTINUING DEFICIT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Aug 85 Sect III p 2

[Article by Henrik Skov]

[Text] The Danish economy showed a very poor half-yearly result. The balance of payments for the first six months shows a deficit of as much as 12.7 billion kroner--and thus alarmingly close to the government's original estimate for the entire 1985. A reversal, if any, may, at the earliest, occur next year, several economists predict.

With a balance of payments deficit for the first six months of 1985 of nearly 12.7 billion kroner, the Danish economy--and especially the export sector--will have to improve sharply for the government's hitherto expectations of a deficit of 15 billion kroner for the entire 1985 to have a merely theoretical chance of being fulfilled.

Economists doubt very much that the deficit of the Danish economy will remain within the 15 billion kroner range. Most economists now expect the deficit to increase by 25 percent to approximately 20 billion kroner.

The deficit will only become less if exports increase enormously during the latter half of 1985. The increase will have to amount to approximately 15 percent in current prices for the deficit to remain below 20 billion kroner. By way of comparison, exports increased by "only" 6 percent during the first half of the year.

"The figures, moreover, show that there is a very great likelihood of intervention by way of financial measures," says Anne E. Jensen, chief economist of Privatbanken [the Private Bank]. However, she is still optimistic with regard to developments in the course of the next couple of years, when there are prospects of improvements in the balance of payments in 1986 and 1987. The year 1985, on the other hand, seems to have gone by. "I do not expect any real improvement in 1985," says Anne E. Jensen. Minister of Economic Affairs Anders Andersen takes more or less the same viewpoint. "I hope that

developments at the end of the year will point to a considerably lower deficit next year," says Anders Andersen.

The deficit during the second quarter of this year of 4.9 billion kroner, if viewed separately, is 800 million kroner larger than during the second quarter of last year, and the half-yearly result for the Danish economy is as much as 3.5 billion kroner worse than the previous half-year.

The slow trend in exports, the high dollar rate and the sharp increase in imports of investment goods account for the poor "half-yearly result." A positive feature, however, is the increase in exports during the month of June, when exports increased by 18 percent compared to June of last year.

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CSO: 3613/183

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

RAPID INVESTMENT GROWTH MAY BE STYMIED BY LABOR SHORTAGES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Aug 85 Sect I p 1, Sect III p 2

[Article by Henrik Skov]

[Text] Danish industrial investments are increasing at a very fast rate--at such a fast rate that the chairman of the Federation of Danish Industries believes that Danish industry also this year will be the chief contender for the European championship in investments. One problem, however, is the shortage of labor in certain sectors which puts a damper on continued investments.

"In 1984, Danish industry became the winner of the European championship in investments, and I definitely believe that we shall head the list this year as well," Nils Wilhjelm, chairman of the Federation of Danish Industries, tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, at the same time admitting that he has lost a wager with the chairman of the Danish Federation of Trade Unions, Knud Christensen.

Nils Wilhjelm says today that his optimism was a little exaggerated when, in late August of last year, at the employment conference of the Danish Federation of Trade Unions, he made a wager with Knud Christensen on the increase in industrial investments in 1984.

"I expected an increase by 50 percent in 1984 and thus a somewhat higher increase than the one now computed by the Department of Statistics," says Nils Wilhjelm.

"However, in spite of everything, the increase became as high as 33 percent in fixed prices, and I believe in a repetition in 1985 with increases of the same magnitude," says the chairman of the Federation of Danish Industries, who has already written the chairman of the Danish Federation of Trade Unions to tell him that he has lost the above-mentioned wager.

"I am gratified that investments in 1984 increased at a higher rate than in the last 25 years," says Nils Wilhjelm, who, at the same time, is concerned by the fact that certain branches of industry apparently are approaching the limit, as far as a continued expansion in investments is concerned.

"We are getting the problem that investments are now being held back because enterprises simply cannot obtain the necessary labor," says Nils Wilhjelm, who points to certain sections of the building industry and the iron industry as areas affected by the problem.

"In certain places, there is also a large shortage, for example, of truck drivers," says Nils Wilhjelm, pointing out that the problem is being enhanced by the fact that retraining and the number of newly trained within the areas affected fail entirely to keep up with developments at the moment.

"It is uncanny that employers dare not invest in new work places because they cannot find the labor, despite the unemployment rate of 250,000 people," the chairman of the Federation of Danish Industries concludes by saying.

Federation of Danish Industries: Shareholders Showed Considerable Restraint in Demanding Higher Dividends

In 1984, shareholders showed considerable restraint with regard to dividend payments, wrote Nils Wilhjelm, chairman of the Federation of Danish Industries, in his letter to Knud Christensen, chairman of the Danish Federation of Trade Unions. This has given Denmark an increase in industrial employment which has not occurred anywhere else in Europe.

"The logic that increasing earnings give increasing investments and thus increasing employment has been fully confirmed again in 1984," Nils Wilhjelm, chairman of the Federation of Danish Industries, goes on to say in his letter to Knud Christensen, chairman of the Danish Federation of Trade Unions.

"A total of 2.4 billion kroner of the increase in earnings of well over 3 billion kroner have been invested to increase activity, while the difference, approximately 0.6 billion kroner, for the most part, has been spent on improved consolidation of the position of the enterprises whose financial standing has been entirely inadequate.

Nils Wilhjelm tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that, as a result, one has to dissociate oneself entirely from the point of view that dividend payments would have increased sharply. "In 1984, shareholders, on the contrary, received the same amounts in kroner and øre by way of dividend as in 1983. Shareholders and the managers of enterprises have thus showed that they fully realize the need for the funds to remain and be employed within the enterprises," Nils Wilhjelm points out.

A new statement from the Department of Statistics reflects this development. Dividends measured in percentages of the result before taxes dropped within the industrial sector from 22 percent in 1983 to 19 percent in 1984. The consolidation--still expressed in percentages of the result before taxes--on the other hand, increased from 46 to 51 percent.

"The rate of employment within the industrial sector increased in 1984 by approximately 15,000, and I expect approximately the same rate of increase this year," says Nils Wilhjelm, with considerable support from the Department of Statistics. Nils Wilhjelm's estimate may even be a little

pessimistic. From April 1984 to April this year, the rate of employment in industry increased by as much as 25,200, according to the most recent statement from the Department of Statistics.

In his letter to the chairman of the Danish Federation of Trade Unions, the chairman of the Federation of Danish Industries stresses that Denmark anew differs from the development in the rest of Europe. "The fact is that the rate of employment in the rest of Europe was declining in 1984 and continues to decline. Danish industry is thus moving in the opposite direction. Strangely enough, not everybody in this country seems to be aware of this happy occurrence," Nils Wilhjelm writes.

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CSO: 3613/183

ENERGY

DENMARK

GOVERNMENT ASKING INCREASED FUNDS FOR ALTERNATIVE ENERGY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Aug 85 p 7

[Article by Kim Barren: "Some 49 Million Kroner for Alternative Energy"]

[Text] Minister of Energy Knud Enggaard has so far spent 49 million kroner on various alternative energy projects. A total of 61 million kroner was budgeted for 1985, but the minister has asked the Budget Committee for an additional appropriation of 26 million kroner.

So far, 278 funding requests have been granted for various alternative energy projects, while another 234 are presently being reviewed by the Ministry of Energy before deciding whether they too will qualify for funding.

This is according to Knud Enggaard's (Liberal Party) response to the parliamentary Energy Committee, which requested a list of the number of applicants, a description of the type of projects in question and the amount of money linked to various types of energy.

The 1985 budget contains a 61-million kroner appropriation earmarked for existing energy plants and individual energy-saving projects.

So far, the Ministry of Energy has issued grants totaling approximately 34 million kroner and an additional 5 million kroner for individual energy-saving projects. The ministry is further expected to provide funding in the amount of 10 million kroner for testing facilities, as well as the cost of administrative, informational and advisory services.

The greatest amount of interest has been in the area of windmills, where 167 grants have been issued, totaling 26.2 million kroner. Funding has also been granted to 83 solar heat projects, valued at 1.3 million kroner, and seven natural gas projects in the amount of 3.8 million kroner.

The Ministry of Energy has also approved funding for two heat-pump and water-power projects, as well as 10 experimental straw- and wood-fired plants.

As of 1 August 1985, the ministry had received funding requests from 73 existing energy plants, totaling approximately 37 million kroner, of which 35 million would be used for windmills alone.

The condition for meeting these requests is the Finance Committee's approval of the additional appropriation of 26 million kroner requested by Knud Enggaard. According to a provision in the government's budget agreement with the Radical Liberal Party, the funding limit for existing energy projects may be raised by 10 million kroner. The remaining 16 million represent monies budgeted for new energy technology. According to the minister's expectations, funding requests that cannot be met this year will be accommodated in 1986.

Dissatisfied

Soren Riishoj, energy policy spokesman for the Socialist People's Party and deputy chairman of the parliamentary Energy Committee, is dissatisfied with the minister's response.

"The additional appropriation requested by the minister is actually only half of what is needed. For the second year in a row, funds for existing energy projects have been running out long before the end of the fiscal year. This creates uncertainty among the applicants and means that the government's established goals for existing energy cannot at all be met," said Riishoj.

He hopes that "the green majority," the Radical Liberal Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Left-Socialist Party, can stand together and bring about a favorable, long-term arrangement with respect to existing energy.

"This is the least we can do after making certain that nuclear energy will no longer be part of our energy plans," said Riishoj.

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CSO: 3613/185

OCEAN/POLAR ISSUES

NETHERLANDS

DELEGATE ON LOS CONFERENCE, DEEPSEA MINING ISSUES

The Hague INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR in Dutch Jul 85 pp 425-434

[Article by Th.J.A.M. De Bruyn, staff member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and member of the Dutch delegation to the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: "The Netherlands and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea"]

[Text] December 9, 1984 marked the end of a short but extraordinarily significant phase in the history of the law of the sea [LOS]. It was the 2 year period during which the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was established on 30 April 1982 and was formally finalized in December of that same year, was open for signing.

In July 1982 the Reagan administration had definitively rejected the treaty, because of its insurmountable objections to the legal regime for the exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed included in the treaty. A few important European industrialized countries, among which the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, are temporarily withholding their decision on signing.

Because in order for the treaty to be effective, at least the deepsea mining regime, it is virtually indispensable for technological and financial reasons that these countries ultimately become a party to the treaty, every effort had to be made during the phase when the treaty was open for signing to pull these European countries in any case over the signature line. As a matter of fact, if those countries did not sign prior to the closing date, then it would be particularly doubtful whether they would commit themselves to the treaty at all, at least in the short or medium term. This would at the same time endanger ratification by the other industrialized countries which did sign the treaty, among which the Netherlands, which would put the future of the treaty up in the air.

The forum where they would try to convince the authorities in the European capitals still to make a positive decision was the Preparatory Commission for the International Seabed Authority (the so-called PREPCOM). The task of this commission, which was set up through one of the resolutions adopted with the treaty, is to further develop the regulations concerning the deepsea mining regime, and thus it offered par excellence a good opportunity to discuss the challenged treaty articles.

In spite of very energetic attempts especially on the part of the Dutch government to set in motion real negotiations between developing countries and industrialized countries, they did not succeed in persuading the most important European partners to sign. That means that a long and laborious period is now getting under way, during which the willingness of these European countries still to make something of the treaty will in all probability only decrease.

Therefore, in spite of the overwhelming number of signatures, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has a very uncertain future ahead. In a favorable scenario ratifications by primarily developing countries will slowly but surely reach the number of 60, which is required for the treaty to become effective, and afterwards most of the industrialized countries, with the exception of a few important deepsea mining countries, will gradually also become party to the treaty. In addition, if only for financial reasons, the mining regime will in all probability remain inoperative.

However, this development, which could take many years and in which the matter is in fact allowed to run its course, is not in the least certain. Therefore the question arises whether it would not be better to open up Chapter XI, which includes the mining regime, for renegotiation. The danger of this however is that, as has happened so far in the Preparatory Commission with initiatives from the Western industrialized countries, it will only run into dogmatic opposition from the developing countries. In that case the gap between those countries would only become wider.

Before going into this in more detail in the conclusions to this article, I will first provide a description of the making of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea during the 11th session of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1982) and the developments so far within the Preparatory Commission for the International Seabed Authority. In this respect, I will limit myself to Chapter XI, because it forms the bone of contention and because international talks concentrate largely on it.*

United States Rejection

The final session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea took place in Jamaica from 6 to 10 December 1982. With the opening for signature of the new United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea an end came to negotiations about a new and virtually all encompassing legal regime for the sea, for which the official starting signal was given during the opening session of the conference in Caracas in 1973. However, the establishment of the new treaty does not at all mean the beginning of an era of peace and security with regard to the customs of the sea. The fact alone that the United States

* The other parts of the Convention, such as the traditional law of the sea, EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zones], fishing, environmental aspects and scientific research, are naturally extremely important. Generally speaking there is agreement on the regulations on these topics in the Convention. Final acceptance of it, however, is blocked by objections related to Chapter XI.

has refused to sign the treaty implies that there is very little certainty that the new legal regime will be generally implemented.*

The American government's objections are directed exclusively against Chapter XI of the treaty, which includes the legal regime for exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed. This legal regime basically determines that an international organization, the Authority, will manage the deep seabed. The Authority can grant concessions for the mining of the ocean floor to private enterprises or state enterprises as well as to the Enterprise, which is under the control of the Authority (in cooperation with developing countries or not).

This so-called parallel system was a compromise proposed earlier by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to build a bridge between the position of the developing countries, who wanted mining to be handled completely by the Enterprise, and the position of the Western industrialized countries who wanted to give as much room as possible to private businesses. At the insistence of the developing countries a provision was included as part of this compromise, which provided that after about 20 years the parallel system should be judged on its merits and could be reviewed by way of a review conference. This conference would be able to amend the treaty by a two-thirds majority, and these amendments would apply to "all" parties following ratification by two-thirds of the member states.

In order to really make it possible for the Enterprise (or the interested developing countries) to participate in the mining of the ocean floor it was determined that whenever a state or private consortium requests a permit for a mining area, half of that area must be reserved for the Enterprise (the so-called "banking system"). Furthermore, in addition to a number of financial provisions, a provision was included concerning the transfer of technology: private enterprises would receive a permit from the Authority only if they are willing to transfer the technology used, whether it is their own or they use it under licence.

Finally, in addition to granting permits the power of the Authority manifests itself in its authority to regulate the production of minerals from the seabed and even to limit it during a certain initial period, in order to protect the economies of countries which produce such minerals on land.

American objections to this compromise in the draft treaty were officially made public for the first time after the inauguration of President Reagan, who announced a complete "policy review" concerning the American position on the law of the sea.** This meant not only that the compromise achieved on deep-sea mining was up in the air again, but also that the 10th session of the Conference would have to take place without actual participation by the United States. Consequently, the most important decisions made during this session were of a procedural nature. On the one hand, the status of the negotiating text was

* This does not automatically preclude the implementation of a number of parts of the Convention, based on the rules of customary law.

** Concerning the origins of the new position see A. Bos, "De VN-Zeerechtconferentie en de Verenigde Staten" [The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the United States], in *INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR*, July 1981, xxxv7.

officially raised to "draft treaty," which meant that negotiations on the treaty were to be considered complete. On the other hand, an extremely firm work agenda was developed to deal with still open questions at the 11th session of the conference, which would ultimately result in the adoption of the new treaty on 30 April 1982.

The questions which remained open involved the so-called problem of participation (participation in the treaty by non-states such as the EC, the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization], etcetera), the resolution concerning the Preparatory Commission for the Authority and an arrangement to protect investments already made in deepsea mining by some private and state consortia (also referred to as the PIP [Preparatory Investment Protection] resolution). There was implicit agreement that it should also be possible to bring up the American desiderata.

The decision concerning the work agenda was never taken seriously by most Western industrialized countries. It had already been said so often that the next conference session should be the last. However, they underestimated the determination of the developing countries to really complete the negotiations. Consequently, during the 11th session the agenda was followed step by step and the treaty was adopted on 30 April 1982 against the will of the United States.

As a matter of fact, the United States had gone to the 11th session with good intentions: meanwhile the policy review had been completed and its conclusions had been made known in a presidential statement. Reagan let it be known that he wanted to amend about 8 points in the draft treaty -- at least in Chapter XI --, but would negotiate this in good faith and, if the result was satisfactory he would present the treaty for ratification to the Senate. In summary, President Reagan's points included the following issues:

- improvement of decision making within the Authority;
- permanent seat for the United States on the Council (executive body of the Authority);
- no implementation of amendments by the review conference without ratification by the United States;
- scrapping of the possibility to limit the production of minerals;
- no positive discrimination by the Enterprise with regard to private businesses;
- no compulsory transfer of technology;
- no undue influence by the Authority on deepsea activities; and
- improvement of the financial provisions.

Negotiations on the above mentioned points never really got off the ground. A number of reasons can be given for this. The first reason was that the United States, in reply to a request by the developing countries to put the American wishes into concrete draft amendments, produced an impressive list of amendments, contained in the so-called "green book of amendments."

Even though it was clear that this was the maximal position of the United States, the negotiations were immediately blocked by the size of the "green book" alone. A compromise proposal by a group of 11 Western industrialized

countries, calling themselves "friends of the conference," turned out not to be an acceptable basis for discussions. Their proposal was based on the eight points in Reagan's statement but given that it met the United States' wishes adequately only in two areas, specifically a permanent seat for the United States on the Council and a more flexible regulation in terms of the transfer of technology, it was rejected by Washington.

The second reason was that the developing countries did not want to start negotiations on Chapter XI until discussions on a settlement concerning the protection of investments already made in deepsea mining (PIP) was completed. As a matter of fact, the developing countries felt that if this matter (one of the official open points) were to be solved to the satisfaction of the United States, Washington would drop its objections to Chapter XI. In other words: the developing countries saw the protection of these previous investments as the price they would have to pay for the treaty. As a matter of fact, a favorable settlement would have solved a large part of the Western problems given that the American, European and Japanese companies would then have had the assurance of being able to exploit the ocean floor for the next 20 years. However, the problem was that the PIP negotiations lasted much longer than expected. The reason for this, on the one hand, lay primarily in the delaying tactics used by the Soviet Union which, in addition managed to create a particularly favorable position for itself in the PIP settlement. Specifically, the Soviet Union was also given an assurance about the exploitation of a mining area, even though up to then there had been hardly any Russian investments in deepsea mining.

On the other hand, the firmness of the developing countries with regard to certain points was also a hindrance to rapid negotiations. This tenacity was often the result of the fact that, as in other United Nations forums, the developing countries presented themselves as a single bloc, united in the so-called Group of 77 [G-77].

The danger of this is that in many cases the group gathers behind the obstinate position of a very limited number of countries out of a sense of solidarity. In terms of a few important questions concerning PIP the position of the Group of 77 also was that of the lowest common denominator, which slowed down and complicated the negotiations tremendously.

All this led to the fact that when the PIP negotiations came to a satisfactory end, the work agenda was virtually completed. Consequently, in accordance with the procedural rules and the program it was decided on 28 April that "all efforts to reach agreement by consensus have been exhausted."

This decision, which the West mistakenly did not object to, made it possible for a decision on the treaty by vote to be forced. In the opinion of some, the hope that agreement might yet be achieved during the two remaining days or that the conference would be extended had not yet dissipated, but time was mercilessly ticking away, and when the United States let it be known early on the afternoon of 30 April that it could agree with the compromise proposal of the 11 "friends of the conference" as a basis for negotiations, this announcement came too late. Under pressure from the Group of 77, conference President

T.B. Koh had no alternative but to present the treaty to the plenary meeting for approval. It was adopted by 130 votes in favor, 4 against and 17 abstentions.*

To many people it was a major disappointment that this largest legislative enterprise in history had to end in this manner. Why the negotiations failed is not a simple matter to explain. Undoubtedly it was the result of a series of important and less important factors which, on the one hand, I would like to call historical and, on the other hand, diplomatic.

It seems to me that the most important historical reason is the treaty's draft text of Chapter XI, which by 1982 had become anachronistic to a certain degree, coupled with a radical change in the ideological background of American foreign policy. As a matter of fact, the compromise on parallel systems was formulated during a period in which ideas concerning the new international economic order (NIEO) were still rampant. This resulted in a number of rather radical provisions, such as the one which made the transfer of technology mandatory, even if it is not one's own. However by 1982, in part as a result of the economic crisis, the NIEO had lost a remarkable amount of influence and the willingness to adopt radical solutions had clearly declined. While in Europe they were still largely inclined to condone certain articles, the new American government, which raised free enterprise to the status of dogma, hardly wanted to compromise. The developing countries, on the other hand, were by that time still far from a more realistic adjustment of their demands and clung to the negotiation results achieved in the seventies.

There was also the fact that the American law of the sea policy was slowly but surely giving lower priority to the navigation provisions in the treaty. In Washington, on the one hand, the conviction prevailed more and more that free passage could also be guaranteed without a treaty. On the other hand, the influence of those who attach importance to a guaranteed supply of strategic raw materials increased. The developing countries neglected to make this analysis, and consequently their negotiators worked under the misunderstanding that, as had been the case in the seventies, the United States would eventually come around because of its interest in the navigation provisions.

This leads me to the diplomatic reasons for the failure of the conference, of which I will name a few.

1. The lack of clarity of the American position, specifically about what really was the bottom line, both the result of the complicated nature of American decision making (influence from the Pentagon, White House, State Department, division of industrial lobbyists into supporters and opponents of the treaty, etcetera).
2. The obstinate position of the Group of 77, who wanted to adopt a treaty at all cost on 30 April, and the absolute refusal by the African Group to meet the United States on the issue of the transfer of technology.

* Opposing votes from the United States, Israel, Venezuela and Turkey. The Eastern Bloc and a number of Western countries, among which the Netherlands, abstained.

3. The extremely effectively implemented delaying tactics of the Soviet Union.
4. The incomprehensible refusal by the interested European industrialized countries (the FRG, France, Italy, Belgium) and to a lesser extent Japan, to play a constructive role themselves, while on the contrary they put themselves fully in the hands of the United States.
5. The far too late acceptance by the United States of the compromise from the "friends of the conference" as a basis for negotiations.
6. Finally, two apparently less important, personal reasons which should not be underestimated: on the one hand, the perhaps somewhat too cautious position of conference President T.B. Koh (Singapore), who did not want to take any risks to endanger his position with regard to the Group of 77; on the other hand, the inability of American negotiator Leigh Ratiner, a private business lawyer -- who had previously been very active as an anti-treaty lobbyist -- to win the confidence of the Group of 77.

Netherlands Signs Treaty

Disappointment about the inability to adopt the treaty by consensus was also great within the Dutch delegation. Even though the Dutch government felt that the treaty was generally acceptable, in spite of a few objectionable aspects in Chapter XI, the Netherlands abstained in order to indicate that instead of proceeding with a vote the negotiations should have been continued. As a matter of fact, this abstention could also be seen as a reflection of the somewhat ambivalent position the Netherlands had taken with regard to the negotiations on the deepsea mining regime. On the one hand, in the tradition of a position in favor of the Third World, the Netherlands was a member of the group of "friends of the conference" who tried to build a bridge between the Group of 77 and the United States. But on the other hand, the Netherlands could not officially support the concrete proposals advocated by this group because they diverged too much from the interests of the Netherlands.

Following the conclusion of the treaty in April 1982, it was up to the new Lubbers administration in November of that year, to make a decision on signing. As was also the case in a number of other West European countries, opinions were divided. It was not so much a question of whether or not the deepsea mining regime was acceptable, but whether they would be able by signing the treaty to exercise more or less influence in order to make the treaty generally acceptable yet in PREPCOM, where the regime should be further elaborated. On the one hand it was argued that signing the treaty, as an expression of a "positive basic position" toward the treaty, would create a base of confidence with regard to the developing countries which is so very necessary for further negotiations. There was the added fact that signing alone would give the right to full membership in PREPCOM. On the other hand it was argued that withholding the signature could precisely be the crowbar to force adjustments of the treaty. This reasoning was advanced once again in November 1982 in the Hague by Don Rumsfeld, special envoy of President Reagan.

The Dutch government ultimately did decide in favor of signing in a well thought out compromise, but it noted specifically that, contrary to what is customary, the signing did not represent a firm resolution to implement. In

a detailed letter to the States General,* Minister Van den Broek explained that they will proceed with implementation only "if the effective working of the regime seems sufficiently ensured" and that a "decision on this subject will be made in view of the working out of the financial burdens and of the deepsea mining regime."

So far the assumption that signing would provide more influence than not signing, has been confirmed. As a matter of fact, it turned out that in PREPCOM the observer status of countries which did not sign is a very precarious one, whereas by signing the Netherlands especially was able to develop an active role, although it must be recognized that this has not led to concrete results as yet.

PREPCOM Sessions

The tremendously large number of signatures obtained during the closing session of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at Montego Bay resulted in the fact that the Preparatory Commission for the International Seabed Authority (PREPCOM) met for the first time already in March 1983. As a matter of fact, in accordance with Resolution I of the treaty, which also includes PREPCOM's mandate, PREPCOM had to meet within 60 to 90 days after 50 states had signed the treaty. Unlike other states which did not sign the treaty, such as the United Kingdom and the FRG, the United States waived its right to participate as an observer in the negotiations in Kingston and also failed to appear later on.

If some people thought that this quick meeting would also lead to quick results, they ended up disappointed. Before PREPCOM could start dealing with substantial matters, they first had to settle the organizational arrangements for the activities, including the election of a president for PREPCOM and a chairman for the various subcommittees.

The latter especially proved to be no sinecure. Due to various differences among the regional groups it took 4 weeks before Joseph Warioba, minister of justice of Tanzania, could be elected president. The organization of the activities was not a simple matter either because the various groups saw in it an opportunity to control certain activities of PREPCOM. The Netherlands also participated in this game. The result of another 4 weeks of tussling was not unfavorable for our country as the Netherlands (Mr H. Sondaal) was elected chairman of subcommittee No 3. This was not without significance, because it is precisely in this subcommittee that those legal regulations will have to be further worked out which are the reason why a number of Western countries cannot adopt the treaty. Hence there was the hope that by leading this subcommittee the Western industrialized nations would be in a good position to do something about the mining regime. In fact, after a total of five PREPCOM meetings progress in this area is virtually nil. This is not solely due to the fact that the careful steps taken in the direction of a mining regime

* See the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 14 March 1983, Second Chamber, 1982-1983 session, 17824 number 1.

acceptable to the West were received by the developing countries in the subcommittee with absolute dogmatic rejection, but especially due to the fact that PREPCOM's attention so far has not been centered on the work of the various subcommittees but on the implementation of Resolution II (PIP).

The PIP resolution, which had already played such an important role during the last conference meeting, involves the protection of deepsea mining investments already made by a number of private consortia and state enterprises, and especially the development of related technology. This protection is provided in Resolution II by giving the relevant enterprises (or states) the opportunity to receive the assurance right now that by the time the treaty is implemented they will be given a permit to exploit a mining area where they have directed their mining activities. To this effect, a state (the so-called certifying state, which must have signed the treaty*) will have to make an application to PREPCOM either for itself or in the name of a company. If PREPCOM approves the application, the state or company is registered as "pioneer investor" with priority rights to exploit a "pioneer mining area." Paragraph 5(a) of Resolution II however states that a state cannot make an application if it has not been determined that the requested mining area does not conflict with other applications (which means that the mining areas cannot overlap).

Rather quickly after the conclusion of the treaty and the resolution of April 1982, the Canadian government took the initiative for a meeting of all potential certifying states (among which the Netherlands) aimed at achieving a regulation to settle disputes in matters of overlapping applications. This initiative was not prompted solely by the idea that in principle a settlement among "all" countries involved would be the simplest solution to the obligation in Paragraph 5(a) of Resolution II, but also to take the wind out of the sails of the United States in its striving for a so-called mini-treaty, that is to say an alternative deepsea mining regime, different from Chapter XI of the treaty, a central element of which would also be the settlement of disputes relating to overlapping applications. The Canadian initiative was forcefully supported by the Netherlands, but the first meeting was immediately frustrated because the Soviet Union took the position that a settlement was premature. First the sheep had to be separated from the goats, that is to say that it first had to become clear in December 1983 who would sign the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and who would not.

The Soviet Union wanted to do business only with those who signed. With this position Moscow wanted to kill two birds with one stone: create dissension within the Western camp and put a white foot among the developing countries. Given that the USSR also maintained this position after the signing ceremony at Montego Bay, and given that the majority of the European countries involved

* Resolution II recognizes three categories of "certifying states": first of all four states on behalf of state enterprises (France, India, Japan and the USSR), secondly eight states on behalf of four private consortia (Belgium, Canada, the FRG, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States) and finally every developing country which meets certain criteria.

still agreed unanimously that "all" certifying states had to be involved in the solution of disputes, the discussions ended up absolutely deadlocked, and the Canadian initiative died a slow death.

This deadlock however meant that the PIP resolution could not be implemented by PREPCOM. As a matter of fact, Paragraph 5 stated that all overlapping applications first had to be resolved before the mining areas could be registered. The USSR thought up a trick which put tremendous pressure on the countries involved and on PREPCOM. The USSR told PREPCOM that Moscow was willing immediately to proceed with the other "certifying states," which signed the treaty and were ready to submit an application, with the exchange of geographic data on the mining areas in order to find out if and to what extent there was a question of overlapping applications. If the other states did not react (and that was highly probable if only because without all kinds of guarantees, those countries were not willing to give up their secret data to the USSR), then the Soviet Union would be the only one to have honored the resolution and then the Soviet application should be registered on the basis of the "first come, first served" principle.*

Meanwhile the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had taken the initiative of forming an interest group of a number of Western deepsea mining countries, including Japan. This so-called Group of Seven [G-7]** was intended not only to formulate common positions with regard to treaty rules still to be worked out, but at the same time to provide a balance against the Soviet Union, which threatened to fill the whole power vacuum created by the absence of the United States. The Group of Seven, of which the Netherlands became coordinator and spokesman, succeeded excellently in the first instance.

As far as implementation of Resolution II was concerned, however, the group was under strong pressure because of the Soviet position. This was because the members of G-7 embraced different political-legal positions with regard to Resolution II. On the one hand, there were France and Japan, both of which had signed the Convention and were thus in a position to submit mining area applications for their state consortia. On the other hand, there were countries which could not (or did not want to) submit applications either because they had not signed the treaty (FRG, United Kingdom, Italy and Belgium) or because, even though they had signed the treaty, they had no control over the consortia (the Netherlands).*** These countries nevertheless felt it necessary to

* Unlike Resolution II, where the first two categories of certifying states have equal status and thus have to resolve their conflicts, the principle which applies to the normal treaty system is that of first come, first served.

** Belgium, FRG, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

*** Canada, which is not one of the members of G-7, was in the same position as the Netherlands, as are Belgium and Italy today, now that they have signed the Convention. Legally they can act as certifying states. But the consortia, which enterprises in these countries are members of, are controlled by American enterprises, and the latter oppose the submission of applications because that way they would be recognizing the treaty regime.

participate in the settling of conflicts. If they did not, then a mining area could be registered on behalf of the USSR, for example, which these countries really had more right to. In that case, not only could international tension increase but in addition any future incentive to get these countries to make a definitive decision on adoption of the treaty regime would be removed.

Consequently, France and Japan were considerably embarrassed by the Soviet position. They were afraid that to hang onto the position of the other members of G-7 would result in PREPCOM eventually confirming the Soviet view. This was not unlikely, because most of the developing countries had little sympathy for the countries which had not signed the treaty. All this would indeed mean that the USSR would be the first one to be registered and that France and Japan, both of which had in fact made much greater investments, might well get saddled with second rate mining areas. Besides, for both countries it was a question either of solidarity with the other Western countries or of guaranteeing registration of their own mining area, that is to say to make a deal with the Soviet Union. The pressure during the resumed session of PREPCOM (Geneva, August-September 1984) became so great that France and Japan indeed made an agreement with the Soviet Union and India.*

This government provided that these countries would give one another data on the mining areas by a certain date** and that possible conflicts would be resolved before 4 March 1985. Next the mining areas would have to be registered by PREPCOM. Other states were given until 9 December 1984 to sign the treaty and to join the agreement. The developing countries reacted favorably to the agreement that was reached, because in principle it meant a breaking of the deadlock in which PREPCOM had landed. They felt, not completely mistakenly, that if countries like the FRG and the United Kingdom were so eager to participate in the settlement of conflicts, they could very well sign the treaty before 9 December 1984.

However, all of this encountered quite a bit of opposition from the other members of G-7 and Canada, because to them the agreement was a "take it or leave it" proposition. They considered that unacceptable not only because of considerations of principle but also of content. As a matter of fact, under strong pressure from the USSR the compulsory arbitration in case of an impasse provided for by Resolution II (a very important provision in the resolution) had been thrown overboard. Moreover, inherent in the registration of mining areas, especially those of the Soviet Union, was the previously mentioned basic danger that it might conflict with other areas, as a result of which PREPCOM would be putting up an extra blockade against adherence to the treaty by other European countries in a later phase. Consequently, the Netherlands pointed out that danger, which was partly the reason why France left G-7.

* India did participate as a certifying state in the first category, but was of little importance because it had been determined that the Indian mining area would not conflict with the other mining areas because, unlike the others which were all located in the Clarion-Clipperton zone, it is located in the Indian Ocean.

** Prior to the exchange of data, a confidentiality agreement would first have to be concluded.

However, there was another reason for this French maneuver besides opposing interests within G-7 concerning Resolution II. The other reason was the extraordinarily strong reaction of G-77 and the Soviet Union to the establishment of the so-called Provisional Agreement on deepsea mining matters. Alas, I cannot deal in depth with this Agreement within the framework of this article, but a few words are nevertheless in order. The Agreement, which was developed after the failure of the Canadian initiative, involves the sanctioning by the governments of the United States and of members of G-7 of agreements among consortia on the settlement of conflicts concerning overlapping claims.

Even though it involves only the settlement of disputes, the Provisional Agreement, because of its strong historical ties with American concerns to achieve an alternative "mini-treaty," was interpreted by the developing countries as an attack on the treaty and the resolutions.

These strong reactions from G-77 and the Soviet Union, which skilfully took advantage of all this, led France, which traditionally wanted to take a position independent of the West anyhow, to break its ties with G-7 and to stress its independence. Japan was better able to combine its diverging interests and continued to be a member of G-7, partly because Tokyo was less inclined to turn PREPCOM into a political body than Paris was and did not lose sight of the fact that cooperation within the framework of G-7 was indispensable if any results were to be achieved in the development of the deepsea mining regime.

Consequently, the Soviet Union not only saw an opportunity to break the joint position of G-7, but even to loosen one of its members definitively.

Following the session of PREPCOM during which the above described developments took place, there were 3 months left until the closing date for signing of the treaty. The Netherlands made a strong appeal to the United Kingdom and the FRG in particular to proceed with the signing. Could not London and Bonn do like the Hague and state that in this case signing did not imply a firm intention to implement? The highly desired signatures would not only facilitate the solution of the PIP problem, they would also strengthen the Group of Seven -- which had become six in the meantime -- because a signature would be seen by the developing countries as a sign of willingness to negotiate. It was in vain. Neither Margaret Thatcher nor Helmut Kohl wanted to give the impression that they would accept the deepsea mining regime.

Meanwhile, France, Japan and the USSR were busily trying to settle their disputes, but that proved to be more difficult than expected. Not only were the conflicts not settled by the beginning of the spring session (March-April 1985) of PREPCOM, but during the session itself the differences of opinion were so great that no solution could be found. According to France and the Soviet Union, whose applications overlapped most, it is not possible to achieve a settlement of the conflicts such that both countries, once they have reserved half of their areas on behalf of the Enterprise in accordance with the banking system, can retain a commercially profitable mining area for themselves. Hence it can be expected that they will propose the joint reservation of a single area for the Enterprise. Without offering any judgement on whether this is a practical necessity, it would represent a complete erosion of the most basic aspects of Chapter XI, this time not undertaken by the United States. Thus

the implementation of Resolution II remains an encumbrance for PREPCOM, and it hinders a very necessary concentration on the work primarily of subcommittee 3, where, in the opinion of most industrialized countries, they need to strive for an acceptable deepsea mining regime.

Conclusions

Hence, one of the conclusions to be drawn from the history of the law of the sea over the last 4 years is that Resolution II, which incidentally was meant to push the Western industrialized countries into joining the treaty, was one of the reasons for the failure of the conference and later on the reason for lack of progress in PREPCOM. The resolution even gave the Soviet Union the opportunity to drive a wedge in the cooperation among European deepsea mining countries and Japan in their striving for an acceptable law of the sea regime.

This situation seems nearly surrealistic when you realize that because of the economic crisis Resolution II had actually already been overtaken during the period it was being negotiated. As a matter of fact, the resolution had to ensure that investments would maintain their level and that exploitation of the ocean floor would be started as soon as the treaty became effective. However, investments by virtually all consortia have been reduced to a minimum because of the sharp drop in the prices of raw materials, and experts do not expect any exploitation of manganese nodules before the beginning of the next century.*

Because Resolution II missed its mark, the implementation of this resolution by PREPCOM has taken on more the character of a division of part of the seabed among a limited number of countries, who thus acquire a favorable starting position for the distant future.

Seen in this light it would have been better to put the PIP resolution on ice until both the political and the economic situation would provide a reason to take the instrument out again. There was sympathy in some corners of the PREPCOM lobbies for the idea of a moratorium on Resolution II, but there was not enough political courage to put such a proposal on the table.

A second conclusion which can be drawn from the outlined developments regarding the law of the sea is that the dominating role in the international dialogue played by the United States until the middle of 1982, was taken over by the Soviet Union which became embroiled in a power struggle with the Group of Seven. This indicates at the same time that the attitude of our country, which coordinated this group, has gradually evolved.

* There is no risk in predicting that, as soon as their mining areas have been registered, the USSR and France will be the first to ask PREPCOM to be relieved from all financial obligations and from obligations related to the transfer of knowledge, which Resolution II requires of the certifying states.

During the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea the Netherlands took a position which can generally be described as that of a "bridge builder" between North and South, even though this role was not played fully because during the last session of the conference our country was a member of the "friends of the conference" but did not subscribe to the compromise proposals submitted by that group.

Following the advent of Minister Van den Broek, the Dutch policy became clearly more businesslike. This increased businesslike approach was dictated by national and international considerations. Nationally, the government wanted to project itself more emphatically as an interested party in the area of deepsea mining, which excluded its position as arbitrator between industrialized countries and developing countries. From an international standpoint it became obvious that if the United States, the FRG and the United Kingdom were not to be definitively alienated from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it was necessary for PREPCOM to initiate serious negotiations with the developing countries in order still to achieve a generally acceptable deepsea mining regime. Hence it was logical for the government to decide to sign the treaty in order to play an active role in PREPCOM. An active role, that is, as a deepsea mining country because, before bridges could be built, one of the banks had to be thoroughly repaired.

In short, it could be argued that the basic goal of Dutch policy still is to achieve a generally acceptable law of the sea regime, but that the means to achieve that goal have gradually been changed.

The third conclusion I would finally like to draw is that the past sessions of PREPCOM have demonstrated that, due primarily to the Soviet Union but also to a number of African countries, PREPCOM has become a political body on which the businesslike approach of the Group of Seven, which was originally well received by the other Western countries but also by many Latin American and Asian countries, has temporarily run aground. This situation, coupled with the refusal by the FRG and the United Kingdom to sign the treaty (which the situation, as a matter of fact, is also partly responsible for), implies in my opinion that one should not have any great expectations for PREPCOM in the near future. As a result, the future of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea also remains uncertain, and one might wonder whether it would not be better under those circumstances to open up Chapter XI for renegotiations. I am naturally aware that this could be a risky initiative, that for the time being the distrust between North and South can only increase* and that in addition it could cause the other chapters to be up in the air again. Hence it is really important not only that a suitable time be chosen, but also that the arrangements be carefully determined.

As far as the time is concerned it is important, among other things, that the United States be receptive to such an initiative. Whether Washington is currently in the process of rethinking its position is doubtful, especially in a time when the whole United Nations system is subject to American criticism.

* As a matter of fact, the legal treaty problems of renegotiation are not slight, but they are solvable.

Some people will expect salvation only from a new government. Next, as far as the arrangements are concerned, because such an initiative within the framework of PREPCOM would encounter a great deal of indignation and for this reason alone would be rejected offhand by many as unattainable, it is necessary that agreement be reached first of all among a number of leading countries from G-77 as well as from the Eastern Bloc and the West. As far as the developing countries are concerned, this seems to be the only way to break through the uniformly dogmatic attitude of G-77, which is often determined by countries which have little or no interest in the law of the sea and are governed by political motives.

Obviously, it does not work to damage the real interests of the developing countries, and hence it is also important for a renegotiation to have well defined points of departure. The most fundamental of these could be that neither the principle of the common heritage of mankind be attacked nor that of the parallel system.

Moreover, the provisions eligible for renegotiation will have to be carefully determined and be limited to a minimum, but specifically that minimum which constitutes a stumbling block for the industrialized countries. That minimum should in any case include Article 154 (Review Conference)* and Article 5 of Annex III to the Convention (compulsory transfer of technology).**

I can hear it already: many people will consider me a representative of what Shridath Ramphal recently referred to in the NRC HANDELSBLAD*** as "a school of new economic gurus who are manifestly anti-Third World." Because renegotiations indeed involve income cuts only for the Third World and a return of everything that has been achieved under the NIEO, I would like strongly to contradict such criticism,**** and for the sake of convenience I will simply leave out of consideration that in a certain sense the United Nations

* Article 154 is not only contrary to the sovereignty of the parties to the treaty, but is also completely in conflict with the principle of consensus on which the Law of the Sea negotiations are based. Given that, in addition, it can hardly be labeled as a fundamental part of the common heritage, giving it up does not cost the developing countries a cent.

** The compulsory transfer of technology, especially of technology which is not owned by the user, is completely unrealistic and serves no interest at all, certainly not in this context.

*** Shridat Ramphal, "Wat heeft 10 jaar praten over een NIEO opgeleverd?" [What Have 10 Years of Talking About an NIEO Produced?], in the NRC HANDELSBLAD, 18 March 1985, page 6.

**** As a matter of fact, one should have few illusions about a concrete value of the treaty for the NIEO: the EEZ (also a demand by many developing countries) in particular has already swallowed up the largest part of what could have become the common heritage.

Convention on the Law of the Sea is the result of extortion. But whatever the case may be, on the one hand what is involved is only that the sharp, mostly unnecessary aspects of the regime are to be filed off, while on the other hand the reality must be faced that for technological and financial reasons, the deepsea mining regime cannot function without participation by the United States and the most important West European deepsea mining countries. Consequently, renegotiation* will have to lead -- and this is where its importance lies for many developing countries -- to general acceptability of the Convention and thus to a concrete form for Chapter XI. If the Group of 77 does not want to face this reality, then the Seabed Authority is doomed to become nothing more than a nice facade along the Kingston harbor.

* At the time this article was being written, an article by a French LOS delegation member was published in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE of April 1985, in which among other things the author pleads for the convening of a meeting of all the countries which signed the Final Act of the Conference on the Law of the Sea (that is to say also the United States). This conference would decide on a moratorium on Chapter XI, which could then be reviewed at a later date, in order to make it possible for all countries to adhere to the treaty.

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